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Abstract
This thesis brings together three independent empirical essays which focus on the
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration and the determinants of
migrant flows from developing countries to developed countries. The first essay looks
at what happens to migrant flows from poor countries as they experience economic
development. It examines the relationship between economic development in poor
migrant-sending countries and migrant flows from those countries to developed
countries, using the UK as a case study. The analysis in this essay relies on UK
immigration data from 1973-2005 for 48 developing countries in Africa, Asia and
Central and South America. The conclusion from this essay is that there is an inverse
If-shape relationship between economic development and the migrant flows from
developing countries to the UK, though this relationship is sensitive to aggregation
of countries
The second essay undertakes a comparative empirical analysis of the relative impor-
tance of the impact of economic and cultural concerns on individual attitudes towards
immigration. Using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey the
study shows that there is no robust evidence to support the widely held view that
economic concerns are more important than cultural concerns in shaping individual
attitudes towards immigration.
In the third essay a series of analyses are undertaken: first, to examine the extent to
which attitudes towards immigration are determined by individual concerns about
how immigration affects the welfare state; and second, to evaluate the individual
characteristics that shape their subjective views regarding the effects of immigrants
on the welfare state.
With evidence based on the European Social Survey, the study finds that welfare
state concerns are positive and robust determinants of individual attitudes towards
predominantly unskilled immigration. It also finds that, older retired individuals
are more likely than young or middle-aged individuals to have pessimistic views
regarding the effects of immigrants on the welfare state. Hence they are also more
likely to oppose immigration. By contrast, skilled individuals are more likely to
have optimistic views and hence more likely to have pro-immigration attitudes than
unskilled individuals.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Context and Background
International migration, the permanent or semi-permanent relocation of people
across countries or international administrative territories, is currently one of the
main global phenomena (along with trade, FOI, global finance and environmental
issues) that receive substantial policy attention both nationally and internationally.
However, unlike other aspects of globalisation, the policies that govern international
migration are largely under the control of the migrant-receiving countries (Hanson,
2010). Observed migrant flows are, thus, an equilibrium outcome resulting from a
combination of demand and supply factors. On the supply side, flows are a function of
migrants' decision to move, driven by economic and non-economic incentives. On the
demand side, flows are shaped by destination countries' immigration policies (Borjas,
1999; Facchini 2008; Mayda, 2006; Harris, 1970).
Immigration control is an issue that is ubiquitous in public policy discussions
and election campaigns throughout Europe. In Western Europe and in the US,
immigration from developing countries is increasingly perceived as a problem in need
of control and hence immigration policy issues are often high on the agenda for the
governments of these countries. The question is, why?
In 2005, the number of international migrants in the world reached almost 191 million,
up from 155 million in 1990 (UNDEsA, 2006). This is a small number compared with
the 6.7 billion inhabitants of the world, but it is often not a trivial number compared
with either the populations of the migrant source or destination country. For instance,
Zlotnik (1999) estimates that one in every 13 persons living in Western Europe, North
America, Australia and New Zealand is an international migrant. Lowell (2007)
also points out that, not only has the migration from less developed countries to
developed countries increased considerably in the past three decades, but also the
bulk of the current global migrant stocks are increasingly being concentrated in only
a few countries.
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International migration raises high hopes and deep fears because it has significant
impacts (both positive and negative) on the lives (socially, politically, and economi-
cally) of billions of people. These people include the migrants themselves, the billions
they leave behind in their countries of origin and the billions they settle with in the
destination countries. The distributional impacts of international migration often have
political consequences, which give politicians an incentive to manage the levels of
restrictiveness in immigration policies. For example, various individuals or groups
of individuals within the migrant-receiving country may have some preferences for
some form, type, quality or quantity of immigrants depending on the perceived dis-
tributional impacts of those immigrants. The threats of international terrorism as well
as the threats to social cohesion and cultural coherence, also contribute in making
immigration policy a key issue in all regions of the world.
Individual attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are key inputs to any
complete model of immigration policymaking. To understand both the policies
implemented as well as the accompanying political conflict and public debates, there
is a need to know who is in favour or against immigration policies and, more
importantly, why? Facchini and Mayda (2009) outline a useful conceptual scheme,
based on Rodrik (1995), for analysing the migration policy formation process. The
basic idea is that the formulation of migration policies involves at least four elements.
First, the policy making necessarily needs to take into account voters' individual
preferences and how these preferences are shaped by immigration. Both economic
and non-economic factors are found to play a role in shaping public opinion or
attitudes towards immigration. The second step is to map these preferences into a
policy demand. Various channels have been suggested in the economic literature,
ranging from pressure groups to grass-root movements (Benhabib, 1996; Hatton and
Williamson, 2005; Ortega, 2005). The third step is to identify the policy maker's
preferences and the final step is to understand the details of the institutional setting in
which the policies are introduced.
1.2 Aims, Objectives and Structure of Thesis
From the migrant destination country's point of view, immigration policies are often
thought of as border policies that dictate how many people and who can enter and
live in the country. However, one may also think of policies that seek to reduce
the migration pressure by addressing the root causes of emigration in the source
countries as forms of implicit immigration policies. Focusing on these two notions
of immigration policy this thesis has two main aims within the context of immigration
policies and immigration policy formulation.
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Firstly, the thesis seeks to contribute further evidence to the economic literature on
the determinants of international migration from developing countries to developed
countries. With evidence on the relationship between emigration from developing
countries and the evolution of economic development, the thesis aims to provide a
better understanding of current and future migrant flows as well as the related foreign
policies aimed at managing these flows. Secondly, the thesis seeks to contribute
new and more systematic evidence to the economic literature on determinants of
individual attitudes towards immigration. In so doing, it aims to throw more light on
cultural and welfare state factors that shape individual attitudes towards immigration
and thereby provide a better understanding of the immigration policy making process
in general.
The thesis starts with an essay that focuses on analysing migrant flows from deve-
loping countries to the UK with the objective of assessing the relationship between
the evolution of economic development in poor countries and the emigration from
those countries to the UK. This is subsequently followed by two essays that focus on
empirically analysing the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration
in Europe, using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008/09).
The data includes a mixture of developed and developing countries as well as a col-
lection of both important migrant destination countries (in Western Europe) and less
important migrant destination countries in Eastern Europe.
1.2.1 Determinants of International Migration
People generally migrate in order to seek better lives and opportunities. The
drive or motive to migrate is therefore born, largely, by economic conditions in
the migrant sending country. As Ravenstein (1889) pointed out over a century
ago, 'bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation and unattractive climate, uncongenial
social surrounds and even compulsionEall have produced and are still producing
currents of migration, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that
which arises from the desire inherent in most men to "better" themselves in material
respects'. However, the literature also shows that, the actual migration event is an
individual/household investment decision. Hence, taking all relevant variables into
consideration, the individual living in a poor country will migrate as long as the
expected wage (given their skill level) in the destination country minus the cost of
migration is greater than the expected wage in their home country (Bhagwati and
Srinivasan, 1974;Harris and Todaro, 1970; Sajaastad, 1962;Stark, 1984; 1991;Stark and
Bloom 1985; Todaro, 1976).
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The study in chapter two undertakes to investigate what happens to migrant flows
when economic conditions in poor migrant-sending countries begin to improve. Does
migration decrease? The study is motivated by recent proposals (10M and VNCTAD,
1996) for migrant-receiving developed countries to promote development through
trade and aid in poor migrant-sending countries as way of addressing the root
cause of migration and hence reducing migrant inflows from those countries. The
assumption, inherent in these proposals is that there is a simple linear relationship
between economic development and migrant flows. The chapter, however, argues
that contrary this assumption, economic theory suggests a more complex, non-linear
relationship between the two, where more development can lead to more migration,
at least in the short to medium term.
The chapter focuses on the VK as the migrant destination country and uses migrant
inflow data collected from the UK Home Office's Control of Immigration Statistics
published in a series of 'command papers' for the VK parliament. The chapter em-
ploys panel data methods (on an unbalanced panel data of 48 developing countries in
Africa, Asia and South and Central America covering 1973-2005) to test the hypothesis
that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between economic development and
migrant flows from developing countries to the UK.
1.2.2 Determinants of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration
In every country of the world, there are, on the one hand, those who are keen to
host more migrants, who need them desperately to fill vacant positions or to find
someone who can pay for their pensions etc, and on the other hand, those who fear
that migrants will ultimately steal their jobs, increase the crime rate, abuse the state
transfers paid out of their pockets, etc. The literature on the determinants of individual
attitudes towards immigration highlights rational (economic) self-interest, cultural
conservatism (threat) and racism (xenophobia) as the main forces that drive individual
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. The strength of these forces may be
influenced by individual characteristics or personal attributes (age, education, gender
etc) as well as environmental, societal and country specific characteristics. These
may include factors such as historical relationships, location, population, per capita
income, economic growth, and the existing immigration experience in the country
(Chiswick and Hatton, 2003; Dustmann and Prestion, 2001; 2004; 2007; Mayda, 2006;
O'Rouke and Sinnott, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).
The second essay in this thesis, presented in chapter three, provides a comparison
of cultural considerations and economic concerns in the observed attitudes towards
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immigration. The chapter investigates the question: are economic concerns more
important than cultural motivations in shaping individual attitudes towards immi-
gration? The analysis controls for ethnicity and racial sentiments and the origin of the
potential immigrants in addition to individual and country characteristics in a series
of trivariate probit estimations.
Chapter four presents the final essay which focuses only on the economic determi-
nants of individual attitudes towards immigration. It specifically looks at the role
of welfare state considerations in shaping individual attitudes towards immigration.
The chapter examines the extent to which individual attitudes are influenced by the
recognition of the potential role of immigrants in addressing (at least temporarily) the
sustainability issues of welfare state systems in Europe. In this context, the chapter
first examines the extent to which individual immigration opinions are determined
by their concerns about the effect of immigrants on the welfare state, where the po-
tential immigrants are perceived as predominantly less skilled. Secondly, the chapter
empirically evaluates the individual characteristics that drive their subjective views
regarding the effect of immigrants on the welfare state and consequently their atti-
tudes towards immigration. To this end, the chapter provides evidence to support
theoretically justifiable predictions of how individual age and skill levels influence
their welfare state concerns and attitudes towards immigration. The chapter employs
a simultaneous bivariate ordered probit model, that allows the joint dependence of in-
dividual attitudes towards immigration and the endogenously determined 'subjective
welfare state concerns' on individual characteristics and other control variables.
1.3 Migration in Europe
1.3.1 Short History
During the 19th Century and early 20th century Europe experienced mass out
migration to the Americas, Africa and Asia. According to Russel King (1993) about
55-60 million people moved during 1820-1940 from Europe of whom 38 million went
to the United States. After the Second World War, Europe became one of the main
migrant receiving regions of the world. The story of migration up to the early 19705 is
one of economic shortages interacting with pre-war colonial migration and citizenship
laws in the UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, and with post-war gust worker
policies in Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Demark
and Sweden.
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The number of people displaced by the Second World War was estimated at around
20 million, among them around 12million Germans who had to leave Eastern Europe.
Around 8 million of them migrated to Western Germany together with another 2.6
million East Germans who moved there before the establishment of the Berlin Wall
in 1961 (Zimmermann, 1995). By 1950s, Germany and the rest of continental Europe
had a level of demand for labour that could no longer be satisfied domestically. In
a pattern common to most continental European countries, Germany looked first
to Southern Europe, later to Turkey and finally to North Africa. The German
Government negotiated guest-worker schemes with Italy (1955) Greece and Spain
(1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia
(1968). Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France
adopted variants of these guest-worker schemes (Hansen. 2003).
The UK also briefly tried its own version of the guest-worker schemes bringing
in workers from Eastern Europe. However, these guest-worker schemes were
mostly used by countries without a colonial history. For those countries without
a colonial history, these bilateral guest-worker agreements were the only source of
migrant labour. Europe's former colonial powers - the UK, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands - were, by contrast, able to draw on a vast supply of unskilled workers.
The UK saw an increase in the immigrants from the New Commonwealth after the
Second World War beginning with the Caribbean countries and, later the Indian
subcontinent. Nevertheless, the UK was pre-dominantly a country of emigration
until the 1970s. France looked to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. In contrast with the
tightly regulated system in Germany, Switzerland and Austria, the common practice
in France was for companies to hire colonial migrants directly and to regularise their
status later through the National office of Immigration (ONI) (Hansen. 2003).
All the major migrant receiving countries ended primary migration in the early
1970s. The UK acted first in 1971 followed by France and Germany in 1972 and
1973 respectively. The other countries did the same by the end of the 1970s. The
first oil-price shock in 1973 also contributed to ending the recruitment of foreign
labour in Europe. Most of the Colonial migrants as well as some of the guest-workers
remained and became citizens, and as such claimed a right to family reunification.
Thus, immigration to the European countries did not halt with the ending of active
recruitment of foreign labour in Europe; rather, the main channels of immigration
became family reunification and humanitarian immigration.
The collapse of the former centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe (including
the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989) created a new source for migration within
Europe, mostly to Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France. Political reforms and
the 1985 Schengen Agreement enabled further migration with Europe. As a result of
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the Schengen Agreement, citizens of European Union member states and their families
have the right to live and work anywhere within the EU because of EU citizenship but
citizens of non-EU or non-EEA states do not have those rights unless they possess the
EU Long Term Residence Permit or are family members of EU citizens.
Since the mid 1980s through to the early 1990s the main migrant receiving countries in
Europe implemented several immigration and boarder policies aimed at preventing
the clandestine inflows of immigrants especially from outside Europe. According to
the United Nations' World Economic and Social Survey 2004, in 1996, the proportion
of Governments having the goal of reducing the inflows of migrants peaked at 40
percent. Since then, the proportion of Governments reporting that they wish to reduce
migrant inflows has fallen almost by half; and over the past decade, the Governments
of many receiving countries have been actively adopting or amending laws and
policies so as to facilitate the inflow of the types of migrants they need, especially
skilled migrants.
1.3.2 Current Picture
According to the World Bank's Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Europe is
now home to a about 27.3 million immigrants. This is about 12.7 percent of the World's
215.8 million immigrants. However, it is about 6.8 percent of the total European
population. Of these immigrants, 0.8 percent are refugees compared to 7.6 percent
for the world. The UN International Migration Report 2006 points out that in 2005
the governments of only six European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Romania) wished to reduce immigration.
Table 1.1 shows that Switzerland has the highest population of immigrants (23.2
percent) as percentage of the total population. In turns out that the Swiss are also
generally more open to having migrants than all the other countries in our sample (this
is show in Chapter 3). However, most of Switzerland's immigrant population come
from other European countries and are from similar race and ethnic backgrounds. The
top five source countries of Switzerland's immigrants are Italy, Germany, Portugal,
France and Spain. Sweden is quite similar to Switzerland as it has a large number of
immigrants (1.3 million) within a population that is highly pro-immigration compared
to other European countries. Thought most of the Swedish migrants come from
Europe a large number also come from Iraq, Iran and Chile.
The other European countries that are normally classified as large immigration coun-
tries with large numbers of foreign population include: Belgium, France, Germany,
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Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the UK. Germany has over 10million mi-
grants (13.1 percent of population) most of whom come from Turkey, Italy, Poland,
Greece, Croatia, the Russian Federation and Austria. The German government finally
acknowledged Germany as a major migrant receiving country in 2005 when it im-
plemented new immigration laws and a clear immigration policy aimed at admitting
more skilled individual and preventing unskilled immigrants.
In 2010, France had about 6.7 million migrant while Spain and the UK both had
over 6.9million resident migrants. These were about 10.7 percent, 15.2 percent and
11.2 percent of their respective populations. Unlike, Switzerland, Sweden and Ger-
many, these three countries have significant non-European migrant populations. For
example most of the migrants in France tend to come from Algeria and Morocco. Im-
migrants living in Spain are typically from Morocco, Ecuador, Colombia, Argentina,
Bolivia and Peru while immigrants in the UK mostly come from India, Pakistan, South
Africa, Bangladesh, the US, Jamaica and Kenya.
The number of immigrant in the Netherlands was above 1.7 million in 2010 and
about 1.5 million in Belgium corresponding to 10.5 and 13.7 percent of the respective
populations in these countries. The immigrants in the Netherlands tend to come from
Turkey, Suriname, Morocco, Indonesia, Germany, Belgium, UK, Poland and China
while the foreign population in Belgium tend to come from France, Morocco, Italy, the
Netherlands, Turkey, Germany, the Democratic republic of Congo, Poland, Spain and
the Russian Federation.
Croatia (15.9 percent), Cyprus (17.5 percent) and Latvia also have very large propor-
tions of their populations being immigrants thought the actual number are relatively
small compared to other countries. The main migrant sending countries in the case
of Cyprus are the UK, Greece, Georgia, the Russian Federation and Sri Lanka while
most of the immigrants in Croatia come from neighbouring countries, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Rep of Macedonia. Immigrants in
Latvia typically come from neighbouring countries, the Russian Federation, Lithuania,
Belarus and Estonia as well as some Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
and Azerbaijan).
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Table 1.1: MiS!:ant Stocks in Selected Euro~an Countries
County /Region Stock Asa Refugees as
of percentage a percentage Top sources of immigrants
migrants of Pop of
(Million) immi~ants
World 215.8 3.2 7.6
Europe 27.3 6.8 0.8
Belgium 1.4657 13.7 1.2 France Morocco, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Ger-
many, DR Congo, Poland, Spain, Russian Fede-
ration
Bulgaria 0.1072 1.4 4.4 Turkey
Croatia 0.6999 15.9 0.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, the Former
Yugoslav Rep of Macedonia, Germany
Cyprus 0.1543 17.5 0.7 UK, Greece, Georgia, Russian Federation, Sri
Lanka, Philippines, Bulgaria, Romania, Egypt
South Africa
Czech Republic 0.453 4.4 0.4 Slovak Rep, Ukraine, Poland, Vietnam, the Rus-
sian Federation, Romania, Germany, Austria
Denmark 0.4837 8.8 7.7 Turkey, Germany, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Poland, Norway, Sweden, Lebanon, Iran, UK
Estonia 0.1825 13.6 0 Russian Federation, Ukraine Belarus, Latvia Li-
thuania, Finland
Finland 0.2256 4.2 3.8 Sweden, Estonia, Russian Federation, Somalia,
Germany, China, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, UK
France 6.6848 10.7 2.2 Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Tunisia,
Turkey, UK Germany, Belgium
Germany 10.7581 13.1 5.5 Turkey, Italy, Poland, Greece, Croatia, Russian
Federation, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Greece 1.1328 10.1 0.2 Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Russian
Federation, Poland, Ukraine, Pakistan, Cyprus,
UK
Hungary 0.3681 3.7 2 Romania, Germany, Austria, China, Ukraine,
US, UK, Poland, France
Latvia 0.335 15 0 Russian Federation, Ukraine Uzbekistan, Bela-
rus, Kazakhstan, lithuania, Azerbaijan, Geor-
gia, Estonia
Netherlands 1.7529 10.5 5.3 Turkey, Suriname, Morocco, Indonesia, Ger-
many, Belgium, UK, Poland, China
Norway 0.4854 10 7.4 Sweden, Denmark, US, Iraq, Pakistan, UK. Ger-
Poland 0.8275 2.2
many, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam, Iran
Ukraine, Belarus, Germany, Lithuania, Russian
Portugal
Federation, US, Czech Rep., Austria
0.9186 8.6 0 Angola, France, Mozambique, Brazil, Cape
Verde, Germany, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau,
Romania 0.1328 0.6 1.3 Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russian Federa-
tion, Syria, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Ger-
many
Uzbekistan,Russian Federation 12.27 8.7 0 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Mol-
dova
Slovenia 0.1639 8.1 0.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia, Ukraine, Rus-
sian Federation, Italy, Austria, Romania, France
Spain 6.9005 15.2 0.1 Romania, Morocco, Ecuador, UK Colombia, Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Germany, France, Peru
Sweden 1.306 14.1 5.7 Finland, Iraq, Poland, Iran, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Turkey,
Chile
Switzerland 1.7628 23.2 2.7 Italy, Germany, Portugal, France, Spain, Turkey,
Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, UK
Turkey 1.4109 1.9 0.3 Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands,
Romania, Russian Federation, UK, Azerbaijan
UK 6.9557 11.2 4.3 India, Poland, Pakistan, Ireland, Germany,
South Africa, Ban8ladesh, US, Jamaica, Kenya
Source: Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011
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CHAPTER2
Economic Development and
Migrant Inflows
2.1 Introduction
Over the last haif-century, international migration has grown considerably and taken
forms which were not anticipated by governments and planners (Castles, 2000). In
the past three decades, there has been a considerable and persistent growth in the
number of people migrating from less developed countries to developed countries,
but also the bulk of the global migrant stock are increasingly being concentrated
in only a few developed countries (Lowell, 2007). In the West, immigration from
developing countries is increasingly perceived as a problem in need of control as it is
an important factor of social transformation and presents several complex, challenging
and contentious issues in the political economy (Castles, 2000; Nyberg-Sorensen, Van
Hear and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002).
However, in spite of substantial efforts, restrictive immigration policies and the mi-
litarization of border controls have failed to significantly curb immigration from de-
veloping countries (Castles, 2004). Given that the most obvious cause of migration
from developing countries is the disparity in the levels of income, employment and
social well-being, one "smart solution" often proposed by some scholars, develop-
ment practitioners and politicians is to promote social and economic development in
poor migrant sending countries as a way of curtailing immigration (de Haas, 2006;
Stalker, 2002; van Dalen, Groenewold and Schoorl, 2005).
In particular development aid and trade liberalisation are commonly advocated as
more effective instruments to reduce migration than restrictive immigration laws and
intensified border controls (Schiff, 1996). For example, in October 2005, president
of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso stated that "The problem of
immigration, the dramatic consequences of which we are witnessing, can only be
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addressed effectively [...] through an ambitious and coordinated development [plan]
to fight its root causes" A comprehensive discussion and analyses of such proposals is
provided by de Haas (2006) who argues why such policies are bound to fail.
The underlying assumption for these proposals is that aid, trade and other develop-
ment promoting incentives can generate "rapid" economic growth and development
in the migrant sending countries which will in tum induce potential poverty migrants
to stay at home (10M and UNCTAD, 1996). Thus, development promotion policies are
expected to address the root causes of migration and lead ultimately to a reduction in
the migrant flows. Contrary to this assumption of a simple linear relation between
economic development and migration, economic theory suggests a more complex,
non-linear relationship between the two where more development can lead to more
migration, at least in the short to medium term (de Haas, 2006).
Ratte and Vogler (2000) are among the few studies that have focused on empirically
analysing the long and short run relationships between migrations and development
dynamics. They analyse migrant flows from 86 African and Asian developing
countries to Germany for the period 1981 to 1995. Their study shows that there is an
inverse If-shaped relationship between development and migrant flows to Germany.
This means that more economic and human development leads to more migration up
to a certain threshold in development after which further development leads to less
migration.
The aim of this chapter is to undertake an empirical analysis on the relationship
between migrant flows and economic development, using the UK as a case study. The
chapter focuses on one main question: does economic development in developing
countries reduce the migration from these countries to the UK? In other words, the
chapter aims to test the existence of a non-linear (inverted U-shaped) relationship
between development and migration from developing countries to the UK. The study
in this chapter is made possible and worthwhile by access to a uniquely rich and
reliable immigration data from the UK Home Office. This is an administrative
data that span from 1973-2005 and provides actual statistics (made possible by visa
applications and entry counts) of immigrants not only by country of origin but also by
the various immigration categories.
In addition to an appropriate dataset, the UK presents an interesting case study
because it has a long and complex history of international migration and is among
the top ten countries currently hosting the largest number of the global international
migrants". The largest increases in the legal permanent-type migrants in 2005 were
ISource: Migration and Remittances Factbook, World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances
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observed in the United States (+164, 000), the UK (+55, 000) and Italy (+31, 000)
(OECD, 2007).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section, 2.2, presents a brief
literature review before a brief overview of UK migration and data sources is provided
in section 2.3. The data and method are introduced in section 2.4 along with some
descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 then presents and discusses the results, while section
2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 LiteratureReview
The first scholarly contribution to migration consisted of two articles by the nineteenth
century geographer Ravenstein (1885; 1889) in which he formulated his "laws of
migration". He recognised the general primacy of economic motivations in migration
and concluded that: 'bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate,
uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation),
all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these
currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in
most men to "better" themselves in material respects'. Labour migration is generally
understood to be the chief motive for migration for the majority of migrants especially
from developing countries to developed countries. This labour migration is also
understood to be driven by differences in returns to labour or expected returns across
countries or markets.
The greater part of economic research on international migration has dealt with the
question of why people migrate and, to a lesser extent, the dynamics of migration,
such as continues migration given changes in the initial conditions. Although there is
hardly a single unifying theory that explains all the aspects of international migration
(including the impacts on both the sending and receiving countries), one cannot
conclude that theory building in this area has been unsuccessful as there is a significant
reservoir of concepts and approaches to rely on for the analysis and explanation of the
various aspects of international migration.
The first influential economic theory about migration emanates from the neo-classical
economic paradigm. At the macro-level, neo-classical economic theory explains
migration by geographical differences in the supply and demand for labour. The
resulting differentials in wages cause workers to move from low-wage, labour-surplus
regions to high-wage, labour-scare regions. Migration will cause labour to become
less scarce at the destination and scarcer at the source. Capital is expected to move
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in the opposite direction. In a perfectly neo-classical world, this process of "factor
price equalisation" (the Hecksher-Ohlin model) will eventually result in growing
convergence between wages at the sending and receiving country (Haris and Todaro,
1970; Lewis, 1954;Ranis and Fei, 1961; Schiff, 1994).
At the micro-level, neo-classical migration theory views migrants as individual,
rational actors, who decide to move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation.
Assuming free choice and full access to information, they are expected to go where
they can be the most productive, that is, are able to earn the highest wages. This
capacity obviously depends on the specific skills a person possesses and the specific
structure of labour markets.
Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) elaborated the basic two-sector model of
rural-to-urban labour migration. This influential "Harris- Todaro model" has remained
the basis of neo-classical migration theory since then. The original model was de-
veloped in order to explain the apparently contradictory phenomenon of continuing
rural-to-urban migration in developing countries despite rising unemployment in ci-
ties. Harris and Todaro argued that, in order to understand this phenomenon, it is
necessary to modify and extend the simple wage differential approach by looking not
only at prevailing income differentials as such but rather at the rural-urban expected
income differential, i.e., the income differential adjusted for the probability of finding
an urban job.
The expected income in the destination area depends on both the actual (or ave-
rage) earnings at the destination and also on the probability of employment. The
assumption is that, as long as rural-urban income differences remain high enough to
outweigh the risk of becoming unemployed, the "lure of relatively higher permanent
incomes will continue to attract a steady stream of rural migrants". Later, the Harris-
Todaro model was refined to make it more realistic (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998).
Modifications pertained to the inclusion of other factors than unemployment that
influence the expected income gains that can be achieved through migration. The
potential gains in the form of higher wages should be balanced with factors such as the
opportunity costs of migration, the costs of travel, (temporary) unemployment while
moving and installation at the destination, and the psychological costs of migration.
Although the Harris-Todaro model was initially developed for internal migration,
it can, with some modifications, also be applied to international migration. Borjas
(1989; 1990) postulated the idea of an international immigration market, in which
potential migrants base the choice of destination on individual, cost-benefit calcula-
tions. Further extension of the model is possible by interpreting it within a human
capital framework, in which migration is seen as an investment decision. Human
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capital theory enables us to theoretically explain the selectivity of migration beyond
explanations focusing only on costs. Migrants are typically not representative of the
communities they come from. Considering that individuals are different in terms of
personal skills, knowledge, physical abilities, age, sex, and so on, there will also be
differences in the extent to which people are expected to gain from migrating, that is,
they can expect diverging returns on their migration investment.
Depending on the specific type of labour demand in migrant receiving areas, migrants
will be selected depending on their specific skills and educational background. This
makes it possible to explain theoretically why the likelihood of migration decreases
with age and why individuals with higher education often exhibit a higher migration
propensity (de Haas, 2(08).
Many of the later refinements of neo-classical migration theory relate to the selectivity
of migration. Without denying the importance of expected wage differentials, the
likelihood of particular individuals and groups emigrating is also supposed to depend
on both the costs and risks of migration and individual human capital characteris-
tics. This makes migration selectivity also dependent on the specific structure and
segmentation of labour markets determining chances to find employment as well as
immigration policies. The combination of such factors may explain the heterogeneity
and dynamism that characterize real-life migration systems.
In recent years "new economics of migration" has arisen to challenge many of
the assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical theory (Stark and Bloom, 1985).
A key insight of this new approach is that migration decisions are not made by
isolated individual actors, but by larger units of related people- typically families or
households-in which people act collectively not only to maximise expected income,
but also to minimize risks and to loosen constraints associated with a variety of
market failures, apart from those in the labour market (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark,
1984; Katz and Stark, 1986; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Taylor, 1986; Stark, 1991). Unlike
individuals, households are in a position to control risks to their economic well-
being by diversifying the allocation of household resources, such as family labour.
While some family members can be assigned economic activities in the local economy,
others may be sent to work in foreign labour markets where wages and employment
conditions are negatively correlated or weakly correlated with those in the local area.
In the event that local economic conditions deteriorate and activities there fail to bring
in sufficient income, the household can rely on migrant remittances for support
One theory that has emerged in the migration literature that combines the macro
and micro incentives is the existence of migrant networks. Migrant networks are
sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non migrants
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in the origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared
community origin. This captures general relationships such as colonial bonds, socio-
economic and political relationships, language as well as the micro relations through
friends and family members in the diasporas. Networks increase the likelihood of
international movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and
increase the expected net returns to migration (Taylor, 1986;Massey et a11993; Massey,
1990a, 1990b). Migrant networks convey information, provide financial assistance,
facilitate employment and accommodation and give support in various forms. In so
doing, they reduce the cost and uncertainty of migration and therefore facilitate it
(Massey et al, 1998). Networks explain the existence of continued migration unlike
the other theories that explain the initiation of migration.
This view extends to an even broader type of theory - a systems approach that com-
bines not just migrant networks and individual decision making but also includes
other flows such as those of capital and goods and further suggests how all these
might combine with economic political and cultural influences. A migration sys-
tem may be seen as a set of places linked by flows and counter-flows of people,
goods, services and information, Boyd (1989). Within the systems framework, indi-
vidual/households are taking into account (in their decision to migrate or not) both
influences acting within the system that originate in the potential country of desti-
nation and those related to the country of origin. This suggests that migration flows
acquire a measure of stability and structure over space and time, allowing for the
identification of stable international migration systems.
Despite the existence of a broad and rich theoretical literature on the determinants of
international migration, not much work has been done to empirically investigate the
various hypothesis. Hence there is still little conclusive evidence that fully explain
the determinants and patterns of migration. The absence of sufficient empirical
studies on the determinants of migration is due to the lack of reliable and comparable
data on migration across countries. In order to measure migration flows, ideally
one would need reliable registration data preferable distinguishing flows by origin
and destination countries, character/purpose of migration, (intended) duration of
migration, some demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In the absence
of such data across countries, aggregated data, either in the form of time-series or
regionally aggregated variables, has long been the key source of data for analysis on
migration .These migration data are often estimations from censuses or large-scale
survey data. Early empirical studies on migration such as Hartog and Vriend (1989);
Katseli and Glytsos (1989); Lundborg (1991); Faini and Venturini (1994) all relied on
this type of data.
Whiles these studies were able to conclude that income in the receiving country
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positively influences migration, other important question were left unanswered. For
example findings with regard to unemployment (or its proxies) for receiving and
sending counties were rather ambiguous because, while Hartog and Vriend (1989),
reported a negative contribution of unemployment to immigration in the receiving
country (Netherlands), Katseli and Glytsos (1989) found that unemployment in
Germany contributed positively to migration.
2.2.1 EconomicDevelopment and Migration
The generally established understanding is that both (or a combination of both)
macroeconomic push factors in the migrant sending country and macroeconomic
pull factors in the migrant receiving country are important determinants of migration
motives. However, the actual migration event is an individual, family or household
investment decision. Hence, taking all relevant variables into consideration, the
individual living in a poor country will migrate as long as the expected wage/Income
(given their skill level) in the destination country minus the cost (including cost of
resettlement and adjusting in the new country and the cost of overcoming immigration
policy barriers) of migration is greater than the expected or actual wage or income in
their home country:
(2.1)
where subscripts A represents abroad and H represents home (Bhagwati and Sriniva-
san, 1974;Harris and Todaro, 1970;Sajaastad, 1962;Stark, 1984;1991;Stark and Bloom
1985;Todaro, 1976).
Based on this understanding, some scholars and political leaders have often advocated
the promotion of economic development in poor migrant sending countries as a
way of reducing the emigration pressure (drive/push) and hence addressing the
root cause of migration and ultimately reducing the migration from those countries
(de Haas, 2006). However, this chapter argues that economic development or the
improvement of conditions in the poor migrant sending countries will initially lead
to an increased rate of emigration from those countries. This is because through
development (in the initial stages) the needed funds become available to finance
emigration for those who wanted to but could not migrate due to financial constraints.
Hence in the short to medium term emigration from poor countries is expected to rise
with economic development, though in the long run economic development will lead
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to less emigration.
Rotte and Vogler (2000) used an unbalanced panel dataset covering migration to Ger-
many from 86 African and Asian developing countries for the period 1981-1995. They
showed with fixed effects estimates that there is an inverse Ll-shaped relationship
between migration and development. The relationship is due to the combined effects
of "migration-impeding factors" and "migration re-enforcing factors". The migration-
impeding factors are identified as, migration cost (including psychological costs), ex-
pected unemployment in the host country, the individual's valuation of the income
differentials, relative deprivation in the sending country and uncertainty and the op-
tion value of waiting. They argue that economic development in the migrant sending
country also leads to other migration-impeding (reducing) factors namely, reduction
of the income differential and a home preference arising from the expectation of better
future prospects in the home country.
On the other hand, the migration re-enforcing factors arise from economic growth
and development in the sending country. These effects of development are: the
dissolution of financial restrictions, population growth, societal change, progress
in communication and transport and Network effects. These factors, re-enforce
the existing known migration pressures in these countries such as, low relative
income, unemployment, poor living conditions, income inequality, other economic
and political factors, population pressure etc.
This chapter adopts their strategy to investigate the same issue for immigration into
the UK. Though Mitchell and Pain (2003) have empirically examined the determinants
of immigration into the UK, they use survey data from the International Passenger
Survey (IPS) and do not test for the existence of the hypothesized inverse V-shape
relationship which is the subject matter of the analyses in this chapter.
2.3 Overview of UK Migration and Data Sources
In 2001, the UK had the third largest foreign born population and labour force in
Western Europe after Germany and France in terms of actual numbers (Dobson, Koser,
Mclaughlan and Salt, 2001). The 2005 figures, taken from the World Bank's Migration
and Remittances Fact Book, show that with a population of about 60 million, the stock
of immigrants in the UK were 5,408,118 (about 9.1% of the population) of which
54.3% are females and 5.5% refugees. The top ten immigrant source countries, from
top to bottom, were Ireland, India, Pakistan, Germany, United States, Bangladesh,
Jamaica, South Africa, Kenya and Australia. On the other hand, 7.0% of the population
17
emigrated in 2005, with the top ten emigrant destination countries being Australia,
United States, Canada, Ireland, Spain, New Zealand, Germany, France, Netherlands
and Italy. This section gives a brief insight to the history of migration as well as the
immigration policy development in the UK and provides a summary review of the
migration data sources in the UK.
The UK has experienced increasing levels of both inward and outward international
migration in recent years. However, traditionally, Britain had been a country
of emigration until the late 1980s and early 1990s, and has had a long history
of international migration dating back before the Norman invasion in 1066AD.
Immigration into the UK began to increase gradually in the twentieth century mainly
because there were labour shortages in the UK and other European countries. It is also
because there were large numbers of people from across the British Empire (Africa, the
Caribbean's and the Indian subcontinent) who had fought for the British in the two
World Wars, and needed to find work. Despite the increasing inflows of migrants, the
UK remained a country of net emigration until 1980s and early 1990s when the intake
of migrants (most of whom were British citizen) from developing countries began to
more than compensate for the outflow of British citizens (Zlotnik, 1999).
In terms of immigration policy development, Hatton and Price (1998) point out that
before the Aliens Act of 1905, followed by subsequent acts in 1914, 1919 and 1921,
any immigrants could enter and leave the UK as they pleased. The acts together gave
the Home Secretary the power to refuse entry to criminals and to those who were
infirm or could not support themselves. However, all subjects of the Crown were
entitled to free entry to Britain and this covered all Britain's Colonies and Dominions.
This privilege was reaffirmed and extended to the newly independent countries in
the 1948 Nationality Act. However, the 1971 Immigration Act is regarded as the first
significant and comprehensive UK immigration policy. It redefined British citizenship
in line with the immigration policy and ended the free entry of British subjects from
the Commonwealth who could not prove that they, their parent or grandparent had
be born, adopted or naturalised in Britain. It fully came into force on 1st January 1973
and clearly defined visa requiring nationals - a firm foundation of UK immigration
policy.
Since this development the main legislation bearing on immigration in the UK are the
British Nationality Act 1981, the Immigration Act 1988, the Asylum and Immigration
Appeals Act 1993, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, the Immigration and
Asylum Act 1999, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Immigration,
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and the UK Borders Act 2007. All of these have
been aimed at streamlining and tightening the rules of entry. Although immigration
into the UK has continued to rise in spite of the restrictive policies, some of the new
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patterns of immigration may also have been a result of these policies. For instance,
the growth of asylum seeker applications increasingly became a significant feature of
immigration in the UK as manufacturing declined and work permits became harder
to get unless one had specialist skills or professional trading. Similarly the data shows
that the foreign work force is generally employed inmore highly skilled occupations
than the domestic (Salt and Millar, 2006).
It is therefore obvious that any comprehensive immigration dataset for the UK will
start from the 1973. However, there is not a single, all-inclusive system in place
to measure all movements of population into and out of the UK, neither is there a
single comprehensive source of migration data in the UK. A range of sources provides
statistical data relating to migrant stocks and flows but, inevitably, all sources have
limitations. For example, in respect of sample size (coverage), population included,
details recorded, time-period covered and changing definitions of a migrant overtime.
The sources of international migration data in the UK include: Censuses, the
International Passenger Survey (IPS), the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and The Total
International Migration Estimates (TIM). In addition to these, some administrative
sources are often used to quantify and study UK immigrant stocks and flows even
though these are typically not designed to capture information solely on international
migration. These include: the NHS Central Registration and Patient Register Data
System; and the National Insurance Number allocations to Overseas Nationals
(NINos). The Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) and the Control of Immigrations
Statistics are the only two administrative data sources that are specifically designed to
capture information solely on international migration. However, the WRS was only
introduced in 2004 in relation to the new countries that joined the European Union.
The decennial UK Census provides a very rough estimate of the percentage of
residents that are foreign born but is of limited use overall as a source of migration
data. The Census questions include place of birth and place of residence a year ago
but there is no question on nationality and year of entry into the UK. The question on
Ethnic origin was asked for the first time in 1991 but the information is of little use, as
increasing numbers of people in ethnic minority groups are British Citizens, many of
whom were born in the UK (Dobson, Koser, Mclaughlan and Salt, 2001). The census
data on migration provides a snap shot of the migrant stocks at the time of each census
rather than flows of migrants. Despite the question on place of birth the census data
made available only shows foreign born residents by region of birth (e.g. West Africa,
East Africa, etc) rather than country of birth.
The IPS is a continuous survey carried out by the Office for National Statistics
(ONS), based on face-to-face interviews with a random sample of passengers as they
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enter or leave the UK by the principal air, sea and tunnel routes. The main aims
of the IPS are to collect data in order to measure travel expenditure and how it
impacts on the UK balance of payments (on the travel account); provide detailed
information about overseas visitors to the UK for tourism policy; provide data on
international migration; and collect travel information on passenger routes as an aid
to aviation and shipping authorities. Travellers passing through passport control are
randomly selected for interview and all interviews are conducted on a voluntary and
anonymous basis. Interviews are carried out throughout the year normally covering
0.2 to 0.3 percent of travellers. The IPS is the only primary international migration data
source that provides information on both immigrants and emigrants. It also provides
information on migrants' citizenship, country/region of origin and destination, age,
sex and occupational status. In spite of this, disaggregated IPS data for migrants by
country of origin and destination are not reliable (as a result of high standard errors)
due to the small sample size but also the fact that most of the surveyed people are
short term travellers who do not qualify as migrants.
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a random household survey that collects a wide
range of variables about the people in the labour market, including their nationality
and country of birth. The surveyed include both UK and foreign citizens and therefore
provide statistics on both workers with foreign citizenship and foreign born workers,
including the diverse group of people born outside the UK. Data provided by the LFS
include nationality, age, sex, occupation and industry, region of destination, ethnicity
and year of entry into the UK for foreign nationals. Like the census data, the LFS
provides migrant stock data rather than flow data.
The Total International Migration (TIM estimates) is the official source of overall
international migration statistics in the UK. It combines data from different sources
that have different characteristics and attributes in order to produce estimates of
both inflows and outflows of migrants. The main sources for the TIM estimates
are migration data from the IPS, Home Office data on asylum seekers and their
dependants, LFS data on the geographical distribution of in-migrants, and the Irish
Central Statistics Office estimates of migration of all citizenships between the UK
and the Irish Republic. In theory the TIM is the most comprehensive source of
international migration data available in the UK, given that it draws on the strengths
of the various sources and provides data for both immigrants and emigrants as well
the demographics of these groups. However the TIM data are not available for country
level analysis. This is because once disaggregated to country level, the data loses
significance due to high standard errors. This problem originates from the issue of
small sample size inherent in the IPS and LFS (ONS, 2006; Dobson, Koser, Mclaughlan
and Salt, 2001).
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Given the inadequacy of the various international migration data available, one may
turn to administrative datasets as sources for estimating immigrant stock or flows in
the UK. One such administrative dataset is the Worker Registration Scheme which
collects data on nationals of the eight Central and Eastern European (AB) countries
that joined the EU in May 2004 who have registered to work in the UK. The purpose
of the scheme is to monitor the access of AB nationals to the UK labour market and to
restrict access to benefits. Although the AB nationals are required to register for each
employer they work for, the WRS statistics are only published for first time applicants
only. At present there is no process for de-registering from the WRS hence the statistics
are a measure of inflows only. Apart from the WRS, the Department of Work and
Pensions (DWP) produces annual statistics on the allocations of National Insurance
Number to Overseas (NINos) nationals arriving in the UK for employment/self
employment purposes, or to claim benefits and tax credits. Although the statistics
may provide a measure of inflows for overseas nationals registering for a NINO, there
are a number of shortcomings. First the NINo figures exclude migrant groups who
do not work or claim benefits. Secondly there is often a substantial lag between a
migrant entering the UK and being allocated a NINo. Moreover there is no process
of NINo de-registration and hence the difficulty to use NINo figures to capture flows
and stocks effectively.
The Control of Immigration Statistics (described further in the next section) is
however, by far, the most important administrative source for immigrant inflow data
especially for nationals of countries that require visas to enter, stay or work in the
UK. Although it does not provide records for outflows of migrants (native and non-
natives), it provides data on all persons, entering the UK, by country of origin, purpose
of journey, intended duration of stay and even information for those refused entry into
the UK.
2.4 Data and Method
The aim of the analyses in this chapter is to test the hypothesis that the relationship
between the rate of emigration from developing countries to the UK and economic
development in those countries is non-linear (inverse U-shaped). The key variables of
interest are, therefore, emigration rates from developing countries to the UK and the
level of economic development in those countries over time. The study relies on data
from the Control of Immigration Statistics publications for the figures on immigration
into the UK. The Control of Immigration Statistics (CIS) is an administrative dataset
on migrant inflows to the UK published annually as part of a compendium report
covering all areas of immigration control for the UK parliament as a 'command paper'.
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These command papers have gradually increased in scope over the years as more
statistics from the Home Office administrative systems became available and now
covers: people applying abroad for visas to enter the UK ('Entry Clearance'); people
given permission to enter the UK, and persons refused entry ('Entry control'); people
granted extensions to visas in the UK, and those granted settlement ('After-entry');
people granted British Citizenship; people detained under the Immigration Act;
people in violation of immigration law, and those removed from the UK; and people
seeking asylum in the UK. By definition, British citizens, EU nationals and others who
have a right of abode in the UK are exempt from control and only appear in the gross
totals of arrivals. For those non-EU nationals granted entry for more than six months
the following data are recorded: date of arrival, length of stay granted, nationality,
admission category, date of birth, sex, number of children, and date of departure.
The data, which are regarded as generally reliable by the Home Office, have been
published since 1973 (this the year the watershed Immigration Act of 1971 came into
force) though with increasing level of detail over the years.
The CIS offers three main advantages for the purposes of this chapter. First, the level
of immigrant detail regarding the purpose of the journey and the intended duration
of stay contained in the CIS allow the flexibility of defining an immigrant in more
than one way (including the UN recommended definition of an international migrant)
for the purposes of analysis. Secondly, the CIS provides the most reliable figures
for immigrants inflows disaggregated by country of origin. This allows the study
to focus on developing countries rather aggregates. Thirdly the length of the period
for which this data is available provides an opportunity to study the short, medium
and long term relationship between immigration rates and improvement of economic
conditions in the migrant source countries.
Even though the study relates to immigration from developing countries in general,
the analysis in this chapter focuses only on immigration from developing countries in
Africa, Asia, South and Central America. The World Bank classification of developing
counties is used, and observations for all non-developing countries as well as all
developing countries in European and Oceania are dropped from the data set.
The level of economic development in the migrant sending country (the main
independent variable of interest) is measured by the per capita gross nation product
(GNP). The GNP data as well as all the data for the other economic control variables
are sourced from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WOI). The political
situation indicators are taking from the freedom house indices available from Freedom
House International. Bilateral trade with the UK data used as an indicator for migrant
networks are collected from the Source OECD database.
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2.4.1 Benchmark Model and Empirical Method
In line with Rotte and Vogler (2000), this study adopts simple regression procedures
with a parsimonious model that explores the panel nature of the data. In theory,
and in accordance with the literature, the argument of this chapter is that the rate
of emigration from developing country to the UK is a non-linear (inverse U-shaped)
function of country income (economic development) level. The level of economic
development in the migrant sending country has two opposing effects on the rate
of emigration. On the one hand, it determines the emigration pressure while on the
other hand it also determines the ability (financial power) to migrate. For example, a
high pressure to emigrate (in search of better standard of living) emanates from low
economic development. However, if incomes are too low and there is no access to
funding to cover the cost of migration, the rate of emigration may be low. But when
income increases, although the pressure to migrate reduces, the funds to do so become
available and those who could not afford to migrate are now able to do so hence the
emigration rate increases.
This positive relationship between income and the emigration rate will continue to
be positive until the incomes are high enough to render the pressure to emigrate
negligible. Thus, while accepting that the individual's decision to migrate depends
on by how much the difference between their expected income (given their skill level)
and the costl of immigration (including personal cost) is greater than their income at
home, it is also recognised that their ability to finance the cost of migration depends
on the general economic conditions (or access to funding). The empirical model from
this postulated relationship is given by:
The dependent variable, miukt , represents the immigration rate from country i to the
UK at time t. The income (wages) of the migrant sending country relative to the UK at
time t is given by Yukit. The GNP per capita of the sending country and its squared term
(to capture the non-linearity) are given by Yit and YTt. Xit and V; respectively represent
the vectors of time-varying and non-time-varying control variables while D, and C,
respectively represent year dummies and country dummies. The idiosyncratic error
term is given by Eit.
The rate of immigration ntiukl, is defined as the annual number of immigrants from
developing country i to the UK divided by the population of country i. Given
2The destination country's immigration policy may be regarded as a cost item as well
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the availability of various categories of immigrants in the CIS data, four alternative
definitions of migrants are explored. The first one, Immigration Ratetl), used in
the benchmark model is a strict definition comprising of persons included in the
immigrant categories of work permit holders (six months and above), dependents of
work permit holders, those given leave to remain under marriage, those accepted for
settlement on arrival and others granted leave to enter for 12month (including clergy,
etc. but not diplomatic officials).
The other three alternative definitions used for robustness checks are Immigration
Rate(2) (which expands Immigration Ratetl) to include students and refugees); Students
(only person in the student categories); and Refugees (only those in the refugee
categories). The data for refugees starts from 1992. The independent variables of
interest in this study are: the income (wage) differential between UK and country
i (Yukit); the immigrant sending countries' GNP per capita; and the GNP per capita
squared.
Using GNP per capita as a proxy for income (wages), Yukit , is defined as UK's per
capita income divided by the per capita income of the sending country for each year.
The GNP data are collected from the World Bank's WOI database. All GNP data used
are measured in current US dollars. The coefficient of the per capita income ratio,
Yukil is therefore expected to be positive since an increase in the ratio is expected to
result in a higher migration push. In other words, an increase in the wage differential
between UK and country is expected to increase immigration from that country to
the UK assuming the cost of immigration remains the same. GNP per capita (Yit) is
included as a measure of economic development in the sending country. It is expected
to have a positive coefficient while the squared GNP per capita is expected to have a
negative coefficient (i.e. if the inverse U-shape relationship exists).
The vector, Xit, contains the following variables related to the migrant sending
country: GOP growth rate; Urban Population growth rate; bilateral trade per head
with the UK; and the Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index. GOP growth rate
in the migrant sending country is a proxy for unemployment rates which are hardly
available for nearly all the developing countries. The growth in GOP captures the
level of economic activity and may reflect the use or absorption of labour hence it is
expected to have a negative coefficient. The growth in share of the urban population
in the migrant sending country controls for the generally mobility of individuals
in the sending country as well as the emigration pressure built up as a results of
urban population density. It is expected to have a positive coefficient. As a means
of controlling for migrant network effects, bilateral trade per head with the UK
is included in the model. This is defined as the annual exports plus imports of
the migrant sending country to and from the UK divided by the population of the
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sending country. Ideally immigrant stocks at the beginning of the period would be a
better measure but reliable estimates of stocks at the beginning of the period are not
available. More contacts (networks) in the UK is expected to make immigration to the
UK easier or less costly for potential immigrants.
The effect of political factors in the sending country on emigration is captured by the
Freedom House Index for political rights and civil liberties. Political rights in the
context of the Freedom House Index enables people to participate in the political
process, while civil liberties cover the freedom to express views, and to develop
institutions and personal autonomy apart from the state, e.g., by freedom of speech,
assembly or religion. For each of the two categories there is an index ranging from
1 (totally free) to 7 (not free at all) according to a checklist based on published
source materials, reports from human rights organizations and governments, and
newspapers. The analyses in this chapter combine the scores from these two categories
into a single variable that range from 1 to 14, with 1 equal to best political conditions
and 14 equal to worst political conditions.
To control for the effect of common language with the UK, a dummy variable English
Speaking is included in the model which takes the value 1 if English is the official
language in the immigrant sending country and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable,
commontoealih, is also included to control for any historic and colonial relations a
country might have with the UK. These dummy variables, together with Distance (the
great circle distance measure from the capital city of the migrant sending county to
London) make up the vector, V;.
Using panel data techniques will make it possible to better deal with heteroscedas-
ticity, but also to explore and control for omitted country specific variables (unob-
served country heterogeneity). The fixed effect model is chosen over the random
effects model as the preferred panel data model for the analysis in this chapter to
control for omitted variables that differ between countries but are constant over time.
Nevertheless OLS and random effects estimates are obtained for comparisons. The
OLS estimates are obtained with robust standard errors hence controlling for hete-
roscedasticity revealed by the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is also undertaken to test the null hypothesis
that the variances of groups (in the random group effect model) are zero. If the null
hypothesis is not rejected then the OLS regression model is appropriate. The time-
invariant variables, Vi as well as the country dummies are only used for the OLS and
Random effects estimates.
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Table 2.1: List of Mi~rant Sendin~ Countries and Year Fresuencies
Country Year Freq. Country Year Freq.
Algeria 30 Malaysia 33
Angola 13 Mauritius 33
Argentina 33 Mexico 33
Bangladesh 33 Morocco 30
Brazil 33 Nigeria 33
Chile 33 Pakistan 33
China 33 Peru 33
Colombia 33 Philippines 30
Congo, Dem. Rep. 13 Sierra Leone 33
Cuba 20 Somalia 28
Egypt, Arab Rep. 33 South Africa 33
Ethiopia 28 Sri Lanka 33
Ghana 33 Sudan 28
Guyana 33 Syrian Arab Republic 28
Hong Kong, China 33 Tanzania 33
India 33 Thailand 28
Indonesia 33 Tunisia 30
Iran, Islamic Rep. 33 Turkey 33
Iraq 33 Uganda 33
Jamaica 33 Uruguay 11
Jordan 28 Venezuela, RB 33
Kenya 33 Yemen, Rep. 13
Lebanon 28 Zambia 33
Libya 28 Zimbabwe 26
Total 1,430
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2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
The final dataset is an unbalanced panel of 1,430 county-year observations comprising
data from 1973-2005 (33 years) for 48 countries in Africa, Asia and South and Central
America. The countries and year frequencies are shown in Table 2.1. The table shows
that there are 11 years of data for Uruguay (1978-1992), while Angola, the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Yemen all have 13 years of data (1993- 2005). Table 2.2 presents
the distribution and summary definitions for all the independent variables. With a
logged mean per capita income differential of 1.42 and a standard deviation of 0.24
the table shows that on average UK has a very large per capita income compared to
the migrant sending countries. However the minimum of 0.97 indicates that in some
instances the per capita income of the migrant sending developing country exceeds
the UK per capita income.
The average score for political rights and civil liberties across all the countries over
the period observed is 9.02. This indicates that the political situation in most of the
countries is quite bad though with significant differences across countries (standard
deviation of 3.25). On average the countries in the sample grew at a rate of 3.38
percent with a large standard deviation of 5.61. However, some countries experienced
large negative GOP growth (e.g. Lebanon was negative 42 percent in 1989 and Iraq
was negative 41 percent in 2003) while others experience large GOP growth over the
period. Less than half of the sample (36 percent) are English speaking countries while
42 percent of the sample are Commonwealth countries.
Figure 2.1 shows that in spite of the large GOP gab between per capita income
in the UK and developing countries, the annual immigration from all developing
countries to the UK is relatively low than immigration from the US alone. This
may be an indication that due large costs and high immigration barriers people from
poor developing countries are less able to migrate compared to the people from more
developed countries.
Figure 2.2 shows that there is an upward trend over time in the average per capita
income across the developing countries in the sample. Together, figures 2.1 and 2.2
indicate that both per capita income and migrant flows in to the UK are increasing
over the period. This supports the hypothesis that migrants flows from developing
countries increases as the conditions in those countries improve.
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Table 2.2: Variables and Descrietive Statistics
Variable Definition Oblerv. Mean Min Max
(StdDev)
Per Capita Income Difference UKGNP per capital GNP per 1289 1.42 0.97 2.31
capita of sending country (0.24)
Per Capita Income GNP per capita of 1289 6.85 4.38 10.23
sending country (1.10)
Per Capita Income Squared GNP per capita of 1289 48.10 19.20 104.63
sending country squared (15.34)
GDPGrowth Annual GDP growth rate 1308 3.83 -42 46
of sending country (5.61)
Political rights and Freedom house index a scale 1384 9.02 2 14
civil liberties index of 1-14 where 1= best political (3.25)
situation
Urban Population Annual growth in Urban 1430 47.42 7 100
growth rate population in sending country (23.15)
English Speaking Dummy = 1 if English is the 1430 0.36 0
(Official Language) official language; 0 otherwise (0.48)
Commonwealth Dummy = 1 if member of 1333 0.42 0
British commonwealth (0.49)
Bilateral Trade exports to + imports I 1403 2.26 1.59 2.90
population of sending country (0.20)
Distance from the UK Great Circle distance from the 1333 8.74 7.41 9.37
Capital of sending country to (0.49)
London
All continuous variables are logged for convenience in explaining results except for growth rates. Urban population growth rates and political
rights and civillibcrtics
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2.5 Results
A series of simple regression analyses are undertaken to test the hypothesis that there
is an inverse U-shaped. relationship between economic development and immigration
from poor counties to the UK. Table 2.3 presents the results for the benchmark model
estimated by OLS, random effects and fixed effects. The table shows high R-squared
test scores: 0.87 for both the OLS and the Random effects (overall) estimates and
0.70 for the fixed effects within estimator. This indicates that the models (1, 2 and
3) are well fitted by the explanatory variables and they have strong predictive powers.
The R-squared test scores are, in fact, all higher than the ones obtained. by Rotte and
Vogler (2000) for Germany. In particular the R-squared for their benchmark fixed
effects model is only 0.33. In addition to the R-squared, the Wald Test of over overall
significance is also reported in table 2.3 for the random effects model (2). This rejects
the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables in the random effects model are
jointly not significantly different from zero.
The test statistic and p-value for the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test shown at
the bottom of the table also indicates that the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates
are appropriate is rejected.. Thus, there exists some kind of group effect that needs
to be controlled for. This is in spite of the fact that both year and migrant sending
country dummies are included in the OLS and random effects regressions to control
for both time-specific and country-specific effects that are not accounted for by the
explanatory variables. The coefficient estimates for the time and country dummies are
not included in the results tables to allow better presentation and focus.
2.5.1 Economic Development and Migrant inflows
After controlling for observed. and unobserved as well as time-varying and country
specific covariates, the results show that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship
between economic development and immigrant flows to the UK from developing
countries in Africa, Asia and Central and South America. Specifically, the results show
that: first, as the wage differential increases, the rate of immigration also increases;
second, as the per capita income in the migrant sending country rises, the flow of
immigrants from that country to the UK also rises; and third, as the per capita income
rises further, after some point, immigration from that country to the UK starts to fall.
In other words, a one percent rise in the income differential is associated with a
0.4 percent increase in the rate of immigration to the UK. However, for a given
income differential, increments in per capita income leads to increments in the rate of
31
Table 2.3: Benchmark Results
Modell Model2 Model3
Observations
R-squared
1191
0.8741
1191
0.8741
Wald Test X2(Sl) =7699.9
P-value 0.000
1191
0.7002 (within)
OLS Random
Effects
Fixed Effects
Per Capita Income Difference 0.375'" 0.375'"
(0.081) (0.064)
Per Capita lncome 0.185'" 0.185'"
(0.048) (0.03S)
Per Capita Income Squared
-D.O~S''' -0.008'"
(0.002) (0.002)
GDPGrowth
-0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Political rights and civil liberties index
-0.001' -0.001'
(0.000) (0.000)
Urban Population growth rate 0.002'" 0.002'"
(0.000) (0.000)
English Speaking (Official Language)
-0.165'" 0.178'"
(0.010) (0.014)
Commonwealth 0.249'" 0.249'"
(0.022) (0.020)
Bilateral Trade 0.074'" 0.074'"
(0.016) (0.016)
Distance from the UK -0.027'"
-0.027'"
(0.006) (0.007)
Constant -1.089'"
-1.089'"
(0.313) (0.248)
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange mu.ltiplier Test X2 (1) =20.70
P-value: 0.000
0.375'"
(0.064)
0.185'"
(0.038)
-0.008'"
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.001'
(0.000)
0.002'"
(0.000)
0.074'"
(0.016)
-1.235'"
(0.250)
All regressions include time dummies for all the years except 1973,as the base, which arc not reported in this table. 111c regressions also
include country dummies for the immigrant sending countries though these drop out in the fixed effects model. Robust standard errors arc
shown in brackets for the OLS.· indicates significance at 1%;" indicates significance at 5%; and .... indicated significance at 10"'0.
immigration up to a certain per capita income level after which any further increments
in the per capita income leads to a fall in the rate of immigration.
These findings are in line with the findings by Ratte and Vogler (2000). They argue
that the positive initial relationship at low income levels may be explained by the
depletion of financial restrictions, with the rising incomes producing the needed
resources for migration. However, (in the long run) at higher income levels, the
negative relationship observed may be due to the effect of home preference (with
higher individual valuation of incomes in the home country).
The results are very similar across all the three models (OLS, random effects and fixed
effects), however, as indicated by the Breusch-Pagan LM test, the OLS estimates are
not appropriate as they do not fully control for group effects. The random effects
estimates on the other hand, though statistically better than the OLS, do not control
for unobserved country heterogeneity properly in spite of the country dummies. In
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the addition, variable such as "commonwealth" and "English speaking" are bound to be
highly correlated and hence the random effects model might suffer from a higher level
of multicollinearity threat than the fixed effects model. Hence more weight is placed
on the fixed effects estimates than the other two for the findings in this chapter.
A series of sensitivity analysis are undertaken to establish the robustness of the above
findings. Firstly, the rate of immigration is redefined to include students and refugees as
immigrants. Secondly, separate estimates are obtained for the rate of refugee inflows
and the rate of student inflows as dependent variables. The results shown in Table
2.4 and 2.5 indicate that redefining the rate of immigration (the dependent variable)
to include refugees and students or to focus on refugees and students separately
does not change the benchmark findings related to the relationship between economic
development and migrant inflows. The inverse U-shape relationship between the two
is still observed. In fact, compared to the benchmark results, the effects seem to be
stronger (with larger coefficients) for refugees but weaker for students.
Table 2.4: Regressions with Students and Refugees included as Immigrants
Model4 Model 5 Model6
Observations
R-squared
1191 1191
0.812 0.812
Wald Test X2(81) =4787.9
Pvvalue 0.000
OLS Random
0.331'"
(0.060)
Per Capita lncome Difference 0.331'" 0.331'"
(0.068) (0.060)
Per Capita lncome 0.159'" 0.159'"
(0.043) (0.035)
Per Capita Income Squared -0.005" -0.005'"
(0.002) (0.002)
GDPGrowth 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Political Rights and Civil Liberties -0.001" -0.001'"
(0.000) (0.000)
Urban Population Growth Rate 0.001" 0.001'"
(0.000) «().QOO)
English Speaking (Official Language) -0.080'" 0.093'"
(0.007) (0.013)
Commonwealth 0.164'" 0.164'"
(0.022) (0.019)
Bilateral Trade 0.164'" 0.164'"
(0.016) (0.015)
Distance from the UK -0.013" -0.013"
(0.006) (0.006)
Constant -1.130'" -1.130'"
(0.281) (0.232)
1191
0.555 (within)
Fixed
0.159'"
(0.035)
-0,005'"
(0,002)
0.000
(0,000)
-0,001'"
(0,000)
0,001'"
«(l.OOO)
0,164'"
(0,015)
-1.185'"
(0,234)
All regressions include time dummies for all the years except I1J73, as the base, which arc not reported in this table. The regressions also include
country dummies for the Immigrant sending countries though these drop out in the fixed effects model. Robust standard errors MC shown in brackets
for the OLS ." indicates significance at 1'Yo; .. in dicates significance at 5%; and **. indicated significance at 10'1."
Another set of sensitivity analyses undertaken involves sample splitting. Unlike Rotte
and Vogler (2000)who split their sample into African and Asian developing countries,
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Table 2.5: Regressions with Rates of Refugees and Students inflows as dependent Variables
Refugees(1992-2005) Students
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 ModellO
Observations 311 311 1191 1191
R-squared 0.610 0.283(within) 0.794 0.437 (within)
Wald Test (58) =379.4 X2(81) 4278.3
P-value 0.000 0.000
Random Fixed Random Fixed
Per Capita Income Differential 1.935**' 1.760'" 0.189'" 0.189'"
(0.602) (0.601) (0.065) (0.065)
Per Capita Income 1.661 , • • 1.479'" 0.100'" 0.100'"
(0.422) (0.425) (0.038) (0.038)
Per Capita Income Squared -0.087'*' -0.076*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.021) (0.022) (0.002) (0.002)
GDPGrowth 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 0.010'" 0.008" -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Urban Population Growth Rate -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
English Speaking 0.061 -0.010
(0.041) (0.014)
Commonwealth -0.279 0.088*"
(0.221) (0.020)
Bilateral Trade -0.090 -0.185 0.195''' 0:195*'*
(0.131) (0.136) (0.016) (0.016)
Distance from the UK 0.839 -0.000
(0.601) (0.007)
Constant -17.037*'* -8.771 '*. -0.873'** -0.836'"
(5.495) (2.875) (0.251) (0.253)
All regressions include time dummies for all the years except 1973, as the base. which arc not reported in this table. The (egressions also include
country dummies for the immigrant sending countries though these drop out in the fixed effects model. • indicates significance at \U{,; .. indicates
significance at So/v;and ... indicated significance at 11.)%.
the sample splitting done in this chapter is based on two per capita income thresholds
identified by the per capita income distribution. As shown in table 2.2 above, the
mean and standard deviations for the logged per capita income variable are 6.85 and
1.10 with a minimum value of 4.38 and a maximum value of 10.23. This implies that
the mean per capita income lies between 6 and 8 (one digit lower and upper bounds
of the mean range). The values 6 and 8 are therefore taken as threshold values and
used to exogenously splitting the sample for further sensitivity analyses. Thus, for the
threshold value of 6, the benchmark model estimates (random and fixed effects) are
obtained for the sub-sample with per capita income less than or equal to 6. This is then
compared with estimates for the sub-sample that has per capita income greater than
6 and the results are shown in Table 2.6. The results corroborate the inverse U-shape
relationship observed in the benchmark model for both the sub-samples. However,
the effects seem to be stronger (in terms of coefficient sizes) for the -:; 6 per capita
income sub-sub-sample.
The sample is similarly split by the upper bound mean threshold value of 8 for
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Table 2.6: Exogenous Sample Split A
Sample where logged
Per Capita Income < 6.0
Sample where logged
Per Capita Income> 6.0
Observations 345 345
Modelll Model12
846 846
Model 13 Model 14
R-squared 0.886
Random
0.614
Fixed
0.902
Random
0.760
Fixed
0.420'"
(0.135)
Per Capita Income Differential 1.022'"
(0.272)
Per Capita Income 1.466'"
(0.343)
Per Capita Income Squared -0.10r"
(0.025)
GDPGrowth 0.001"
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.003'"
(0.001)
0.153"
(0.068)
-1.149'"
(0.349)
0.021
(0.040)
2.421'"
(0.727)
-26.836'"
(6.554)
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Urban Population Growth Rate
English Speaking
Commonwealth
Bilateral Trade
Distance from the UK
Constant
1.022'"
(0.272)
1.466'"
(0.343)
-0.107'"
(0.025)
0.001"
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.003'"
(0001)
0.021
(0.040)
-6.076'"
(1.536)
0.420'"
(0.135)
0.196'"
(0.062)
-0.008'"
(0.003)
-0.000'
(0.000)
·0.001"
(0.000)
0.001'"
(0.000)
0.458'"
(0.054)
·3.411'"
(0.368)
0.083'"
(0.017)
1.S99"·
(0.19S)
-15.459'"
(1.500)
0.196'"
(0.062)
-o.OOS"·
(0.003)
-0.000'
(0.000)
-0.001"
(0.000)
0.001'"
(0000)
0.OS3···
(0.017)
-1.344'"
(0.455)
All regressions include lime dummies for all the years except 1973, as the base, which are not reported in this table. The regressions also include
country dummies for the immigrant sending countries though these drop out in the fixed effects model. • indicates significance ell 1"10;
.. indicates significance at 5%; and ..... indicated significance a' 10%.
estimation and the results are shown in Table 2.7. It is seen that at the threshold
value of 8, the results differ between the two sub-samples. While the::; 8 per capita
income sub-sample confirms the inverse U'-shaped relationship, the> 8 per capita
income does not. The regression for the sub-sample with a per capita income greater
than 8 produces insignificant coefficient estimates for all the key variables. The results
therefore generally suggest that while the hypothesized inverse U-shaped relationship
is prevailing, its existence and strength may be driven by sub-samples of the data
defined, for example, by different thresholds of per capita income.
2.5.2 Other Variables
With regard to other variables, the results are largely in accordance with theoretical
considerations and expectations. GOP growth is found not have any significant
impact on migrant inflows in to the UK. This is true for all the robustness checks,
except in Table 2.6. The table shows that GOP growth has a positive effect on migrant
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Table 2.7: Exogenous Sample Split B
Sample where logged
Per Capita Income < 8.0
Sample where logged
Per Capita Income> 8.0
Observations 1036 1036
Model IS Model16
155 155
Model17 Model18
R-squared
Random Fixed
0.696 0.831
Random Fixed
Per Capita Income Differential 0.407'"
(0.073)
Per Capita Income 0.19Z'"
(0.048)
Per Capita Income Squared -0.007'"
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
O.OOZ'"
(0.000)
0.422'"
(0.045)
-2.963'"
(0.306)
0.062'"
(0.017)
1.667'"
(0.165)
-13.755'"
(1.264)
GDPGrowth
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
Urban Population Growth Rate
English Speaking
Commonwealth
Bilateral Trade
Distance from the UK
Constant
0.407'"
(0.073)
0.19Z'··
(0.048)
-0.007'"
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.002'"
(0.000)
0.062'"
(0.017)
-1.322'"
(0.295)
-0.816
(1.287)
-0.815
(0.706)
0.040
(0.034)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.005'"
(0.001)
-0.003"
(0.00l)
0.130
(0.174)
0.112'
(0.061)
0.007
(0.061)
0.s73
(0.s13)
0.000
(.)
-0.816
(1.287)
-0.815
(0706)
0.040
(0.034)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.005'"
(0.001)
-0.003"
(0.001)
0.007
(0.061)
5.386
(4.806)
AU regressions include time dummies for all the years except 1973, as the base, which are not reported in this table. The regressions also include
country dummies for the immigrant sending countries though these drop out in the fixed effects model. * indicates signlftcancc at 1%; • •indicates
significance at 5%, and .u indicated significance at 10%.
inflows for the sub-sample with per capita income up to the logged value 6, whereas it
has a negative but negligible effect for the sub-sample with a per capita income greater
than 6. A negative effect is expected because GOP growth leads to more employment
opportunities in the home country, however, a positive coefficient for growth rate at a
relatively lower per capita income level is also plausible since GOP growth may also
lead to the weakening of financial constraints with GDP growth providing needed
resources for migration.
The effect of political rights and civil liberties is negative for nearly all the estimates
except the estimates for refugees where the effect is positive. This is as expected and in
line with Ratte and Vogler (2000), who ague that the negative effect indicates that free
movement and hence more migration might be facilitated by a good political climate,
in general. However, for refugee migration, it is primarily the outcome of poor
political and human rights conditions. Urban population growth rate in the migrant
sending country is expected to have a positive effect on the rate of immigration. This
is generally found to be the case. However, it has no significant effect for refugees
and students and tends to have a negative effect for the sub-sample with a per capita
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income greater than the average.
Based on the random effects estimates, it is seen that immigration to the UK tends
to increase if the sending country is an English speaking country though this does
not matter for student and refugees. Similarly, the benchmark model shows that
immigration tends to increase if the country is a member of the British Commonwealth
though the effect is negative for refugees and in the sample split results. As expected
bilateral trade per head with the sending country, a proxy for contacts/networks has
a positive impact on the rate of immigration to the UK while distance of the sending
country from the UK has a negative impact on the inflow of migrants.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter undertakes a panel data analysis of the determinants of migrant flows
using administrative immigration data for the UK from 1973 to 2005 to ascertain the
non-linear relationship between economic development levels in the migrant sending
country and the migrant inflows. The study is motivated by the misconception
that there is a linear relationship between the level of economic development and
emigration, such that, helping improve general economic conditions (through trade
and aid) in poor countries would reduce the rates of emigration from those countries
to the developed world. This simplistic view is apparent in the calls, by some scholars,
politician and development practitioners, to promote economic development through
trade and aid as a way of addressing the root cause of migrant flows from poor
countries.
The chapter is based on the premise that economic development is more likely to
lead to more immigration from poor countries, at least in the short to medium term,
since development provides the needed resources to facilitate migration at the initial
stages. The study therefore tests the hypothesis that there an inverse U-shaped
relationship between economic development and migrant flows from poor countries,
i.e. emigration initially rises with economic development up to a certain development
threshold after which further economic development leads to less emigration.
The analysis in the chapter confirms that, to a large extent, the hypothesis holds
but is sensitive to aggregations of countries. It may therefore be concluded that,
while the analyses confirm a non-linear relationship between economic development
and migrant inflows from poor countries to the UK, it reveals that there is some
heterogeneity in the relationship across different country groupings.
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CHAPTER3
Economic versus Cultural
Determinants of Attitudes towards
Immigration
3.1 Introduction
The role of non-economic determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration
has always been acknowledged as important in the economic literature though usually
perceived as less traceable and treated as supplementary (ancillary) rather than a
main determinant of individual attitudes towards immigration. However, only a
few studies (Card, Dustman and Preston, 2005b; Dustmann and Preston, 2007) have
systematically examined, empirically, the role of non-economic considerations in
shaping attitudes towards immigration. Evidence of any comparative analysis of
the strength of economic versus non-economic determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration is scarce. This chapter takes a step at filling this gap in the
literature by empirically exploring how individual assessments of economic and
cultural effects of immigrants shape their immigration policy preferences. This
provides the opportunity to directly compare the importance of economic and non-
economic determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration.
According to Zimmermann and Constant (2008), the EU recognizes that culture and
diversity are vital elements to its member economies and competitiveness and its
international relations with third countries. Studies by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for
the US and Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Prarolo (2008) for the EU also find that
cultural diversity is positively correlated with productivity. They provide evidence
that causation runs from the former to the latter. While cultural diversity is mainly
enhanced by immigrants (of various ethnicities and races), religious minorities,
stateless people, etc; the economic literature on the effects of immigration as well as
the literature on attitudes towards immigration views cultural effects of immigrants
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as non-economic. Studies on the economic impacts of immigrants typically look at the
labour market and welfare state effects of immigrants.
Irrespective of the effects of immigrants on the economy, be it through cultural diver-
sity, labour market or welfare state, the immigration policies in modern democratic
societies are, to a large extent, outcomes of citizens' attitudes towards immigrants
and immigration (Rodrik 1995). These individual attitudes are, in turn, shaped by
how the individual perceives the effects of immigrants on their personal, social and
economic welfare. Thus, individual attitudes towards immigration are deeply rooted
in the self-interest hypothesis. Although the economic literature on individual atti-
tudes towards immigration recognises the importance of non-economic determinants
(such as culture), the focus is generally on economic concerns. The role of cultural
diversity, racism and ethnicity are often treated as secondary, often without syste-
matic analysis. This is in spite of the fact that Card, Dustman and Preston (2005b)
find cultural concerns to be more important than economic concerns. This chapter
therefore aims to provide more systematic empirical analyses aimed at comparing the
relative importance of economic and cultural concerns in shaping individual attitudes
towards immigration.
The main research questions in the chapter are: (i) To what extent are economic
concerns more important than cultural concerns in determining individual attitudes
towards immigration? (ii) Do ethnic and racial preferences alter the extent to which
economic concerns differ from cultural concerns in individual attitudes towards
immigration? The primary hypothesis that is tested to answer the research questions
is as follows:
Individual subjective assessments of the economic impacts of immigrants are more important
than their subjective assessment of the cultural impacts of immigrants in shaping their
attitudes towards immigration, irrespective of ethnic or racial preferences.
This hypothesis is tested using data from the European Social Survey (2008/09
edition) and employing the trivariate probit model for the empirical analyses.
3.2 Literature Review
In Europe and in the United States the policy debate on immigration focuses mainly
on who should be allowed to come and how many. The debates typically have
two distinct dimensions - economic and non-economic. The economic concerns
are normally related to consequences of immigration on the labour markets (such
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as unemployment level, wage level, skill shortage issues etc), welfare state and
public finance outcomes. The non-economic issues relate to cultural alienation
(cultural threat/cultural identity), fear that immigrants will undermine the traditions,
language, religion, political power, or general way of life of the native population.
Other non-economic factors also include beliefs about civil rights (non-discrimination
and free movement of persons), terrorism, international responsibility and altruism.
The aim of this chapter is to compare the impacts of these concerns, particularly
economic and cultural concerns, on individual attitudes towards immigration. The
chapter is therefore related to two strands of literature. First, the chapter is related to
the literature on the effects of immigration on the host country and its citizens. Second,
and more specifically, the study is related to the growing literature that looks at the
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration.
With regard to the literature on the consequences of immigration in the host country,
the studies in economics primarily focus on labour market impacts; welfare state
impacts and cultural impacts (to lesser extent) of immigration. There is a large
body of both theoretical and empirical literature that study the economic impacts
of immigration (Borjas 1994, 1995, 1999,2003; Boeri, Hansen and McCormick, 2002;
Card 1990, 2001, 2005; Card and Di Nardo, 2000). A particularly strong focus has
been on the effect of immigration on labour market outcomes (employment and wage
levels). These studies typically treat labour markets for different skills as segmented,
and focus on the consequences of wages for different skill-groups in the short and
medium run. Even though a consensus has not been achieved on the general impact
of immigrants on wages, reviews of recent evidence (Borjas, 2003) conclude that
there is a small macroeconomic benefit of immigration, but that this is accompanied
by adverse impacts on the employment and wage levels of competing (skill-group)
native workers. This is because immigration changes the relative supply of workers
of different skill groups.
There is also a growing body of literature that focuses on the welfare state effects of
immigrants. This branch of the literature is interested in the impacts of immigrants
on taxes, transfer payments, social security and other state provisions. Some of the
questions explored in this literature include: Do immigrants take into account the
generosity of the welfare state system when choosing a host country? Do immigrants
put a strain on the financing of the welfare state? Do different types (skilled / unskilled)
of immigrants have different impacts on the welfare state? The general argument is
that, the very existence of redistributive social insurance programmes in the main
migrant-receiving countries is likely to have a magnetic effect on some unskilled
immigrants. These unskilled immigrants may not only be interested in the new job
opportunities but also in other benefits that come in the form of subsidised healthcare,
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unemployment compensation or provisions concerning dependents. The consensus is
that unskilled immigrants are likely to represent a net burden on the public finances
in the host countries even though in general migration can have the opposite effect
on the welfare state, for example, when migrants are skilled (Benhabib, 1996; Boeri,
Hanson and McCormick, 2002; Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Facchini and Mayda, 2009a;
Krieger, 2005; Ortega 2005).
In addition to labour market and welfare state impacts, there is also a small but
growing literature in economics that is interested in the cultural consequences of
immigration (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005, 2006). On the one hand, greater cultural
distance between immigrants and native populations in Europe arguably makes the
ideal of national solidarity based on shared values harder to achieve. Immigrants,
who in many cases are of different racial and ethnic groups, with different religions,
languages or culture may be perceived as undermining existing institutions and
threatening the way of life and social status of current residents (Blalock, 1967;
Quillian, 1995). On the other hand, cultural diversity has been considered by
economists as valuable both in consumption and production. For instance, Jacobs
(1969) attributes the prosperity of cities to their industrial diversity. Quigley (1998) and
Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001) identify the diversity of available consumption goods
and services as one of the attractive features of cities. Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(2001) use the 'love of variety' in preferences and technology as the building block of
their theory of spatial development; the production of a larger variety of goods and
services in a particular location increases the productivity and utility of people living
in that location.
Irrespective of the overall consequences of immigration on the host country's labour
market, welfare state and cultural life, the resulting immigration policies are largely an
outcome of individual attitudes towards immigration (Rodrik, 1995). This chapter is
more closely related to the substantial body of literature that studies the determinants
of individual attitudes towards immigration. This literature looks at the effect of
both economic and non economic factors on attitudes towards immigration. The
overall message from these studies is that, whereas non-economic drivers have an
important and independent effect on individual preferences, economic characteristics
of the respondents are shown to systematically shape attitudes towards immigration
(Facchini and Mayda, 2009a).
The early contributions have mainly focused on individual countries like the United
States (Citrin et al., 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Kessler, 2001; Scheve
and Slaughter, 2001) and the United Kingdom (Dustmann and Preston, 2001; 2004;
2007). More recently, cross country studies have taken advantage of newly available
social surveys, which cover large samples of both advanced and developing countries
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(Chiswick and Hatton, 2003; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Facchini and
Mayda, 2007; 2009b) and allow richer studies.
Mayda (2006) uses the 1995 round of the International Social Survey Panel and
the 1995-1997 round of the World Value survey to analyses the economic and non-
economic determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants within and across
countries. She finds that labour market concerns, security and cultural considerations
as well as individual feelings towards political refugees and illegal immigration are all
significant determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants. She considers
two main factors under non-economic factors - the impact of immigrants on crime
rates and individual perceptions of the cultural effect of immigrants. Given that
her primary focus was on economic determinants, she shows that the non-economic
determinants do not significantly alter the results regarding economic variables and
concludes that labour market explanations of attitudes towards immigrants survive
after taking into account the non-economic factors. Her conclusions are similar to
O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) who also used the same dataset.
Card, Dustman and Preston (2oo5b) and Dustmann and Preston (2007) are however
the two studies that are most related to the focus of this chapter. Using data from the
British Social Attitudes Survey, 1983-1991, Dustmann and Preston (2007) examines
"Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration". They compare racial
motives with economic considerations relating to individual attitudes immigration.
They conclude that racial issues are considerably more important than economic
concerns in driving attitudes, particularly so amongst less educated and lower skilled
sections of the population.
Card, Dustman and Preston (2005b), however, considers a cross-country approach and
using data from the first round (2002) of the European Social Survey they employ a
combination of factor analysis, independent ordered probit and bivariate probit me-
thods to compare the effects labour market, welfare state and cultural considerations
on individual attitudes towards immigration. They conclude that economic concerns
matter less than cultural protectionism in shaping attitudes towards immigration.
The analysis in this chapter differs from Card, Dustman and Preston (2005b). The
present analysis relies on data from the latest round (2008) of the European Social
Survey, and employs trivariate probit methods with the primary aim of systematically
comparing the effects of economic and cultural concerns in shaping attitudes towards
immigration.
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3.3 Data and Method
This chapter mainly uses the dataset from the fourth wave of the European Social
Suvery (E554),2008/2009, to test the hypothesis that economic concerns are more im-
portant than cultural concerns in shaping individual immigration policy preferences.
The European Social Survey (the ESS)is a biennial multi-country survey, which started
in 2002/2003, covering over 30 nations. It is an academically-driven social survey
designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions
and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations. The ESS
employs random (probability) sampling methods with comparable estimates based on
full coverage of the eligible residential populations aged 15 or older who are resident
within private households, regardless of nationality and citizenship or language.
The broad national coverage provides cross-national variation in social, political and
economic contexts. In each round the questionnaire consists of a "core" module
that contains a large range of socioeconomic and demographic questions and several
rotating, topic-specific modules, one of which focuses on the issue of immigration.
The data used for the analysis in this chapter come from the third edition of the
ESS4 data release which covers twenty-eight countries and consists of up to 54,988
observations (respondents) with the average country sample being around 1900
respondents. The countries are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany,
Denmark, Estonia, Span, Finland, France, UK, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia Croatia, Czech
Republic, Greece, Latvia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. Germany (5.00%) has the
largest proportion of the total unweighted sample size followed by Spain (4.68%)and
Russia (4.57%),while Cyprus (2.21%) has the smallest proportion of the total sample
(although when the appropriate weights are applied Russia has the largest proportion
of the weighted sample). The econometric analyses are however carried out on the
weighted samples. The data comprise of design weights and population weights that
correct for the slight differences in the probabilities of selection within a country and
also the differences in population sizes across countries.
3.3.1 Outline of Relevant Survey Questions
The main dependent variables for the empirical analysis carried out in this chapter
are taken from three versions of the survey question which required respondents
to provide, on a four-point scale ("many", "some", "few" or "none"), how many
immigrants should ideally be permitted to enter their country. The questions are:
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To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group
as most [country's] people to come and live here?
Towhat extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group
as most [country's] people to come and live here?
Towhat extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside
Europe to come and live here?
The available options of answers to these questions are: (a) allow many, (b) allow
some, (c) allow few, (d) allow none, and (e) don't know. The last option ("don't
know) is treated as missing and dropped from the analysis. The resulting categorical
variables from the survey questions above are named IMPP}, IMPP2 and IMPP3
respectively (i.e. immigration policy preference 1, 2 and 3). Unlike similar questions
in other cross-country surveys (such as the International Social Survey Programme-
ISSP), that typically ask how respondents will alter existing immigration policies (Le.
whether they would prefer to relax or tighten immigration policy in their country),
the answers to the questions above are expected to be less biased by the individual's
judgement of the current immigration policy and the current number of immigrants
living in their country. Note also that the word "immigrants" is not mentioned in
the questions above since it may have different connotations in different European
countries. Instead the phrase "people from abroadE.to come and live in [country]"
is used. This framing leaves open the issue of whether immigrants are permanent
or temporary. The variation in the questions (pertaining to the race/ ethnicity and
general skill level) also allows the views of the relative desirability of the potential
immigrants to be captured and analysed.
The three variables (IMPP1, IMPP2 and IMPP3) capture the individual's immigra-
tion policy preferences which could be regarded as indicators of the latent individual
attitudes towards immigration and hence are the main dependent variables in this
study. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to estimate the independent effects of the
individual's economic and cultural concerns on their attitudes towards immigration
as observed by their immigration policy preferences.
To measure the substance of the individual's economic concerns regarding immigra-
tion, this study relies on respondents' answers to the following question:
Would you say that it is generally bad or good for [countryJ's economy that people come to live
herefrom other countries?
The responses to this question are recorded on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 indicates
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the individual's subjective view that immigrants are bad for the economy and 10
implies immigrants are good for the economy. This subjective individual assessment
of the effect of immigrants on their country's economy could be seen as capturing
the individual's economic self-interest regarding immigrants and immigration. Thus,
a rational utility maximising individual, assuming they are well informed, and have
no other preconceptions will be expected to choose to "allow many" immigrants if
they believe that immigrants are good for their economic outcomes (wages, taxes etc).
The variable resulting from these subjective assessments of the economic effects of
immigrants is named pro - immigration - economy: the first explanatory variable of
interest in this study.
Similarly, the second explanatory variable of interest, pro-immigration-culture, comes
from respondents' answers to the following question:
Would you say that [countryJ's cuIturallife is generally undermined or enriched by people
coming to live herefrom other countries?
The responses are also recorded on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 implies a subjective
assessment that immigrants undermine cultural life in the country and 10 means
immigrants enrich the cultural life in the country.
Thus, all things being equal, individuals' immigration policy preferences (given by
IMPPl, IMPP2 and IMPP3) are functions of their views on the economic and
cultural effects of immigrants (pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture).
In addition to these main variables of interest other independent variables and
controls relating to the individual characteristics, personal attributes as well as
relevant socio-economic background information are available from the dataset. These
are detailed in the descriptive statistics in subsection 3.3.3.
3.3.2 Empirical Model and Estimation Method
The aim of the empirical analyses in this chapter is to evaluate and compare the effects
of economic and cultural concerns on the latent individual attitudes towards immi-
gration. This is based on estimating the effects of subjective individual assessments of
the economic and cultural impact of immigrants on observed individual immigration
policy preferences, where the potential immigration are of the same race or ethnicity;
of a different race or ethnicity; and from poor countries outside Europe. This requires
estimating the effects of pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture on each
of the dependent variables (lMPPl, IMPP2 and IMPP3) while controlling for indivi-
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dual socio-economic backgrounds.
The canonical empirical method, given that all three dependent variables contain
ordinal responses, is the ordered probit model. This method would comprise
simply of a series of three independent ordered probit regressions (for IMPP1,
IMPP2 and IMPP3) with both pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture
as determinants along with the controls. However, due to possible endogeneity bias,
the ordered probit method may not be appropriate for the analysis in this chapter.
Edogeneity bias may be a problem because of any or all of the following three
reasons. Firstly, the causal relation between each of the two explanatory variables (pro-
immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture) and each of the dependent variables
(IMPP1, IMPP2 and IMPP3) may not be unidirectional. Thus while one would
expect the high correlation between individual preferences and their economic or
cultural concerns, one cannot expect causality to always run from the later to the
former. Hence the analyses need to control for possible dual causality. Secondly, the
two explanatory variables of interest may, just as well as the dependent variables, be
influenced by the socio-economic background variables (such as ages, education level
etc) used as controls. Thus, the main variables (IMPP1, IMPP2 and IMPP3 as well
as pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture) may all be jointly determined
by similar observed variables'. Thirdly, the variables may all depend on correlated
unobserved factors.
The nature of the possible endogeneity problem suggests the use of simultaneous
equation techniques (Freedman and Sekhon, 2010). Theoretically, this means that a
recursive trivariate ordered probit model needs to be estimated. However, according
to Greene and Hensher (2009) the bivariate ordered probit model is more or less the
dimensional limit of the applications of the multivariate ordered probit model due
to practical reasons. Hence the trivariate probit model seems to be the next practical
option available in the class of discrete choice models. The trivariate probit model
is a generalisation of the univariate probit model that allows the estimation of three
dichotomous dependent variables simultaneously. This method explicitly models the
correlation in the disturbance term (unobserved factors). In the case of the analysis in
this chapter, two of the three dependent dichotomous variables in the trivariate probit
model are endogenously determined.
The trivariate probit model used to estimate the influence of economic and cultural
concerns on individual attitudes towards immigration is therefore given by:
1Thus there may be a case of possible multicollinearity bias
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Yi = aYi + 'Yyj + f31Xl + El where Yl = 1 if Yi > 0, 0 otherwise
Yi = f32X2 + E2
yj = f33X3 + E3
where Y2 = 1 if Yi > 0, 0 otherwise
where Y3 = 1 if yj > 0, 0 otherwise
(3.1)
Where Yi, Yi and yj represent the latent attitudes towards immigration, concerns
about the economic effects of immigrant and concerns about the cultural effects of
immigrants respectively. The observed dichotomous indicators for these are given by
YI , Y2 and Y3 while Xl , X2 and X3 represent the vectors of observed determinants which
may be the same across the three equations. The error terms (El, E2 and E3) are assumed
to be multivatriate normal and jointly correlated. In the case of the multivariate probit
model the correlated disturbances are represented by:
COV[El,E2J = P21
COV[El,E3J = P31
COV[E2,E3J = P32
(3.2)
The unknown parameters a and I represent coefficients of pro-immigration-economic
and pro-immigration-culture, while f31 , f32 and f33 are the coefficients of the demogra-
phic and socio-economic controls. The three correlation coefficients (P21, P31, P32) along
with the other unknown parameters are estimated using the trivariate probit re-
gressions-. This empirical strategy has the advantage of allowing the individual im-
migration policy preferences to be estimated jointly and simultaneously with pro-
immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture. The recursive trivariate probit es-
timation also controls for dual causality and takes into account the likely correla-
tion between the errors' terms. The method applies the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane
(GHK) smooth recursive conditioning simulator to evaluate the multivariate normal
distribution. Capellari and Jenkins (2003) state that the simulated probabilities are
unbiased, and they bound the correlation coefficients (P21, P3lt P32) within the (0,1)
interval. They argue that the GHK simulator is also more efficient (in terms of the
variance of the estimators of probabilities) than other simulators and is a continuous
and differentiable function of the model's parameters. Hajivassiliou, McFadden and
Ruud (1996) also found the GHK simulator to generally outperform other simulators.
Although the estimation technique allows the vectors Xl , X2 and X3 to contain the
same variables, some control variables are excluded in the vectors. This is expected
to improve identification in the model. Thus, some variables in X2 are excluded
2This is implemented by the multivariate probit application 'rnvprobit' for Stata version 10.1 (Stata
Corporation, TX, USA) that uses Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator developed by Cappallari
and Jenkins, 2003
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in Xl and X3 while some variables in X3 are excluded in Xl and X2. The additional
control variables that may also serve as exclusion restrictions are described in the next
subsection.
It should however be noted that the multivariate probit model does not require any
instruments or exclusion restrictions for identification. Wilde (2000) demonstrates that
no additional restrictions on the parameters are needed to achieve the identification of
the multivariate probit model with an endogenous dummy regressor. Identification
requires only the existence of one varying exogenous regressor. This is in spite of
the fact that Maddala (1983, p. 122) agues that, for the two equation probit model,
the parameters of the second equation are not identified if there are no exclusion
restrictions on the exogenous variables.
The individual immigration policy preference variables (IMP PI, IMP P2 and IMP P3),
as well as the covariates, pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture,
are re-coded to reflect the dichotomous nature of YI, Y2 and Y3. The individual
immigration policy preferences (IMPP1, IMPP2 and IMPP3) are redefined as binary
variables where the 1 represents pro-immigration preferences, "allow many" and
"allow some", while 0 represents anti-immigration preferences, "allow few" and
"allow none". This is presented in the transformation below:
1 Allow none
2 Allow few ~ { 1 if IMPP; > 2 (pro - immigration)IMPP; = o if IMPP; ~ 2 (anti - immigration) (3.3)
3 Allow some
4 Allow many
The endogenous dependent variable, pro-immigration-economic, is redefined as a binary
variable such that all outcomes above 6 on the 0-10 response scale are re-coded as 1,
meaning immigrants are good for the economy while all other outcomes, 0-6, are re-
coded as O.This is represented in the transformation below:
pro - immig - eco =
1
o immigrants are bad for the economy
10 immigrants are good for the economy
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if pro - immig - eco > 6 (immigrants are good for the economy)
if pro - immig - eco ~ 6 (immigrants are bad for the economy)
(3.4)
On the original scale of 0-10 one would regard outcome 5 as the midpoint, signifying
that immigrant are neither good nor bad for the economy. Hence any outcome above
5 may be deemed as indicating that immigrants are good for the economy, while any
outcome below 5 represents the believe that immigrants are bad for the economy.
However, it could be argued that those who chose outcomes 6 on the 11 point scale
are the people who do not necessarily want to send a clear message that they believe
immigrants are good for the economy. Therefore, to capture only responses that
clearly and strongly indicate beliefs that immigrants are good for the economy I
choose only outcomes above 6 to be re-coded as 1 while relegating any uncertainties
to 0 (immigrants are bad for the economy).
Similarly, pro-immigration-culture is also redefined from a 0-10 categorical variable to a
dichotomous variable. All outcomes above 6 are re-coded as 1, meaning immigrants
enrich the cultural life in the country. All other outcomes, 0-6, are re-coded as 0,
meaning immigrants undermine the cultural life in the country.
pro - immig - culture =
o immigrants undermine cu1turallife
1
10 immigrants enrich cultural life
~ { 1
o if pro - immig - culture ~ 6 (immigrants undermine cu1turallife)
if pro - immig - culture> 6 (immigrants enrich cultural life) (3.5)
For both pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture, additional variables
are created with a set of more relaxed definitions named pro-immigration-economicil)
and pro-immigration-cultureil), These additional variables, which are used in the
robustness check estimates, are defined such that they take the value of 1 if the original
outcome is greater than 5; otherwise they take the value O. Similarly, a set of stricter
variables pro-immigration-economic(2) and pro-immigration-culture(2) are also defined
such that they take the values of 1 if the original outcomes are greater than 7; while
every original outcome that is 7 and below is re-coded as O.
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3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
The analyses in this chapter focus on three main dependent variables - IMP P1, IMP P2
and IMPP3 - represented by in the above trivariate model and the two endogenous
dependent variables, pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture represented
by Y2 and Y3 respectively. Table 3.1present the sample means and standard deviations
for these variables.
The table indicates that the race or ethnicity of the potential immigrants is very
important for the individual's attitude towards immigration. It shows that, while
65 percent of 52, 678 respondents are willing to allow immigrants of the same race
or ethnicity as them to come and live in their country, only 48 percent of 52, 439
respondents are willing to allow immigrants of a different race or ethnicity to come
and live in their country. This suggests that attitudes are more unfavourable if there
is a large racial distance between potential immigrants and natives. The attitudes
are even more hostile if the potential immigrants are from poor counties outside
Europe - only 45 percent of 52, 055 respondents would allow immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe to come and live in their country. This general opposition for
immigration from poor countries outside Europe is mostly likely due to the perception
that those immigrants are predominantly of low skills (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007),
in addition to being of different cultural backgrounds.
More generally, the distribution shows that while the preferences for immigrants of
the same race or ethnicity are above the average (0.50), preferences for immigrants
of different race or ethnicity and immigrants from poor countries outside Europe are
below average. However, there are significant differences in these attitudes across
countries as indicated by the standard deviations. The cross countries differences are
larger for IMPP2 and IMPP3 both with a standard deviation of 0.50.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Endogenous Dependent Variables
Main Dependent Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev
Preferences for Immigrants of the Same Race or Ethnicity (IMPP1)
Preferences for Immigrants of a Different Race or Ethnicity (lMPP2)
Preferences for Immigrants from Poor Countries Outside Europe (lMPP3)
52,67S
52,439
52,055
0.65
0.4S
0.45
0.48
0.5
0.5
Endogenous Dependent Variables
Pro-immigration-economic
Pro-immigration-culture
51,762
51,SOl
0.26
0.37
0.44
0.48
Endogenous Dependent Variables (Altemative definitions)
Pro-immigration-economic( 1)
Pro-immigra tion-cul ture(I )
Pro-immigration-economic(2)
Pro-immigration-culture(2)
51,762
51 ,SOl
51,762
51,SOI
0.37
0.47
0.15
0.23
0.48
0.5
0.35
0.42
50
Figure 3.1 highlights the cross country differences in IMPP1, IMPP2 and IMPP3 but
also the differences within each country between the three variables. For instance, the
figure shows that nearly all the respondents (91 percent) in Sweden have a preference
for immigrants of the same race or ethnicity while the proportion is only 37 percent
in Turkey. With regards to immigrants of a different race or ethnicity, Sweden leads
again with 87 percent of the Swedish respondents in favour while only 12 percent
of the respondents from Cyprus are in favour. Similarly, most Swedish respondents
(87 percent) are in favour of immigration from poor countries outside Europe while
Cyprus has the lowest proportion of respondents (9 percent) in favour of immigration
from poor countries outside Europe. Thus the Swedish population are, on average,
more pro-immigration than all the other countries irrespective of the race or origin
of the potential immigrants. Among all the countries in the dataset, the Cypriot
population (made up mainly of Greek and Turkish Cypriots) discriminates most
between the three type immigrants. For instance, while 80 percent of the Cypriot
respondents are in favour of having immigrants of the same race or ethnicity, only 12
percent of them are in favour of having immigrants of a different race or ethnicity.
The Spanish population seems to exhibit the least racial discrimination in their
immigration policy preferences. In fact, the proportion of Spanish respondents that
are in favour of having immigrants from a different race or ethnicity (43 percent)
is slightly higher than the proportion that prefers immigrants of the same race (42
percent). In Sweden, Belgium and Israel the mean IMPP2 is equal to the mean IMPP3.
However, in Poland, Slovakia and Turkey the proportion of respondents that prefer
immigrants from poor countries outside Europe exceeds the proportions that prefer
to have immigrants of a different race (i.e, the mean IMPP3 is greater than the mean
IMPP2 in these countries).
Table 3.1 also indicates that, in general, individual perceptions about the effects of
immigrants on the economy and on the cultural life are mostly negative. The table
shows that about 74 percent of the respondents believe that immigrants are bad for
their economy while 63 percent believe that immigrants undermine the cultural life
in their country. Nevertheless there are more optimistic views on the cultural effects
of immigrants (37 percent) than there are on the economic effects of immigrants (26
percent). The patterns in these distributions for pro-immigration-economic and pro-
immigration-culture do not change when the definitions are relaxed or tightened further
for pro-immigration-economicil) and pro-immigration-culture(1) on the one hand and
pro-immigration-economic(2) and pro-immigration-culture(2) on other. Thus, the general
perceptions are still mostly negative for cultural effects and economic effects with the
optimistic views greater for cultural than economic effects.
These views however differ considerably across countries according to the standard
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Figure 3.1:Proportions ofIndividual Immigration Preferencesby Country
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deviations of +/ - 0.44 for pro-immigration-economic and +/ - 0.48 for pro-immigration-
culture. For instance, even though the overall sample mean is only 37 percent for
pro-immigration-culture, as high as 74 percent of the respondents in Finland believe
that immigrants enrich the cultural life in the country. On the hand, as low as
11 percent of the respondents in Greece believe that immigrants enrich the cultural
life in their country. The cross country variations (captured by figure 3.2) in pro-
immigration-economic are not as high as they are in pro-immigration-culture even though
the individual country means differ considerably from the overall sample mean.
Switzerland has the largest proportion of respondents (50 percent) who believe that
immigrants are good for the economy while Greece has the smallest proportion of
respondents (12percent) who believe that immigrants are good for the economy.
Figure 3.2 also confirms that the views on cultural effects are more optimistic than the
views on economic effects of immigrants, even for the individual country samples.
For instance, while Finland leads with a dear 74 percent for pro-immigration-culture,
Switzerland's leads for pro-immigration-economic is not dear cut with 50 percent. In
addition, for all the countries (except Cyprus, Russia and Greece) the mean pro-
immigration-culture exceeds the mean pro-immigration-economic. These descriptive
statistics suggests that the high racial and ethnic discrimination in Cyprus and Greece
(as indicated by IMPPI and IMPP2) may be due to the fact that most Cypriots and
Greeks believe that immigrants undermine the cultural life in their country.
The empirical model adopted for the analysis means that the individual's economic
and cultural concerns about the effects of immigrants together with the resulting
individual immigration policy preferences are jointly determined, simultaneously, by
the individual's demographic and socio-economic background factors as well as other
personal characteristics or attributes. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for all the
independent control variables considered for the analysis in this chapter.
Controls for the individual's age, education level, citizenship, gender (female) and
ethnicity (ethnic minority), are included in the benchmark model as standard. Table 3.2
shows that with a mean of 48 years, most of the respondents are aged between 29 and
67years. The age distribution in each of the individual country samples does not differ
too much from this overall age distribution. The age and education level distributions by
country are provided in TableA3.2 in the appendix. The education level is a categorical
variable with 0 to 6 categories respectively representing: not completed high school;
completed primary or basic; completed lower secondary; completed upper secondary;
completed post-secondary, non-tertiary; completed tertiary and completed second
stage tertiary. The summary statistics indicate that the average respondent in the full
sample has completed the upper secondary (3) education level. With the exception of
Portugal and Turkey (where the average respondent has a lower level of education)
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Figure 3.2: Proportions of Individuals with Pro-immigration Economic and Cultural attitudes by Country
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the respondent education level distributions are similar across all the countries. As
an alternate measure of the respondent's education level, the years of schooling is used
in place of education level for robustness check. This is a continuous variable that
simply counts the total number of years of full-time education completed by the
respondent. The mean years of school completed by respondents is 12 years, which
roughly corresponds the upper secondary level of education in most countries.
As a control for citizenship, the dummy variable, citizen, is used in the benchmark
models. This takes the value 1 if the individual is a citizen (officially) of the country
in which they are surveyed and 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable, born in
the country, (equal to 1 if individual was born in the country) is used as a proxy
for citizenship in the robustness checks. The data shows that 97 percent of the
respondents are citizens of the relevant survey countries while 91 percent were born
in those countries.
With regard to gender, the dummy variable, female, (equal to 1 if female and 0
otherwise) is included in the benchmark models. To control for ethnicity, the dummy
variable, ethnic minority, is included in the regressions. This takes the value 1 if the
respondent considers themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority in the country;
otherwise it takes the value o. Table 3.2 shows that 55 percent of the respondents are
females, while 7 percent consider themselves as members of an ethnic minority in their
country.
Two dummy variables (unemployed and retired) are included to control for the indi-
vidual's labour market status which has been shown to be important in previous
studies (Mayda, 2(06). Unemployed takes the value 1 if the individual is unemployed
and actively looking for a job in the past seven days (before they were interviewed)
and 0 otherwise. The summary statistics show that 4 percent of the respondents are
unemployed and actively looking for a job, while 26 percent are retired, although
these vary slightly between countries. Figure A3.1 in the appendix shows Turkey
has the highest proportion of unemployed respondents (11 percent) though it also
has the lowest proportions of retired respondents (10 percent). Cyprus has the lowest
proportion of the unemployed (1 percent) and a proportion of retired respondents (17
percent) that is less than the overall sample mean (26 percent). The low proportion
of unemployed for Cyprus supports the statistics (shown above) that indicate that
Cypriots are more pro-immigration-economic than they are pro-immigration-culture.
The household income is included as a measure of social class differences. The
household income variable is coded 1-10, where 1 represents households with income
corresponding to that held by 10 percent of households with lowest income (0-10%);
and 10 represent household with income corresponding to that held by top 10 percent
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of households. The household income variable (with a mean of 5.29) is expected to be
highly correlated with the education level (skills) variable hence the inclusion of both
variables might raise some issues of multicollinearity. As a result household income
is not included in the benchmark models but in extended models for robustness.
To control for the effect of the political views of individuals, the variable Right-wing
Political inclination is also included in the regressions. This variable is measured on a
scale of 0 to 10; where 0 is equal to a self-reported left-wing political inclination and
10 is equal to a self-reported right-wing political inclination. This is envisaged to take
care of any bias in the individual's opinions and preferences that may be a result of
their political affinities or ideologies. Table 3.2 shows that, in general, the majority of
people are neither wholly left or right, politically (mean of 5.20).
Table 3.2: Descrietive Statistics for Joint Inde~ndent Variables
Independent Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Age 54,791 47.53 18.52 15 123
Age-squared 54,791 2602.55 1846.75 225 15129
Education Level 54,841 3.00 1.42 0 6
Years of Schooling 54,478 11.87 4.16 0 48
Citizen 54,943 0.97 0.18 0
Bom in the Country 54,867 0.91 0.28 0
Female 54,958 0.55 O.SO 0
Ethnic Minority 53,843 0.07 0.25 0
Unemployed 54,988 0.04 0.20 0
Retired 54,988 0.26 0.44 0
Household Income 39,563 5.29 2.79 10
Right-wing Political Inclination 45,948 5.20 2.30 0 10
Worked Abroad 46,991 0.05 0.23 0
Big City 54,nl 0.27 0.44 0
Current Immigration level: Subjective Estimate 44,486 3.79 2.58 11
The nature of personal contacts one has with immigrants can influence not only
the individual's immigration policy preferences but also their assessment of the
cultural and economic impacts of immigrants in their country (Allport, 1979). He
distinguishes between "true acquaintance" (e.g. being entertained as a dinner guest in
an immigrant's home) and superficial or "casual contact" (e.g. passing an immigrant
on the street). While the first type of contact is likely to decrease prejudice towards
the immigrant, the second seems more likely to increase it. To measure and control for
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the effects of personal contacts with immigrants, the dummy variable worked abroad
(which is equal to 1 if the individual has ever worked abroad for more than six months;
otherwise 0) is used. Additionally, the dummy variable big city is used which take
the value 1 if the individual lives in a big city and 0 otherwise. The assumption
is that those who live in big cities are more likely to have more "true contact" with
immigrants. The summary statistics show that while only 5 percent of the respondents
have ever worked abroad for more than six months, 27 percent live in big cities.
The individual's subjective estimate of the current immigrant population in their
country (Current Immigration level) is also included in the regressions to control for both
the individual's disposition towards the existing immigration policy in their country
and their perception of the immigrant population in their country. Respondents are
asked to provide their subjective estimate of the proportion of people of working
age born outside the country. The resulting categorical variable is coded from 1 to
11 (where 1 represents 0-4 percent, 2 is 5-9 percent ~ and 11 represent 50 percent or
more). With a mean of 3.79 and a standard deviation of 2.58 it shows that the majority
of respondents rate the existing level of immigration in their country between 0 and
29 percent.
Table 3.3: Descrietive Statistics for Exclusion Restrictions
Exclusion Restrictions for Pro-immigration Economic Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Economic Satisfaction 53,652 3.81 2.48 0 10
Job Security 52,536 2.84 1.61 5
Ufe Satisfaction 54,521 6.54 2.45 0 10
Exclusion Restrictions for Pro-immigration Culture
Multicultural 53.224 2.40 1.07 6
Traditional 53,379 2.61 1.32 6
Religious 54,375 4.86 3.02 0 10
Table 3.3 provides the summary statistics for the additional control variables excluded
in model equations. Three variables are chosen that may satisfy the condition of
exclusion restriction for the endogenous dependent variable, pro-immigration-economic.
These are economic satisfaction, job security and life satisfaction. The economic satisfaction
is a categorical variable (captured. on a scale of 0-10, where 0 indicates extreme
dissatisfaction while 10 denotes extreme satisfaction) that measures how satisfied
respondents are with the present state of the economy in their respective countries.
Job security measures the extent to which respondents think they are likely to be
unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 months. This is recorded on a scale
of 1-5, where 1 is equal to "not at all likely"; 2 is "not very likely"; 3 is "likely"; 4 is
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livery likely" and 5 is lino longer working and not looking for work".
It is expected that the level of economic satisfaction and job security would influence the
pro-immigration-economic outcomes but will have no direct effect on pro-immigration-
culture or the individual's immigration policy preferences. Thus, for instance, if an
individual is extremely satisfied with the state of the economy then they might be
more likely to think that immigrants are good for the economy. Also, if an individual
feels they are not at all likely to be unemployed in the next 12 month then they are
more likely to have an optimistic view about the effects of immigrants on the economy.
However, all things being equal, this should not influence their view on the cultural
effects of immigrants.
The life satisfaction variable (measured on a scale of 0-10, where 0 is extremely
dissatisfied and 10 is extremely satisfied) captures the extent to which the respondent
is satisfied with life as a whole. This is expected to influence individual's views
on both the economic and cultural effects of immigrants but not directly their
immigration policy preferences. Table 3.3 shows that while mean economic satisfaction
is only 3.81, the mean life satisfaction is 6.54 indicating that generally respondent are
less satisfied about the sate of the economy than they are about life as a whole.
This suggests that respondents' satisfaction with the economy does not necessarily
overshadow their satisfaction with life as a whole.
Three variables are also chosen that may satisfy the condition of exclusion restriction
for pro-immigration-culture and hence included in the vector X3 but not X2 or Xl . These
are multicultural, traditional and religious; factors that are expected to directly influence
cultural concerns regarding the effects of immigrants. The variables multicultural
and traditional come from the supplementary survey questions of ESS4. Multicultural
measures the extent to which the respondent believes they are like the person who sees
difference/ diversity positively and as something worth learning about. Respondents
are asked: how much like you is this person, for whom it is important to listen to people who
are different from him/her; a person who still wants to understand different people even when
Ire/she disagrees with them?
Similarly, traditional measures the extent to which the individual believes traditions
and customs are important to them. They are asked: How much like you is this person
who tries to follow the customs handed down by his/her religion or family?
Both multicultural and traditional are categorical variables with outcomes on a scale
of 1 to 6 as follows: very much like me (1); like me (2); somewhat like me (3); a
little like me (4); not like me (5); Not like me at all (6). One would expect a negative
relationship between multicultural and pro-immigration-culture-indicating that that the
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more a person believes they are multicultural, the more likely they are to think that
immigrants enrich the cultural life in their country. On the other hand the more
traditional an individual is, the less likely they are to think that immigrants enrich
the cultural life in their country - hence a positive relationship is expected between
traditional and pro-immigration-culture. Both traditional and multicultural are however
not expected to influence the individual's view on the effect of immigrants on the
economy, all things being equal. The descriptive statistics indicate that, for the
overall sample, respondents are skewed towards both multicultural and traditional.
Interestingly, the overall distribution for traditional seems to be driven by strong
traditional samples in a few countries like Cyprus, Greece and Ukraine'. Figures A3.2;
A3.3;A3.4 and A3.5 in the appendix provides more details.
The final explanatory variable in vector X3 that also serves the purpose of an exclusion
restriction variable for pro-immigration-culture, religious, measures the extent to which
the respondent considers themself as religious. This is recorded on scale of 0 to 10,
where 0 represents "not at all religious" and 10 represent "very religious". Table 3.3
indicates that the overall distribution is skewed towards "not religious" with a mean
of 4.86 and a standard deviation of 3.02.
3.4 Results
This section presents the results and discussions from a series of trivariate probit
regressions with the aim of analysing the relative importance of economic and cultural
concerns as the main determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration.
The regressions estimate the effects of pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-
culture on pro-immigration policy preferences in a system of simultaneous equations
with correlated errors. In order to provide a more systematic comparison, the
relative importance of these determinants is examined separately for three types of
immigrants: immigrants of the same race and ethnicity (lMPP1); immigrants of
different race and ethnicity (IMPP2); and immigrants from poor countries outside
Europe (I MPP3). Results from standard ordered probit models are also presented to
compare the result between the three types of immigrants.
Country dummies are included for all countries, except Germany (designated as a
comparison group), in all the regressions to control for country-specific effects on
individual attitudes towards immigration that are not explicitly accounted for in the
model. The coefficients for the country dummies are not provided in the tables due
3And Turkey to a lesser extent.
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to lack of space. In addition, robust standard errors are used in all the estimates. The
estimates are also weighted by design weights (dweight) and population size weights
(pweight) variables. These are provided with the dataset to correct for slightly different
probabilities of selection as well as to correct for the similarities in sample sizes across
countries that are not of the same sizes in population. These weights make it possible
to generalise the results for the whole population in Europe.
Table 3.4 presents the results from the benchmark models, 1, 2 and 3 representing es-
timates for IMPPl, IMPP2 and IMPP3 respectively as the main dependent variables
while pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture are the main endogenous
variable of interest. The first elements to note from the table are the test statistics.
Starting with the Wald Test of Overall Significance, which is used as a goodness of fit
test, the table shows that all three models are well fitted and the hypotheses that the
independent variables are jointly equal to zero are strongly rejected.
The Likelihood Ratio Test of Independent Equations is significant at 1 percent level for
each of the three models with following Chi-squares and P-values: X2(3) = 1968.20,
p-value = 0.000 and x2(3) = 1970.09, p-value = 0.000; and X2(3) = 2061.07; p-
value = 0.000 respectively for models 1, 2 and 3.This indicates that the residuals
(disturbance terms) for the three simultaneous equations in each of the models are
jointly correlated. Hence the trivariate probit specification is statistically appropriate
for the analysis. In spite of this, the table also shows that not all the pair-wise
correlation coefficients (P21, P31, P32) are significant. While for model 1, all three
correlation coefficients (P21, P31, P32) are significant, only is significant for models 2
and 3. However, the signs for the coefficients are consistent for all three models.
The correlation between pro-immigration preferences for immigrants of the same race
(lMPP1) and pro-immigration-economic is -0.095. The correlation between pro-immigration
preferences for immigrants of the same race (lMPP1) and pro-immigration-culture is
-0.120, while the correlation between pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-
culture is 0.559. This means that the unobserved factors influencing IMPPI are negati-
vely correlated with the unobserved factors influencing both pro-immigration-economic
and pro-immigration-culture while the unobserved factors influencing the two endoge-
nous dependent variables are positively correlated with each other. Irrespective of the
sign or significance of these coefficients the important point to note is that they control
for any correlations between the unobserved variables.
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3.4.1 Economic and Cultural Concerns
After controlling for any common unobserved factors, individual socio-economic and
demographic characteristics, country-specific factors, and other factors, the results
in the second part of Table 3.4 show that both pro-immigration-economic and pro-
immigration-culture are strong positive and highly significant (at 1 percent significance
level) determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. This result holds
irrespective of the type of immigrants in question (i.e. immigrants of the same race,
immigrants of a different race or immigrants from poor countries outside Europe).
The results suggest that there is a significant increase in the likelihood that an
individual prefers to "allow many" or "allow some" immigrants of the same race or
ethnicity to come and live in their country if the individual believes that immigrants
are good for the economy. This is given by a coefficient of 0.719 for pro-immigration-
economic in model 1. The likelihood that the individual is in favour of immigrants of
the same race or ethnicity also increases if the individual believes that immigrants
enrich the cultural life in their county. This is given by a coefficient of 0.648 for
pro-immigration-culture in model 1. Similarly the likelihood of a favourable attitude
towards immigrants of a different race or ethnicity increases with pro-immigration-
economic and pro-immigration-culture as given by the coefficients 0.664 and 0.658
respectively in model 2. The likelihood of a preference for immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe also increases if the individual is pro-immigration-economic
(0.631) and pro-immigration-culture (0.567).
One point to note is that the difference between the coefficient for pro-immigration-
economic and pro-immigration-culture is relatively smaller for model 2 than models 1
and 3, although for all the models the estimated coefficients for pro-immigration-economic
is greater than the coefficients for pro-immigration-culture. This may be an indication
that, although economic concerns are more important than cultural concerns in sha-
ping individual attitudes towards immigration, the relative importance depends on
the race or ethnicity of the immigrants. However, it is difficult to interpret magni-
tudes and compare the coefficient estimates shown in Table 3.4 and one needs to be
careful about drawing strong conclusions regarding the magnitudes of the differences
between those coefficients.
The computed marginal effects are usually more useful for interpreting and compa-
ring the magnitudes of the coefficients in probit based models. However, for the tri-
variate probit model used in this study, the marginal effects are computationally com-
plicated. The conventional approach adopted by studies that have used the trivariate
probit method (Ramchand, Pacula and Iguchi, 2(06) is to calculate the predicted mar-
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ginal probabilities with respect to the variables of interest for a reference individual
identified by a set of defined (unchanging) characteristics. The predicted marginal
probabilities for specific outcomes in the variables of interest can then be compared
to give a better idea of the magnitude differences based on the characteristics of the
reference individual using the trivariate probit coefficient estimates.
This conventional approach is therefore adopted to help analyse the differences
in the impacts of pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture on individual
attitudes towards immigration. Thus, the marginal predicted probabilities from
the coefficient estimates for pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture in
models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.4 are compared based on the characteristics of the same
reference individual. This reference individual is a 47 year old female citizen of the
United Kingdom; her highest level of education is "upper secondary"; she lives in a big
city and does not consider herself of an ethnic minority; she is neither unemployed nor
retired and neither politically inclined to left nor right; she believes that 10-14percent
of the labour force in the UK are immigrants; her satisfaction with the economy is
scored at 4 out of 10 and her satisfaction in life as a whole is scored at 6 out of 10;
she is neither traditional nor multicultural and neither very religious nor completely
not religious; and she is relatively certain that she will not be unemployed and looking
for work in the next 12 months (job security is equal to 3 out of 5). These identified
characteristic are based on the sample means (averages).
The marginal predicted probabilities for the individual identified above are calculated
for pro-immigration-economic is equal to 1 while pro-immigration-culture is equal to
0; then vice-versa (for pro-immigration-culture is equal to 1 while pro-immigration-
economic is equal to 0) for the coefficient estimates from models 1, 2 and 3 (same race
immigrant, different race immigrants and immigrants from poor countries outside
Europe). Based on the results for the three models in Table 3.4 the calculated marginal
predicted probabilities for the three models are plotted in Figure 3.3. The predictions
confirm that, although pro-immigration-economic has a slightly larger impact than pro-
immigration-culture, the magnitude of the differences in impacts depends on the type
of immigrants.
The predictions show that, where immigrations are of the same race or ethnicity,
the probability that the reference individual is in favour of immigration is only
0.023 higher for pro-immigration-economic (0.760) than pro-immigration-culture (0.737).
However, for immigrants of a different race or ethnicity the difference in the predicted
probabilities can be considered negligible at 0.0024. This means that economic
concerns are only more important than cultural concerns where immigrations are of
4The difference is zero at two decimal places.
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the same race or ethnicity. Even so, the difference between the two considerations is
quite small. This is consistent with the view that immigrants of a different race are
more likely to undermine the cultural life in the country, and hence for this group of
immigrants the cultural concerns are just as strong as the economic concerns.
In the case of immigrants from poor countries outside Europe, the predicted marginal
probability for pro-immigration-economic (0.651) is higher than for pro-immigration-
culture (0.564) with a relatively larger difference (0.87) between the two predictions
shown in Figure 3.3. This is consistent with the view that immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe are predominantly of low skills and hence are perceived to
have a relatively more negative impact on the economy than immigrants from richer
countries. Thus, although this group of immigrants are also more likely to be of a
different race or ethnicity, the added dimension of their perceived skills attributes
make the economic concerns more important than cultural concerns, relative to the
case for different race immigrants.
Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities for Immigration Policy Preferences from Benchmark models
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Figure 3.3 also suggests that the probabilities are generally higher for same race
immigrants than different race immigrants and generally lower for immigrants from
poor countries outside Europe based on the characteristics of the reference individual
identified irrespective of economic or cultural concerns. However, the relevance of
race, ethnicity and the origin of the potential immigrants are analysed and discussed
further in the next subsection.
With regard to the focus of this chapter, the main message from the benchmark models
and the corresponding marginal predicted probabilities is that the differences between
the impacts of economic and cultural concerns on individual attitudes towards
immigration are not substantial and tend to vanish when the potential immigrants
are of different race or ethnicity. Toensure that this finding is robust and the evidence
is conclusive, a series of sensitivity analyses are undertaken for further discussions.
First, there is a need to find out if the finding is sensitive to the definitions of pro-
immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture hence these variables are replaced
with pro-immigration-economic(1) and pro-immigration-culture(1) and the benchmark
regression are re-run. Recall that these new pair of variables relaxes the definitions
of the former pair. Hence the new variables capture more individuals whose pro-
immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture views are not as strong as in the
definitions used in the benchmark models. The results for the variables of interest
from the trivariate probit regressions are shown in section A of Table 3.5 (the full set
of results are provided in TableA3.3 in the appendix).
These results together with their corresponding marginal predicted probabilities (for
the reference individual) plotted in Figure 3.4 are fairly consistent with the benchmark
models. The message remains that: the impacts of economic concerns on individual
attitudes towards immigration are slightly larger than the impacts of cultural concerns
and the difference between impacts tends to diminish when race or ethnicity is
the only difference between natives and immigrants. However, when immigrants
are from poor countries outside Europe, the difference between the two impacts
tends to increase. The predicted probabilities presented in Figure 3.4 shows that
when immigrants are of the same race the difference between the impacts of pro-
immigration-economic(1) and pro-immigraiion-culturetl) is 0.05. However, when the
potential immigrants are of a different race or ethnicity, the difference reduces to
0.02but then increases to 0.07when the potential immigrants are from poor countries
outside Europe.
Having established that relaxing the definitions of pro-immigration-economic and pro-
immigration-culture does not lead to any changes in the findings, next is to check if
the findings are also robust to stricter definitions of the variables. The regressions are
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Figure 3.4: Predicted Probabilities for Immigration Policy Preferences-models 4, 5 and 6
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Table 3.5: Summary Results from Sensitivity Analyses
Section A Pro-immigration-economic(1) Pro-immigration-culture(1)
Model 4 - Same Race Immigrants 0.714'"
(0.057)
0.625'"
(0.078)
Model 5 - Different Race Immigrants 0.720'"
(0.060)
0.709'"
(0.087)
Model 6 - Immigrants from Poor Countries out- 0.722-"
side Europe
0.573'"
(0.064) (0.099)
Section B Pro-immigration-economictz) Pro-immigration-culture(2)
Model 7 - Same Race Immigrants 0.788'"
(0.072)
0.712'"
(0.073)
Model 8 - Different Race Immigrants 0.669-'-
(O.OSO)
0.753"-
(0.107)
Model 9- Immigrants from Poor Countries out- 0.569-"
side Europe
0.73S···
(0.084) (0.107)
Section C Pro-immigration-economic Pro-immigration-culture
Model 10 - Same Race Immigrants 0.648'"
(0.069)
0.468'"
(0.092)
Model l l- Different Race Immigrants 0.614'"
(0.073)
0.636"-
(0.122)
Model 12 - Immigrants from Poor Countries 0.533-"
outside Europe
0.S14···
(0.076) (0.08S)
This table shows the results for Key variables from various sensitivity analyses involving Cl series of trivariate probit regressions. The full results are
shown in the Appendix Tables A3.3 A3.4 and A3.5. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets .• indicates significance at 10%; .....indicates
significance at 5%; and .... indicated significance at 1'ro.
therefore re-run again, this time, substituting for pro-immigration-economic(2) and pro-
immigration-cuituret'i). These capture the views of those individuals who are strongly
convinced that immigrants are good for the economy and those who are strongly
convinced that immigrants enrich the cultural life in their country. The results for
these regressions, shown in section Bof Table 3.5, seem to suggest that, for immigrants
of a different race and immigrants from poor countries outside Europe, cultural
concerns are more important than economic concerns. This result is confirmed by
the marginal predicted probabilities (plotted in Figure 3.5) related to the estimated
coefficients.
The predicted probabilities for the reference individual show that when immigrants
are of the same race or ethnicity, the impact of economic concerns on individual
attitudes towards immigration are slightly larger (by 0.03) than the impact of cultural
concerns. However, when immigrants are of a different race or ethnicity, the impact
of cultural concerns becomes slightly more important (by 0.01) than the impact of
economic concerns. Cultural concerns are also slightly more important (by 0.02)
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than economic concerns when immigrants are from poor countries outside Europe,
according to the predicted probabilities. Thus, when pro-immigration-economic and
pro-immigration-culture are narrowly defined to reflect only strong optimistic views of
individuals regarding the economic and cultural effects of immigrants, the impact of
cultural concerns becomes slightly larger than economic concerns except for the case
where immigrants are of the same race or ethnicity.
Figure 3.5: Predicted Probabilities for Immigration Policy Preferences-models 7, 8 and 9
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For the next sensitivity analyses, the benchmark model is modified in four ways. First
the individual's level of education is replaced with their years of schooling as a proxy
both for their education and skill level as well as their personal income level. Second,
the variable citizen is replaced with born in the country which take the value if the
individual was born in the country; as opposed to just having a citizenship status.
This is because many of those who are citizens may not necessarily be natives and
may be first generation immigrants who have citizenship status. Third, the dummy
variable worked abroad is included as an additional control for contact with foreigners.
This takes the value 1 if the individual has ever done paid work in another country
for six months or more in the last ten years. Forth, an additional control, household
income is included in the model. This variable, though expected to correlate with the
individual's own income, relates to and controls for the individual's social status.
Thus, an individual's own education level may be low signifying a low personal
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income but they may have a spouse who's personal income may be very high and
hence may be accustomed to living, behaving and having the attitudes of a high
income person.
Figure 3.6: Predicted Probabilities for Immigration Policy Preferences-models 10, 11 and 12
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The trivariate probit regression results for this robustness check are reported in section
C of Table 3.5 and the associated predicted marginal probabilities are shown in Figure
3.6. The results are marginally different from the benchmark results but consistent
with the results from Section B. The predicted probabilities show that the impact
of economic concerns on individual attitudes towards immigration is slightly larger
(by 0.01) than the impact of cultural concerns when the potential immigrants are of
the same race or ethnicity. On the other hand, the impact of cultural considerations
is negligibly larger (also by 0.01) than economic considerations when the potential
immigrants are of a different race or ethnicity. Similarly, the predicted probability
for pro-immigration-cultural is 0.06 points larger than the predicted probability for pro-
immigration-economic when the potential immigrants are from poor countries outside
Europe. Interestingly the predicted probabilities for pro-immigration-culture for
the case where immigrants are of a different race or ethnicity and the case where
immigrants are from poor countries outside Europe are almost the same (0.68 and
0.67).
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The sensitivity of the results to econometric method is examined in the final robustness
check. This involves employing a standard ordered probit model estimation and
disregarding any possible endogeneity or joint dependence issues. Thus, three uni-
variate ordered probit regressions are run with the original ordered variables, IMPP1,
IMPP2 and IMPP3 as the dependent variables while the (0-10 outcome) categorical
variables, pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture, are the independent
variables of interest. The marginal effects from theses regressions are shown in Table
3.6. These marginal effects are calculated for outcome 4 ("allow many immigrants")
of the dependent variables at the sample means of the independent variables. The
diagnostics (Pseudo R-squared and the Wald Test of Overall Significance) shown in
the top rows of the table indicates that the models are well fitted.
Table 3.6: Marginal Effect Results (at sample means) from Ordered Probit Regressions
Model13 Model 14 Model15
Same Race Different race Immigrants from
Immigrants Immigrants poor COUll tries
Outside Europe
Observations 25,059 25,05S 24,97S
Pseudo R-squared 0.1399 0.1769 0.1630
Wald Test of Overall Significance X2(3S)= X2(3S)= X2(3S)=
3105.7 37S2.S 3767.7
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Explanatory Variables
Pro-immigration-economic 0.045'" 0.025'" 0.024'"
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Pro-immigration-culture 0.02S'" 0.020'" 0.017'"
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.000 -0.00] ." -0.000'"
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education level 0.019'" 0.009'" 0.006'"
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Citizen -0.016 -0.002 -O.DlS
(0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Female 0.004 0.001 O.OOS"
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
Ethnic Minority 0.009 0.025" 0.018'
(0.018) (0.010) (0010)
Unemployed -0.034' -0.017' -0.008
(0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
Retired 0.006 0.007 -0.003
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
Right-wing Political Inclination -D.ODS'" -0.006'" -0.007'"
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Big City 0.004 0.006 -0.000
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Worked Abroad 0.017 0.007 0.000
(0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
Current Immigration level -0.002 -0.002" -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Household Income 0.004'" 0.002" 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
The coefficients are margmal effects calculated at the sample means for outcome 4 (allow mc ny imrnigran ts). Robust standard errors in • Indicates
!llgTllflcancc at 1U%, ,. signtficdncc at 5%, H. !tlgnificancc at \Uk All r(.·~ressions include country dummies for nll countries c xccpt Ccrmenv
(largest sample); coeffrctents for countries not reported in this lab le.
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The results for pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture are fairly similar
to the benchmark results. Thus, the results show that, for immigrants of the same
race or ethnicity, a unit increase in pro-immigration-economic leads to a 4.5 percent
increase in the probability that the individual will choose to "allow many immigrants"
while a unit increase in pro-immigration-culture only leads a 2.4 percent increase. When
immigrants are of a different race, the probabilities are 2.5 percent and 2.0 percent
for pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture respectively and when the
immigrants are from poor countries outside Europe the probability increases by 2.4
percent and 1.7 percent respectively. With these increases in the probabilities, one can
still argue that the impact of pro-immigration-economic is not sizeably different from the
impact of pro-immigration-culture and the magnitude of the differences between the
two depends on the type of immigrants.
Table 3.7 presents a few more marginal effects calculated from the ordered probit
regressions. To capture the full impacts of the key variables, the marginal effects
are calculated, first, for the cases where pro-immigration-economic is equal to 10
(immigrants are good for the economy) while pro-immigration-culture is equal to 0
(immigrants undermine the cultural life in the country) and second, for the cases
where pro-immigration-economic is equal to 0 and pro-immigration-culture is equal to 10.
These marginal effects highlight the point that the size of the differences between the
impacts of economic and cultural concerns depends on the type of immigrants. For
example, the overall probability of choosing to "allow many" immigrants of the same
race is 29 percent when pro-immigration-economic is equal to 10 and pro-immigration-
culture is equal to O. This falls by about 16.7 percent to 12.3 percent when pro-
immigration-economic is equal to 0 and pro-immigration-culture is equal to 10. However,
the overall probability of choosing to "allow many" immigrants of a different race
or ethnicity is only 9.6 percent when pro-immigration-economic is equal to 10 and pro-
immigration-culture is equal to 0; falling (by only 4.5 percent) to 5.1 percent when
pro-immigration-economic is equal to 0 and pro-immigration-culture is equal to 10. With
regards to immigrants from poor countries outside Europe, the overall probability of
choosing to "allow many" immigrants is 10.7 percent when pro-immigration-economic
is equal to 10 and pro-immigration-culture is equal to O. This falls by 6.4 percent to
4.3 percent when pro-immigration-economic is equal to 0 and pro-immigration-culture is
equal to 10.
As an additional robustness check, all the categorical variables in the benchmark
models are redefined as dummy variables. Thus, education level is broken down into
seven dummy variables - one dummy variable for each category of education level
reported. This yields the following dummy variables which are used in the regressions
in models 13, 14 and 15: Not completed primary education (Reference group); Primary or
first stage of basic; Lower secondary or second stage of basic; Upper secondary; Post secondary,
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Table 3.7: Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Regressions
Model13 Model 14
Same Race Different race
Immigrants Immigrants
Model IS
Immigrants from
poor countries
Outside Europe
Overall Predicted Probability 29% 9.6% 10.7%
~Unnrigration~onomic=lO 0.054- 0.029"·· 0.032·"
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pro-immigration-culture=O 0.033- 0.024 ... • 0.023·"
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Overall Predicted Probability 12.3% S.1% 4.3%
Pro-immigration-economicetl 0.032- 0.018"· 0.016···
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pro-immigration-culture=lO 0.020- 0.015"· 0.011···
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Overall Predicted Probability 66.30/. 53.6% SO.I%
Pro-immigration-economlce 10 0.058- 0.069"·· 0.069···
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Pro-immigration-culturee Hl 0.036- 0.055"· 0.050"··
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003
non-tertiary; First stage of tertiary; and Second stage of tertiary.
The political inclination variable is re-coded as a dummy variable (Rightwing) that takes
the value of 1 if the respondent's self reported political inclination is above 6 on a scale
of 0-10 (where 0 represents left-wing political inclinations and 10 represents right-wing
political inclinations). The variable that measures the subjective views of respondent
regarding the size of the immigrant population in their country (current immig. level)
is also re-coded as a binary variable. It takes the value 1 if the individual believes that
the size of the immigrant population in their country is above 19 percent; and zero
otherwise. The two additional variables that serve as exclusion restrictions, economic
satisfaction and life satisfaction, are also re-coded into three dummy variables each.
In each case these dummy variables are: extremely dissatisfied, satisfied and extremely
satisfied.
Other redefined categorical variables are job security, multicultural, traditional and
religious. These are all re-coded as dummy variables. Job security takes the value of 1
if the respondent does not think they are going to lose their job in the next 12 months;
Multicultural takes the value of 1 if the respondent considers themselves as being open
to other cultures; Traditional takes the value of 1 if the respondent describes himself as
someone who like to stick to customs and traditions; religious take the value 1 for an
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individual who scores himself above 6 on the religious scale of 0-10.
A set of regressions are run using all these redefined categorical variables and the
results (provided models 13, 14 and 15) are shown in Table A3.6 in the appendix. It
is seen that one of our key variables, Pro-immg-culture, loses significance in model13.
As expected, this means that, where immigrants are of the same race or ethnic group,
cultural concerns are not significant though economic concerns are still significantly
important. Where immigrants are of a different race, cultural concerns begin to play
an important role though economic concerns are still stronger. However, where
immigrants come from poor countries outside Europe, cultural concerns begin to
show stronger importance than economic concerns. Thus for the key variables,
story remains the same. Thus, the higher the cultural distance, the more important
the cultural concerns hence economic motivations are not always the dominant
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. The results for Education
levels and the other re-categorised dummy variables are discussed in subsection 3.4.3.
Having looked at the robustness of the benchmark findings vis-a-vis the definitions
of the key variables, further controls, extensions and econometric method, one can
conclude that there is no strong evidence in support of the notion that economic
concerns are more important than cultural considerations in shaping individual atti-
tudes towards immigration. Even though for immigrants of the same race or ethnicity,
the evidence is consistently supportive of this notion (in all the sensitivity analysis),
the impact of economic concerns are not sufficiently larger than cultural concerns. In
fact, the analyses show that when the benchmark models are extended or when pro-
immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture are re-defined to related to stronger
views, cultural considerations start to become more important for immigrants of dif-
ferent race or ethnicity and immigrants from poor countries outside Europe (although
not by a considerable margin). Thus, either way, one cannot conclude that economic
concerns are more important than cultural considerations or cultural considerations
are more important than economic concerns in shaping individual attitudes towards
immigration. On the other hand, the findings do not corroborate the conclusions from
Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005). This might be due to the fact that the 2008/09
ESS coincides with a period of economic recession in most European countries hence
respondents might generally be more conscious about the economic atmosphere. This
is likely to be reflected in their economic concerns. The analyses also show that the
race or ethnicity; the origin of the potential immigrants; and the absoluteness of the
individual's economic and cultural views matter for which concerns are more impor-
tant in shaping their attitudes.
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3.4.2 Race, Ethnicity and Origin of Immigrants
It is seen from the results and discussion above that the race or ethnicity as well
as the origin of the potential immigrants (i.e. the type of immigrants) matter not
only for the magnitudes of the differences between the impacts of pro-immigration-
economic and pro-immigration culture but also for pro-immigration attitudes in general.
This subsection of the results and discussion focuses on exploring the differences in
individual attitudes towards immigration stemming from race, ethnicity and origin of
immigrants. Observationally, all the results above show that, irrespective of economic
and cultural concerns, the attitudes towards immigrants of the same race or ethnicity
are generally more favourable than attitudes towards different race immigrants and
immigrants from poor countries outside Europe. The aim in this subsection is,
therefore, to find out if there are significant differences in general attitudes towards
immigrants of the same race or ethnicity on one hand and immigrants of a different
race or ethnicity as well as immigrants from poor countries outside Europe on the
other hand. Statistical tests are carried out on the results across models for the ensuing
discussion.
Table 3.8: Paired T-Test for Differences in the means of IMPP1, IMPPl and IMPP3
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic
Mean(IMPP1-IMPP2)<0
P-Value
t= 106.0175
0.0000
Mean(IMPP1-IMPP3)<0
P-Value
t= 113.4193
0.0000
Mean(IMPP2-IMPP3)<0
P-Value
t=30.1398
0.0000
As a first step to checking whether there are racially motivated differences in attitudes
towards immigration, simple paired t-tests are used to compare the differences in the
means of IMPP1, IMPP2 and IMPP3. The test pairs the two variables by matching
each element of one variable to its corresponding element of the other variable and
examines the mean of individual differences of paired outcomes (preferences). Thus,
it is based on the pair-wise differences in values of matched observations of the two
variables. The null hypothesis is that the population mean of individual differences of
paired observations is less than zero. A significant P-value rejects the null, indicating
there is a significant difference between the two variables.
Recall that from the descriptive statistics it is shown that the mean of IMPPI is greater
than the mean of IMPP2 which is also greater than the mean of IMPP3. Table 3.8
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shows significant p-values for all three paired one tail test. This indicates that the null
hypotheses specified in the table may be rejected. Thus, people are generally more in
favour of immigrants of the same race than they are of immigrants of different race and
immigrants from poor countries outside Europe. In addition, Europeans are generally
more in favour of immigrants of a different race or ethnicity than immigrants from
poor countries outside Europe. Even though, immigrants from poor countries outside
Europe are generally of a different race or ethnicity, the higher opposition of this type
of immigrants in Europe may be due to the perception that they (immigrants from
poor countries outside Europe) are predominantly also of low skills (Hainmueller and
Hiscox,2(07).
Having established that general attitudes are more favourable towards immigrants of
the same race, the next table (Table 3.9) presents all the overall marginal predicted
probabilities for all the previous trivariate regressions discussed in this chapter. The
conclusion from these overall predictions for models 1 to 12 is that, based on the
sample means, the probability of choosing to allow immigrants of the same race
is always the highest followed by the probability of choosing to allow immigrants
of a different race with the probability of choosing to allow immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe always the lowest. This conclusion is irrespective of
individual cultural and economic concerns. The overall predicted probabilities for
the ordered probit regressions presented in the bottom part of Table 3.7 (above) tell
the same story.
Table 3.9: Overall Predicted Marginal Probabilities from the Trivariate Probit Regressions
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Modell 36716 0.671 0.218 0.117 0.997
Model2 36716 0.515 0.256 0.009 0.996
Model3 36716 0.475 0.252 0.008 0.995
Model4 36716 0.672 O.22B 0.092 0.995
ModelS 36716 0.515 0.27 0.005 0.994
Model6 36716 0.475 0.263 0.005 0.993
Model7 36716 0.67 0.203 0.136 0.999
Model8 36716 0.513 0.242 0.01 0.999
Model9 36716 0.474 0.244 0.01 0.998
Model10 25271 0.689 0.203 0.101 1
Model II 25271 0.534 0.248 0.015 0.999
Model12 25271 0.485 0.262 0.017 0.997
However, with regard to the ordered probit regressions (models 13-15), one can
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bring the three regressions together in a seeming unrelated estimation (SUEST)5. This
allows cross-model hypothesis testing and variable comparisons. By employing this
procedure, the Wald test is used to compare the results for pro-immigration-economic
and pro-immigration-culture across the models. The results of the tests are presented
in Table 3.10. The tests show that pro-immigration-culture is significantly different
between all model pairs (i.e. between models 13 and 14; 13 and 15 as well as 14
and 15). However, pro-immigration-economic is significantly different (weakly) between
models 13 and 14 as well as models 13 and 15 but not significantly different between
models 14 and 15. This suggests that the impact of cultural concerns vary significantly
for immigration attitudes across the three types of immigrants while the impact of
economic concerns vary less across same race, different race and immigrants from
poor countries outside Europe.
Table 3.10: Test Statistics after SUEST for Ordered Probit Regressions
Wald Test after Seeming Unrelated
Probit Estimations of Models 13, 14 and 15
Pro-immigration-economic Pro-immigration-culture
Model 13=Model 15
P-value
,r(1)=3.40 ,r(1)= 30.76
0.0652 0.0000
,r(1)=2.84 X2(1)= 12.01
0.0931 0.0005
,r(1)=O.OO r(1)=5.90
0.9560 0.0151
Model 13=Model 14
P-Value
Model 14=Model IS
P-value
3.4.3 Other Explanatory Variables
With regard to the socio-economic background control variables, the results presented
in Table 3.4 are qualitatively consistent and similar across all the estimated models
including the robustness check results shown in the appendix Tables A3.3, A3.4 and
A3.5. The results show that a year's increase in age reduces the likelihood of choosing
to allow immigrants (of any kind) and also reduces the likelihood of believing that
immigrants enrich the cultural life in the country. However, a year's increase in
age increases the likelihood that and individual believes immigrants are good for the
economy. Higher levels of education leads to a higher probability that the individual
will choose to allow immigrants and a higher probability that the individual is both
pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture. This result is made clear when
the education level dummy variables are used. Appendix Table A3.6 shows that below
the first stage of tertiary educations, a persons education level does not matter to
their attitude towards immigration. However, having first and second stage tertiary
educations influence's one's attitude towards immigration. People with first stage
5With the help of Stata's SUEST post-estimation command.
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tertiary education level tend to place more with on cultural concerns than people with
second stage tertiary education while people with second stage tertiary education also
place more importance on economic concerns than people with first stage tertiary
education.
As expected, being a citizen of the country has a negative impact on all pro-
immigration attitudes and views. The results for female are mixed. They show that
being female increases the likelihood of being in favour of immigration except for
immigrants of the same race. This is in spite of the fact that being female reduces
the likelihood of being pro-immigration-economic and being female does not matter for
cultural concerns. If an individual consider them self as part of an ethnic minority
they are more likely to have pro-immigration attitudes but this does not affect their
likelihood of being in favour of immigrants of the same race as majority of people
in the country. Being unemployed decreases the likelihood of being in favour of
immigration, although the results for immigrants from poor countries outside Europe
are not Significant. Interestingly, being unemployed has no significant impact on
pro-immigration-economic but has a weakly significant negative coefficient for pro-
immigration-culture when immigrants are of the same race.
Retired individuals are less likely to think that immigrants are good for the economy
and are also less likely to think that immigrants enrich the cultural life in country
though this does not have a significant impact on their immigration policy preferences.
The more right-winged a person is, the more likely they are to be anti-immigration
with pessimistic economic and cultural concerns. These concerns are stonger for
immigrants of a different race and immigrants from poor countries outside Euroipe
than they are for immigrants of the same race or ethnicity. Individuals who live in a big
city are more likely to be pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture though
this does not affect their immigration policy preferences. The higher an individual's
subjective estimate of the proportion of immigrants in the country, the lesser their
likelihood of have pro-immigration attitudes. If an individual has worked abroad for
6 month and above, they are more likely to be pro-immigration-economic but this has no
significant impact on their immigration policy preferences and this no effect on their
views regarding the effect of immigrants on the cultural life in the country. The final
control variable is household income (included in models ID, 11 and 12). The results
show that individuals from higher income households are more likely to have all pro-
immigration attitudes though the coefficient is insignificant for immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe (model10).
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3.4.4 Additional Control Variables: Exclusion Restrictions
With regard to the additional control variables that satisfy the exclusion restriction
conditions imposed on the trivariate probit model used in this study, the results
are qualitatively consistent and very similar across all the regressions. The results,
shown in the bottom part of Table 3.4 (as well as Table A3.3, A3.4 and A3.5 in
the appendix), indicate that individuals who report a higher satisfaction with their
country's economy and in life, are more likely to think that immigrants are good for
the economy. Thus, general optimism about life and about the economy leads to more
optimistic views about the effect of immigrants on the economy. Higher levels of
satisfaction in life also increase the likelihood of being pro-immigration-culture.
The extent to which an individual feels they are likely to be unemployed and looking
for work in the next twelve months has no significant impact on their pro-immigration-
economic outcome. The variables, multicultural and traditional both have the expected
effect on pro-immigration-culture. Note that both variables are categorical variables
with 1-6 outcomes where 1 signifies higher levels of the individual's multicultural or
traditional nature. This means that the negative coefficient for multicultural means that
the more multicultural a person is, the more likely they are to think that immigrants
enrich the cultural life in the country. A positive coefficient for traditional indicates
that the more traditional a person is, the less likely they are to think that immigrants
enrich the cultural life in the country. The results, across all the regressions also show
that, more religious people are more likely to think that immigrants enrich the cultural
life in the country.
According to Cappallari and Jenkins (2003) the Stata program for implementing the
multivariate model does not require any exclusion restrictions for the model to be
identified. However the variables in this subsection are treated as though they were
exclusion restriction variables. This is not because they are needed as instruments but
because there are needed as control variables in the respective equations. Thus, the
variables are not instruments in the strict sense. Hence there is no need or no reason
for any tests of over-identifying restrictions. Nevertheless, a simple refutability test
which involves finding insignificant effects of those variables in the main Yi equation.
Table 3.11 presents the results of Wald Text after a series of probit regressions for the
main equation in the trivariate model.
The tests show that while Economic Satisfaction, Job Security and Traditional are si-
gnificant determinants of individual immigration preferences for migrants of the same
race, Life Satisfaction, Multicultural and Religious are not. Thus Life Satisfaction,
Multicultural and Religious are justifiable excluded in the model. Even though
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Table 3.11: Wald Test of Si~cance after Probit Estimates
Variables Immigrants of the same Immigrants of a different Race Immigrants from p<Xlr
Race countries outside EuroE!
Chi-Squared Chi-squared Chi-Squared
(p·Value) (P-Value) (P·Value)
Economic Satisfaction 14.41 13.98 22.61
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Ufe Satisfaction 2.S1 0.16 0.01
(0.113) (0.6930) (0.9105)
Job Security 6.87 2.22 2.72
(0.0088) (0.1361) (0.0988)
Multicultural 2.17 18.16 7.42
(0.1406) (0.0000) (0.0065)
Traditional 6.31 13.45 3.36
(0.0116) (0.0002) (0.0666)
Religious 1.92 0.32 4.78
(0.1657) (0.5708) (0.0288)
Economic Satisfaction, Job Security and Traditional tum out to be significant the ar-
gument remains that their effects on individual immigration preferences for migrants
are channeled through pro-immigration-economic and pro-immigration-culture
rather than a direct effect. it is also seen that Economic Satisfaction, Multicultural
and Traditional are also significant determinants for attitudes towards immigrants
of a different race while Life Satisfaction, Job Security and Religious are justifiably
excluded. Life Satisfaction, Job Security are also justifiably excluded in the equation
for the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants from poor countries
outside Europe.
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3.5 Conclusions
The literature on attitudes towards immigration has established that both economic
and cultural effects of immigrants are important determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration. However the economic literature often implicitly assumes that
economic concerns are relatively more important than cultural concern for individual
attitudes towards immigration, yet, the economic literature has not provided systema-
tic evidence to arrive at this implicit conjecture.
The main focus of this chapter is therefore to empirically analyse the relative im-
portance of economic and cultural concerns as determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration where the potential immigrants differ by race and ethnicity
as well as by origin (which has connotation for the perceived skill attributes of the
potential immigrants). The study uses data from the 2008/09 edition of the European
Social Survey and employs a trivariate probit model which allows the joint estimation
of immigration policy preferences with the economic and cultural views of individuals
regarding the effects of immigrants. The analysis in the chapter yields two main
conclusions.
First, the relative importance of the impact of individual concerns regarding the
effects of immigrants on the economy is not conclusively greater than the impact
of individual concerns regarding the cultural effects of immigrants on individual
attitudes towards immigration. Thus, the impact of economic concerns on individual
attitudes towards immigration are found only to be consistently higher than the
impact of cultural concerns for the case where the potential immigrants are of the
same race or ethnicity as most people in the country; even so, the margins between
the two impacts are very small and sometimes negligible.
The relative importance of economic and cultural concerns on individual attitudes
towards immigration is found to be sensitive to the definitions of pro-immigration-
economic and pro-immigration-culture. As the definitions of the variables are
tightened (capturing only the more extreme views), the impact of cultural concerns
tends to become slightly more important than the impact of economic concerns in
shaping attitudes towards immigrants of different race or ethnicity and immigrant
from poor countries outside Europe. Thus, it cannot be concluded, based on
the evidence, that economic concerns are inherently more important than cultural
concerns in shaping individual immigration policy preferences.
One should, however, note, that the evidence in this study are based on surveys
that were conducted between 2008 and 2009 when most of western Europe was
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experiencing an economic recession. Hence the economic concerns may even be
exaggerated due to the generally difficult economic atmosphere in Europe around the
time of the surveys.
The second conclusion is that, there are significant differences in the individual
attitudes towards different kinds of immigration. Thus, all other things remaining
constant, the individual immigration policy preferences are generally highest for
immigrants of the same race or ethnicity and lowest for immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe with preferences for immigrants of a different race or
ethnicity in the middle.
The conclusions in this chapter highlight the point that studies on the effects of
immigration as well as immigration policy studies need to find ways of incorporating
cultural effects for a more comprehensive understanding of immigration issues. It
also means that one should be careful in making generalisations and drawing strong
conclusions from studies that focus only on either cultural or economic effects of
immigrants alone.
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3.A Appendix to Chapter3
Coun ISO Wei tSample
Code Num ero Proportion
observations observations of weighted
observation
DE Germany 2,751 5 7094 12.14
ES Spain 2~76 4.68 3866 6.61
RV Russian Federation 2~12 4.57 12000 20.73
IL Israel 2,490 4.53 514 0.88
TR Turkey 2,416 4.39 5194 8.89
PT Portugal 2,367 4.3 899 1.54
GB UK 2,352 4.28 5044 8.63
BG Bulgaria 2,230 4.06 662 1.13
FI Finland 2,195 3.99 441 0.75
RO Romania 2,146 3.9 1825 3.12
FR France 2,073 3.77 5054 8.65
GR Greece 2,072 3.77 961 1.64
CZ Czech Republic 2,018 3.67 890 1.52
LV Latvia 1,980 3.6 196 0.34
VA Ukraine 1,845 3.36 3969 6.79
SE Sweden 1,830 3.33 764 1.31
CH Switzerland 1,819 3.31 642 1.1
SK Slovakia 1,810 3.29 455 0.78
NL Netherlands 1,778 3.23 1347 2.3
BE Belgium 1,760 3.2 887 1.52
EE Estonia 1,661 3.02 114 0.2
PL Poland 1,619 2.94 3221 5.51
DK Denmark 1,610 2.93 447 0.76
NO Norway 1,549 2.82 383 0.66
HV Hungary 1~ 2.81 854 1.46
HR Croatia 1,484 2.7 375 0.64
SI Slovenia 1,286 2.34 175 0.3
CY CITrus 1,215 2.21 65 0.11
Total 54,988 100 58000 100
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Table A3.2: Individual A~ and Education Level Distribution bl: Coun~
Country Individual A~ Education Level
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Portugal 52.75 19.96 1.84 1.45
Bulgaria 51.84 17.66 2.92 1.18
Slovakia 50.09 17.15 3.13 0.93
Netherlands 49.31 17.78 3.11 1.36
Denmark 49.26 18.07 3.47 1.17
UK 49.15 18.57 3.33 1.35
Germany 48.96 17.43 3.65 1.12
Ukraine 48.84 18.68 3.70 1.40
France 48.65 18.72 3.04 1.55
Switzerland 48.59 18.34 3.32 1.18
Latvia 48.32 18.57 3.50 1.18
Finland 47.97 18.76 3.14 1.48
Hungary 47.78 19.07 2.43 1.32
Estonia 47.78 19.24 3.29 1.21
Sweden 47.60 19.27 3.30 1.44
Croatia 47.31 18.26 2.63 1.41
Russian Federation 47.21 19.00 3.60 1.22
Czech Republic 47.10 17.34 3.07 0.79
Spain 46.83 19.16 2.20 1.55
Slovenia 46.56 18.91 2.56 1.41
Belgium 46.46 18.73 3.18 1.42
Romania 46.08 17.67 2.84 1.16
Norway 45.76 17.85 3.65 1.19
Israel 45.42 19.10 3.17 1.55
Greece 45.04 16.75 2.80 1.38
Cyprus 44.81 17.79 3.06 1.43
Poland 44.64 18.96 2.73 1.37
Turkey 39.61 16.49 1.71 1.36
Total 47.53 18.52 3.00 1.42
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Figure A3.I: Country Proportions of Unemployed and Retired
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Figure A3.3: Distribution of Traditional
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Figure A3.4: Distribution of Multicultural by Country
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Figure A3.5: Distribution of Traditional by Country
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Table Al.6: Robustness: Cat~orical variables redefined as dumml: variables
Model13 Model14 Model15
Same Different Poor
Race Race Countries
Observations 6786 6781 6759
Wald Test 1377.82 1556.51 1619.88
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
IMPPl IMPP2 IMPP3
Pro-immig-economic 0.679"· 0.705·" 0.663···
(0.152) (0.143) (O.ISO)
Pro-immig-culture 0.350 0.531· 0.659···
(0.254) (0.272) (0.230)
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Education Level
Not completed primary education (Reference group)
Primary or first stage of basic -0.027 0.035 -0.170
(0.265) (0.277) (0.284)
Lower secondary or second stage of basic 0.162 0.162 0.043
(0.256) (0.267) (0.276)
Upper secondary 0.351 0.373 0.062
(0.257) (0.268) (0.277)
Post secondary. non-tertiary 0.437 0.392 0.154
(0.282) (0.291) (0.297)
First stage of tertiary 0.559·· 0.601·· 0.287
(0.272) (0.286) (0.294)
Second stage of tertiary 0.978" 1.270·· 0.089
(0.491) (0.514) (0.421)
Citizen -0.418"· -0.236· -0.248·
(0.131) (0.131) (0.132)
Female 0.056 0.010 0.101·
(0.063) (0.062) (0.060)
Ethnic Minority 0.062 0.060 0.271··
(0.124) (0.122) (0.110)
Unemplored -0.239·" -0.253·· ' -0.065
(0.080) (O.OSI) (0.076)
Retired 0.055 0.123 -0.016
(0.145) (0.141) (0.143)
Rightwing (Binary) -OJ SO" -0.190·· ' -0.196·· '
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073)
Big City -0.022 0.020 -0.023
(0.076) (0.074) (0.070)
Curent Immig level (Binary) -0.132· -0.186·· ' -0.131··
(0.071) (0.068) (0.065)
Constant 0.783·· -0.032 -0.007
(0.337) (0.333) (0.348)
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Table A3.6: continued
Def!ndent Variable: Pro-Immigration Economic Model13 Model14 Model IS
Age 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education Level
Not completed primary education (Reference group)
Primary or first stage of basic -0.164 -0.146 -0.119
(0.274) (0.266) (0.274)
Lower~ndaryorsecondstageofbasi 0.144 0.177 0.185
(0.264) (0.254) (0.263)
Upper secondary 0.058 0.089 0.096
(0.261) (0.251) (0.259)
Post secondary, non-tertiary 0.148 0.169 0.169
(0.285) (0.276) (0.283)
First stage of tertiary 0.550- 0.584·· 0.602··
(0.263) (0.254) (0.262)
Second stage of tertiary 0.992- 1.035- 1.049··
(0.456) (0.465) (0.465)
Citizen -0.487-
-0.490···
-0.497""'·
(0.121) (0.122) (0.121)
Female -0.277"" -0.278···
-0.293"·
(0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
Ethnic Minority 0.252·· 0.259·· 0.249··
(0.107) (0.107) (0.106)
Unemplored 0.057 0.050 0.051
(0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
Retired -0.235 -0.223
-0.198
(0.168) (0.167) (0.169)
Rightwing (Binary) -0.079
-0.091 -0.109
(0.073) (0.074) (0.075)
Big City 0.165·· O.ISO" 0.173··
(0.071) (0.070) (0.070)
Curent Immig level (Binary) -0.132· -0.130· -0.135··
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Economic Satisfaction
Extreemly dissatisfied
Satisfied 0.12~· 0.126·· 0.131··
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061)
Extreemly Satisfied 0.295··· 0.286··· 0.286···
(0.098) (0.099) (0.100)
Life Satisfaction
Extreemly dissatisfied
Satisfied 0.087 0.082 0.069
(0.092) (0.090) (0.092)
Extreemly Satisfied 0.369·- 0.374··· 0.3S~"
(0.093) (0.093) (0.095)
Constant -0.629· -0.670· ' -0.635·
(0.340) (0.333) (0.339)
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Table A3.6: continued
Dependent Variable: Pro-Immigration Culture Model13 Model14 Model15
Age -0.002
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
Ed ucation Level
Not completed primary education (Reference group)
Primary or first stage of basic
Lower secondary or second stage of basic
0.145 0.195 0.204
(0.246) (0.240) (0.247)
0.441- 0.482" 0.477"
(0.235) (0.230) (0.237)
0.533" 0.554-- 0.545"
(0.233) (0.229) (0.235)
0.620-- 0.634" 0.621-'
(0.259) (0.252) (0.260)
0.966'" 1.003'" 0.986*"
(0.236) (0.232) (0.239)
0.687 0.757- 0.880--
(0.424) (0.386) (0.410)
-0.140 -0.136
-0.159
(0.123) (0.123) (0.122)
-0.111- -0.109-
-0.143"
(0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
0.238" 0.256-- 0.227"
(0.108) (0.106) (0.105)
-0.008 0.018
-0.005
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
-0.341--
-0.259'
-0.287*
(0.162) (0.156) (0.157)
-0.125-
-0.166" -0.147"
(0.073) (0.072) (0.074)
0.154-- 0.163-- 0.150--
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
-0.206--- -0.196---
-0.191"-
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
0.084 0.060 0.070
(0.086) (0.087) (0.087)
0.347--- 0.319--- 0.348"-
(0.086) (0.086) (0.085)
-0.057 -0.174 -0.114
(0.136) (0.140) (0.128)
0.050 0.Dl4 0.041
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
0.085 0106 0.099
(0.067) (0.065) (0.065)
-0.784"
-0.779" -0.750--
(0.310) (0.305) (0.309)
Upper secondary
Post secondary, non-tertiary
First stage of tertiary
Second stage of tertiary
Citizen
Female
Ethnic Minority
Unemplored
Retired
Rightwing (Binary)
Big City
Curent Immig level (Binary)
Life Satisfaction
Extreemly dissatisfied
Satisfied
Extreemly Satisfied
Multicultural (Binary)
Traditional (Binary)
Religious (Binary)
Constant
Robust standard errors an brackets ." significance at 10%; ". significance at 5%;·" significance at 1"/0. All regressions include country dummies for <111
countries except Cerrnanv (largest sample); the coefficients for countries are not reported in this table.
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CHAPTER4
The Welfare State Channel and
Attitudes towards Immigration
4.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades immigration policies in nearly all the major migrant
receiving countries have gradually moved towards a preference for (highly) skilled
immigrants and an increased restriction for unskilled (low skilled) immigrants.
A report by the UN indicated that between 1996 and 2005, the proportion of
governments wishing to reduce international migration declined from a peak of 40 to
22percent as a result of governments reacting to the challenges and opportunities from
international migration. The report points out that the governments of many migrant-
receiving countries have been actively adopting or amending laws and regulations so
as to facilitate the inflow of the types ofmigrants they need, especially skilled migrants
and to prevent the inflow of unwanted types of migrants.
This shift towards immigration policies that favour skilled immigrants is driven by
a growing concern about the issue of skills shortage - "a situation where there is a
genuine shortage in the accessible labour market of the type of skill being sought
and which leads to a difficulty in recruitment" (NSlF, 1998). Dumont (2003) points
out that by the late 1990s employers in most OECD countries had began to report
labour shortages in highly skilled occupations as well as for semi- and low-skilled
jobs, although both employment and labour market participation rates were on the
increase. A European Commission report, Employment in Europe 2001,Recent Trends
and Prospects, established (through regular harmonised labour marker survey for
employers) that there were labour shortages in all sectors in seven countries across
the EU.
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However, for aging economies like those of Western Europe, inflows of young workers
(irrespective of their skill endowments) from third countries can possibly play an
important role in improving the sustainability of social security systems that rely on
intergenerational transfers. The OECD International Migration Outlook 2008, reports
that current birth rates in nearly all OECD countries have fallen below replacement
levels, and international migration is the main driver of population growth in most
OECD countries. For countries like Japan, Germany and Hungary even migration
was insufficient to offset population decline in 2007. At the same time, most OECD
countries are entering a period where the baby-boomer cohorts are retiring and
the youth cohorts are getting smaller. In addition, life expectancy has improved
significantly allowing people to live longer in most OECD countries. As a result
of this, government spending on state pensions and other provisions for old people
(including health, winter fuel payment, etc) takes a significant proportion of the fiscal
budget, while the revenue base for future social security is dwindling.
Castles (2004) points out that the strategic use of immigrants is not a new pheno-
menon. The French Nationality Code of 1889 was explicitly designed, in a period
of demographic decline, to obtain soldiers for future conflicts with Germany. Ho-
wever, in current democratic societies, immigration policies are outcomes of native
individual attitudes towards immigrants. Individual attitudes towards immigrants
may influence immigration policies, either through the voting system (Scholten and
Thurn, 1996; Haupt and Perters, 1998; Krieger,2004; Fachini and Mayda, 2008 and
2009; Razin, et al., 2009) or through a process of lobbying from various interest groups
within the economy (Hatton and Williamson, 2004; Facchini and Willmann, 2005).
This raises the question of what determines individual attitudes towards immigration.
Within the framework of economic self-interest, the determinants of individual
attitudes towards immigration can be analysed under two main economic channels
- the labour market and the welfare state channels. Immigration can have positive
or negative impacts on the labour market outcomes of individuals such as wages
and unemployment, labour market competitiveness and job security. It can also have
positive or negative impacts on the individual's welfare state outcomes such as taxes
and social benefits (pensions and unemployed benefit claims). Whether these impacts
are positive or negative to a native individual voter may well depend on their personal
attributes and characteristics such as skill level, age (age-group) employment status
etc. Thus the individual's perception of the effects of immigration on their labour
market and welfare state outcomes may be the motivation for their attitudes towards
immigrants, ceteris paribus. Put differently, the subjective views of individuals
regarding the economic effects of immigrants may be important determinants of their
attitudes towards immigration. Consequently, various groups of individuals within
the population who share similar characteristics may be expected to exhibit similar
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attitudes towards immigration.
Within this context, this chapter has two aims. The first objective is to empirically
examine the extent to which attitudes towards immigration are determined by indivi-
dual concerns about the effect of immigrants on the welfare state; where the potential
immigrants are perceived as predominantly low skilled. This focuses on assessing the
level of dependence between perceived welfare state effects of immigrants in general
and individual attitudes toward (predominantly unskilled) immigration. The second
objective of the chapter is to empirically evaluate the individual characteristics that de-
termine their subjective views regarding the effect of immigrants on the welfare state
and consequently their attitudes towards immigration. To achieve this, the chapter
relies on established and theoretically justifiable predictions to analyse the effects of
the individual age (age-groups) and skill levels on their attitudes towards immigration
when social security considerations are taken into account.
To help answer the research questions that emanate from the objectives of the study,
three empirical hypotheses are tested using the data from the 2008/09 edition of the
European Social Survey. The first hypothesis is that, individual attitudes towards
(predominantly unskilled) immigration are significantly driven by the individual
subjective views regarding the effects of immigrants on the welfare state. In other
words, welfare state considerations are important determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration.
The second hypothesis is that, old and retired individuals have a more anti-immigration
attitude than the young and middle aged individuals due to social security considera-
tions. This hypothesis is mainly the outcome of a model by Scholten and Thurn (1996),
which indicates that in a welfare state economy characterised by a pay-as-you-go
social security system where pension benefit rates (replacement rates) are fixed I(based
on average wages) and where the contribution rate (taxes) vary according to the de-
pendency ratio, an increase in the working population due to immigration has a ne-
gative effect on pension benefits received by the retired generation. Hence with the
motivation of economic self-interest, old and retired individuals are expected to have a
preference for a more restrictive immigration policy than the young and middle aged,
who by virtue of immigration receive net gains (from the combination of reduced taxes
and wages).
The third hypothesis is that when social security concerns are taken into consideration,
skilled individuals have a preference for more immigration than unskilled individuals
especially when the potential immigrants are perceived as predominantly unskilled.
1The first (public) pillar of most countries' pension systems is a pay-as-you-go system of the defined-
benefit type (Werding, 20(3), in which either the pension benefit or the replacement rate is fixed by law.
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This hypothesis is based on Kreiger (2004) which models the preferences of skilled
and unskilled individuals in a welfare state economy characterised by a pay-as-you-go
social security system with defined benefits (pension rates) and varying contributions
(taxes). Kreiger (2004) analytically shows that, although both skilled and unskilled
individuals gain from the inflow of young unskilled immigrants due to reduced
tax burdens, skilled individuals gain more since they do not suffer the additional
(unskilled) wage reduction associated with unskilled immigration.
The study in this chapter contributes to the growing literature in the area of welfare
state determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration in four ways. The
first contribution is that the study focuses on attitudes towards immigrants who are
arguably perceived as predominantly unskilled. This brings more precise evidence to
the broad literature.
The second contribution is that this study applies a more direct measure of subjective
individual views regarding the effects of immigrants on the welfare state. The
availability of a specific set of questions in the European Social Survey provides an
opportunity to adopt a more direct approach than in previous studies on the issue. The
third contribution to the literature is methodological. The study employs a bivariate
ordered probit empirical method which allows the subjective views of individuals
to be treated as an endogenous determinant of attitudes towards immigration.
This suggests that attitudes towards immigration are simultaneously determined
along with the subjective views of individuals regarding the welfare state effects of
immigrants. The final main contribution of this study is that it provides an empirical
examination of the issue of individual attitudes towards immigration where social
security concerns are taken into consideration. This novel contribution provides more
evidence that can help address the political challenges of using immigration policy as
one of the tools in tackling the impending public pension crises that are faced by most
European countries due to ageing populations.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section (4.2) provides some
background to the issue of immigration and the welfare state. It provides summary
descriptions of the types of welfare state systems in Europe, and highlights the
challenges these systems face with immigration both as one of the challenges as well
as a potential means of addressing some of the challenges. Section 4.3 provides a
review of relevant theoretical and empirical studies on the welfare state determinants
of individual attitudes towards immigration. Section 4.4 presents a short outline of
the models by Scholten and Thum (1996), Haupt and Peters (1998) and Kreiger (2004)
to give the empirical analyses an inductive structure. Section 4.5 describes the data
and the estimation method while, 4.6 discus the results and their sensitivity. The key
findings and shortcomings are summarised in section 4.7.
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4.2 The Welfare State and Immigration
The major migrant-receiving countries are often characterised by large welfare states
(Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 2(02), in which the public sector redistributes a
substantial fraction of national income across individuals. A welfare state is a concept
of government where the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion
of the economic and social well-being of its citizens through government financed
income transfers designed to effect a distribution of income considered desirable.
According to Baldwin-Edwards (2002), social investment, income redistribution and
horizontal redistribution (managing life time incomes) are the three primary functions
performed by the modem welfare state although these are represented differently in
different countries. This covers all the social security programmes usually established
by statute to insure individuals against interruption or loss of earning power and
for certain special expenditures arising from marriage, birth or death including
allowances to families for support of children. The welfare state is characterised by
a system of publicly provided or guaranteed social insurance, transfer payments and
service-programmes which include pension plans, unemployment insurance, health
insurance, child benefits health care, housing and education. It developed as the social
policy arm of the Keynesian Welfare State (Bommes and Geddes, 2000). The premise
behind this system is that it is the responsibility of the state to provide its citizens with
basic security against certain life-risks. Moreover, the premise is that it is the role of
the state to guarantee aid to its citizen in certain vulnerable phases of the life cycle.
Welfare systems are explicitly tied to the evolution of the nation state and the concep-
tualisation of national citizenship. However, the existence of redistributive social
insurance programs is likely to have an attraction for some unskilled immigrants,
who may be interested not only in new job opportunities, but also in the benefits that
come in the form of subsidized healthcare, unemployment compensation, or provi-
sions concerning dependants. Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002) points out that,
the probability of immigrant households to depend on social assistance and related
welfare programmes is determined by the human capital and other socio-economic
characteristics of the immigrants. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that to some
extent, differences across European countries with respect to the composition of the
immigrant population and their welfare dependency correlates with the generosity of
the welfare state (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 2002).
While immigrants with higher welfare dependency are likely to represent a net burden
for the public finances of the host countries, in general, immigration can have the
opposite effect on the welfare state. For example, when migrants are skilled or
when birth rates are low and the working population is dwindling due to an ageing
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population. Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002) review some of the evidence
on the effects that immigrants have on the welfare state in the host economy in
European countries. They observe that in all EU countries, immigrants are less likely
(than natives) to depend on old-age and health benefits because they are younger.
They conclude that, in general, immigrants are less likely in depend on the welfare
state, with the exception of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and France where
immigrants are more likely than natives to be on unemployment benefits and welfare
assistance because of their reduced earning capacity.
Regardless of whether immigration represents a net cost or benefit for public finances,
the presence of immigrants leads to some adjustments in the social welfare system
(taxes and social benefits) that affects different subgroups of the population differently.
This effect of immigration on the individuals' social welfare outcomes, be it perceived
or real, may affect their immigration policy preferences or attitudes toward immigra-
tion.
Given that skilled immigrants both fill vacancies in skill-shortage occupations and are
less likely to depend on social welfare benefits, one would expect a clear majority
support for skilled immigration. However, unskilled immigration policies are more
likely to be met with resistance from various subgroups of the population (Massey and
Taylor, 2004). Section 4.4 takes an a priori look at how voters in democratic societies
will vote on unskilled immigration, when welfare state concerns are taken into
consideration. Before the model on individual preferences for unskilled immigration,
this section gives a brief background of why there may be a need for unskilled
immigration in Europe. The basic argument is that, as nearly all European countries
approach the predicted demographic crises of having relatively small populations
of working age to support the many pensioners, immigration of young workers
(irrespective of the skill level) seems an ideal solution. This argument assumes that
immigrants are always available and willing to migrate. However, skilled immigrants
are not always available in sufficient numbers and so countries compete for them.
Thus, for the argument to be plausible it may be useful to think of immigrants as
predominantly unskilled since this group of young workers are always available and
willing to migrate.
In order to highlight the link between immigration, on one hand, and the sustainabi-
lity of pension systems, on the other hand, the next subsections briefly discusses the
pension systems, some basic information on welfare state and some stylised facts on
ageing societies.
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4.2.1 Some Basic Facts on European Demography and Welfare States
Eurostat Statistics in Focus (200Sa) reports that in 2006 about 3.5 million people settled
in a new country of residence in the EU-27, representing nearly a 25 percent increase
since 2002. It reports that the annual average increase was more than 100,000 people
during the period, although since 2005 the increase has slowed and even turned
into a decline. The biggest rise in immigration was in Ireland and Spain but with
the majority (more than half of all immigrants) of immigrants settling in the 'big'
EU member states such as Spain, Germany and UK. This is in spite of the fact that
several countries including Germany, Austria and the Netherlands saw a decline in
immigration over the whole or part of the period, with total immigration to these three
countries falling by 14%, 17% and 11%, respectively, compared to the 2002 figures. The
report also shows that about half of all immigrants were younger than 29 years old.
The statistics indicates that international migration seems to be the main driver of
population growth in Europe. The 2007 edition of Eurostat Statistics in Focus, reports
that migration contributed 76 percent to total population increase of 2.9 million in
Europe as a whole. The report also confirms that population increase at EU-27 level
was also mostly due to migration with natural change (live births minus deaths)
accounting for only 20 percent of the total population change in the EU-27 in 2007
(with the exception of France, the Netherlands and the UK where positive natural
change is still the main driver of population growth). At the same time Europe seems
to be experiencing a demographic transition with low fertility rate (below replacement
levels), high life expectancy rates and low mortality rates (Eurostat, 2(07). Table
4.1 indicates that Europe has the highest aging population in the world with 21.6
percent of the European population aged over 60 compared to the world average
of 10.S percent. The figures drawn from World Populations Ageini 2009 indicate
that Europe has the highest old-age dependency ratio (23.6) in the world. This being
coupled with the low fertility ratios; Eurostats (2ooSb) projections show the population
of the EU27 rising gradually from 495.4 million in 200S, reaching 520.7 million in 2035
and thereafter gradually declining to reach 505.7 million by January 2060 in spite of
immigration. The median age is projected to rise from 40.4 years in 200S to 47.9 years
in 2060 and number of people aged 80 years or over is projected to almost triple from
21.S million in 200S to 61.4 million in 2060.
The old age dependency ratio in the EU27 area is expected to increase substantially
from its current levels of 25.4 percent to 53.5 percent in 2060; meaning that there
will only be 2 persons of working age (15-64 years old) for every person aged 65
2UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Publication ref:
ESA/P /WP /212, December 2009
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Table 4.1: Percentages of old age population and l?ependecy ratios:world Major areas and regions 2009
Major Areas or Pop. aged Pop. aged Pop. aged Life Old-age
Region over 60 over 65 over 80 expo dep.
(%) (%) (%) ratios
World 10.8 7.5 1.5 68 11.5
Africa 5.3 3.4 0.4 54 6.1
Asia 9.7 6.6 1.1 69 9.8
Europe 21.6 16.2 4.1 75 23.6
Latin America and the Ca- 9.8 6.8 1.4 73 10.4
ribbean
North America 18 12.9 3.8 79 19.2
Oceania 15.1 10.6 2.8 76 16.3
Source: World Population Ageing 2009
years (ceteris paribus) or over in 2060 (Eurostat 2oo8b). These projections indicate
that unless there are substantial reforms in European social security programmes
(especially pension systems) tax burdens and social security contribution rates will
most likely increase considerably over the period up to 2060. Krieger (2005) argues
that the funding of many public pay-as-you-go systems has come under threat as
a result of these demographic trends. He proposes that an immigration policy that
allows predominantly young workers to settle in the host country can be seen as a
simple solution to the problem. However, he recognises that immigration might be a
politically difficult solution due to the sheer size of the inflows needed to maintain the
dependency ratios at reasonable levels. The analysis in this chapter therefore attempts
to investigate if these demographic trends have any effect on individual attitudes
towards immigration through their effect on the social security programmes. Table
A4.1 in the appendix presents detailed 2008 demographic and social security related
statistics for the European countries in the dataset used for the empirical analysis.
4.2.2 Overview of Social Security Systems in Europe
The welfare states in Europe provides protection to citizens through Social Security
benefits which may be either cash benefits to replace lost income (income maintenance
programmes) or benefits in kind which provide or finance the provision of direct
services. Cash benefits under the income-maintenance programmes are provided
through three broad approaches namely: employment-related, universal, and means-
tested systems.
Under both the employment-related and the universal approaches, the insured
dependents and survivors can claim benefits as a matter of right. Under means-
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tested approaches, benefits are based on a comparison of a person's income or
resources against a standard measure. Some countries also provide other types of
coverage mainly delivered through financial service providers - mandatory individual
accounts, mandatory occupational pensions, and mandatory private insurance'.
Social security benefits may be summarised under the following five groups: old-age,
disability and survivors; sickness and maternity; work injury; unemployment; and
family allowance. However, this subsection will only focus on old-age programmes
to motivate the analyses in the chapter.
The pension systems in Europe and most industrialised countries can be viewed
in three dimensions. The first dimension distinguishes fully funded (FF) pension
systems from pay-as-you-go (PAYG)systems. The pay-as-you-go system is based
on inter-generational redistribution, where the entire contributions of the working
generation are immediately transferred to the retirees. On the other hand the fully
funded system is not characterised by any form of redistribution (be it inter or intra -
generational), instead, it depends on the capital market return or the market interest
rate as its internal rate of return. The second dimension of the pension systems
compares the degree of redistribution of the pension system with the degree of
actuarial fairness of the system. Primarily, this distinguishes systems that follow the
Bismarckian tradition from those that follow the Beveridgean tradition. The latter is
concerned with fair redistribution and intended to guarantee a certain minimum level
of retirement income; hence follows universal coverage with a weak link between
contributions and benefits. On the other hand the Bismarckian tradition aims at
actuarial fairness with pension benefits strongly linked to contributions. It requires
compulsory membership (employment related) and minimum years of contribution
necessary for benefit entitlements. The third dimension of the pension systems
distinguishes between systems that are characterised by defined-benefits (DB) and
those that are characterised by defined-contributions (DC). Defined-benefit means
that the rate of pension benefit is fixed irrespective of the number of retired persons,
implying that the rate of contribution or tax rate varies with the old age dependency
ratio. On the other hand defined-contribution operates with a fixed contribution rate
and a pension benefit rate that varies with the number of retired claimants (Werding,
2003; Thode, 2003; Krieger, 2005). As shown in figure 2.1 below, all the countries
in Europe (except Italy and Sweden) have pension systems that are characterised by
defined-benefits. Italy and Sweden adopted defined-contribution pension schemes
through fundamental pension reforms in 1995and 1998respectively.
Thode (2003)reports that European public pension programmes are usually composed
3More details are available from "Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe,2008"
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Figure 4.1: Characteristics of ational Pension Schemes (First, Second and Third Pillars 2002)
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of three pillars. The fir t pillar commonly follows a pay-as-you-go principle consisting
of a pension scheme that is financed by taxes, contributions or a combination of both
with the current working populations paying the pensions of the retired. The second
pillar comprises occupational pension schemes which may be mandatory or optional
depending on the countr. Employers and employees contribute to funds that are
organized either within the firm or externally through financial service companies.
Lastly, the third pillar compri e all oluntary individual savings plans specifically
aimed at old-age pro i ion. Life-insurance and personal stock-market investments
with annuitized returns are popular instruments in this pillar.
Hi torically, the countrie that primarily follow the Bismarckian tradition can be found
in Au tria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain while
public pensions in Ireland, the etherlands and the UK are built on the Beveridgean
tradition. Denmark, Finland France and Switzerland have pension systems which
in one wa or another follow combined elements of both traditions (Werding, 2003).
In Figure 2.1 below the horizontal axis from left to right signifies the degree of
actuarial fairne ; where the e treme left (flat rate benefit) indicates the complete inter-
generational redistributi e fairness. The figure shows that all the countries are far
away from redi tribut faime and are clustered near actuarial fairness; this is so
even for the countrie that primarily follow the Beveridgian tradition.
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From the above descriptions of pension systems in Europe, it can be summarised that
in general, European public pension systems are largely characterised by a pay-as-
you-go principle of finance (at least in the first pillar) and by defined-benefits schemes
as opposed to defined-contribution schemes.
Due to the prevalence of the pay-as-you-go principle of funding across Europe, the
issue of ageing populations along with low birth rates presents some challenges
and pressures for pension reforms. Immigration has been suggested as (at least) a
temporary solution to the problem of aging populations and low birth rates so as to
help sustain the pension systems during a transition to fully funded system through
reforms (Scholten and Thum, 1996; Haupt and Peters, 1998; Razin and Sadka, 1998;
Krieger, 2004 and 2005; Kemnitz, 2005; Razin and Sand, 2007). The next section
provides a summary review of the relevant literature to which this study is related.
4.3 Literature Review
In a very broad sense, this study, relates to the substantial body of literature that
attempts to evaluate the economic impact of immigrants in the host economy. This
literature typically focuses on the impact of immigrants on the labour market and
welfare state. The overall message from the literature that focuses on the labour
market impacts is that immigration depresses the wages of competing labour in
the host country in the short run. This follows from the fact that the inflow of
immigrants increases the size (relative to other factors of production) and alters the
(skill) composition of the labour force in the host country. Theoretically, this may lead
to higher unemployment rates or higher labour market competition as the economy
tries to employ the new labour in the short run. This means that the inflow of skilled
migrants depresses the wages of native skilled workers, while the inflow of unskilled
immigrants depresses the wages of native unskilled workers (Grossman, 1982;Borjas,
1985;1995;1999;2003;Card 2005). However, the empirical evidence in support of this
intuitively appealing argument is mixed and not conclusive.
Empirical studies using US and Canadian labour market data suggest that immigra-
tion depresses wages for competing workers to some extent. Yet, the estimated wage
impact of immigration depends in part on whether one treats the labour market as
national or local in scope. Borjas (2003)defined the labour market at the national level
according to a worker's education and experience and finds that immigration slowed
down (depressed) the wages of low skilled US workers. Aydemir and Borjas (2007)
applied a similar methodology and finds comparable evidence of the wage effects of
migration for Canada where immigration slowed down the growth of skilled workers
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wages. The problem with their approach is that the effect of immigration on wages
cannot be disentangled from other shocks, such as technological changes that might
affect low skilled workers' wages.
Studies that define the labour market at the sub-national level, on the other hand, tend
to find that immigration has little or no impact on wages. These include Borjas (1999)
for the US; Addison and Worswick (2002) for Australia; Pischke and Yelling (1997) for
Gennany; Zorlu and Hartog (2005) for the Netherlands and Norway (2005); Carrasco,
[imeno, and Ortega (2008) for Spain; and Dustmann, Fabri, and Preston (2005) in the
UK. On the contrary a UK study by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2007) concludes
that immigration has a positive absolute wage effect for natives, but lowers wages of
those workers employed in the lowest paid jobs.
Apart from labour market competition issues, the literature on the effects of immi-
gration also examines the effect of immigrants on public finances and the welfare
state. Immigrants pay taxes, receives transfer payments and make use of public serves.
The main message from this branch of the literature is that, while skilled immigrants
generally constitute a net contribution to public finances, low skilled immigrants gene-
rally constitute a net burden. Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002) survey a number
of studies and conclude that, in all EU countries, immigrants are less likely (than
natives) to depend on old-age and health benefits because they are younger. They
conclude that, in general, immigrants are less likely to depend on the welfare state.
However, in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and France, immigrants are more
likely than natives to be on unemployment benefits and welfare assistance because of
their reduced earning capacity. In the UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal, the contrary
is observed. Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005) ague that net effect of immigrants
on public finances depends on the demographic and economic characteristics of the
immigrants and on the nature of the tax and benefit system ina particular host country.
One issue in the area of economic impacts of immigration that has received very
little attention in the literature is the effect of immigrants on the non-labour and non-
welfare state income of natives. This includes the effect of immigrants on commodity
and housing market prices. However, irrespective of the overall impact of immigrants
on the economy through the labour, welfare state and other socio-economic impacts,
the presence of immigrants inevitably leads to some adjustments in the economy that
affects the individual residents or natives in different ways depending on a number
of factors which include their personal attributes. Based on the simple hypothesis of
economic self-interest, it can be argued that the effect of immigration on the native
individual is the main motivation for their attitudes towards immigration. This leads
to the literature on the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration, to
which this study is specifically related.
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A growing literature investigates both the economic and non-economic determinants
of individual attitudes towards immigration. The early contributions have mainly
focused on individual countries like the United States (Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong,
1997;Espenshade and Hempstead 1996,Kessler 2001,Scheve and Slaughter 2(01) and
the United Kingdom (Dustmann and Preston 2001, 2004, 2007). The overall message
from these studies is that economic concerns strongly shape individual attitudes
towards immigration although non-economic concerns are important as well. Recent
studies however employ cross-country surveys such as the International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP), the World Value Survey (WVS), the Eurobarometer, and the
European Social Survey (ESS) that allow richer cross-country analysis (Chiswick
and Hatton, 2003; Mayda, 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Hainmanueller and
Hiscox, 2007; Facchini and Mayda, 2008; 2009). The analysis of the economic
determinants of attitudes towards immigration focuses on the income distribution
effects of immigrants. The consensus is that, under the self-interest maximising
behaviour, individual responses in survey datasets reflect the impact of immigration
on each respondent's utility. Therefore, income distribution predictions may be tested
through the analysis of individual responses combined with their socio-economic and
personal attributes.
Most of the existing literature considers a highly stylized economy that is usually
described by a simple factor proportions analysis or a two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin
trade model. In both these frameworks, ignoring cases in which wages are not
affected, the labour market effects of immigration depend on the skill composition
of the migrants relative to the natives in the destination country. If immigrants are
on average less skilled than the native population, their presence will hurt unskilled
and benefit skilled natives. On the other hand, if immigrants are on average more
skilled than natives, they will benefit the domestic unskilled, while hurting the
skilled. The evidence is largely consistent with the theoretical predictions (Mayda,
2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Mayda (2006) analysed the economic and non-
economic determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrations, within and
across both developing and developed countries using data from both the ISSP and
WVS.Her results show that skilled individuals favour immigration in countries where
the natives are relatively more skilled than immigrants. On the other hand, low
skilled individuals favour immigration in countries where immigrants are relatively
more skilled than natives. She also shows that non-economic variables (such as crime
and culture) correlate with immigration attitudes, but do not alter the labour market
results significantly.
However, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007),using data from the 2003 European Social
Survey, found that across Europe higher education and higher skills mean more
support for both skilled and unskilled immigrants. Thus people with higher education
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and occupational skills are more likely to favour immigration regardless of the
skills attribute of the potential immigrants. This result is not consistent with the
predictions of the factor-proportions-analysis labour model and the Heckscher-Ohlin
trade model. They conclude that individual attitudes towards immigration in Europe
have very little to do with fears about labour market competition. They argue that the
results might be better explained by an alternative account; more education means
greater tolerance and improved understanding of foreign cultures and a taste of
cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity.
Following from this, the empirical analysis in this chapter draws on theoretical
foundations of welfare state determinants of individual attitude towards immigration
to offer an alternative explanations as to why skilled or higher educated individual
are more likely to favour immigration irrespective of the skill levels of the potential
immigrants. The chapter is, therefore, most related to two empirical papers (Facchini
and Mayda, 2009; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2(07) that focus on welfare state
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. Using data for the US for
1992 and 2000, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) are able to conclude that welfare-
state considerations are important in explaining differences in individual attitudes
toward alternative globalization strategies (migration and trade). They developed
a framework for examining how pre-tax and post-tax cleavages may differ across
globalization strategies and also fiscal jurisdictions. Applying this framework to the
case of individual immigration and trade preferences across U.s. states, they find that
high exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration
among natives, especially the more-skilled.
Subsequently, Facchini and Mayda (2009) contribute further to this nexus of the
literature with a more comprehensive cross country analysis of the welfare state
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. They consider a simple
redistributive welfare state, characterized by a linear income tax and assume that
revenues are lump-sum rebated to all citizens. In their model, an inflow of unskilled
migrants (relative to natives) will make all natives worse off, by causing a given level
of redistribution to become more costly. More specifically, if the welfare state adjusts
through a change in the taxation level in order to maintain the same level of per capita
benefits (tax adjustment model), higher income individuals will be more negatively
affected, as they are on the "contributing" end of the system. On the other hand, if the
adjustment takes place through changes in the size of per capita benefits in order to
keep the same level of taxation (benefit adjustment model), lower income individuals
will be the ones more adversely affected by immigration, as they are on the "receiving"
end of the system. If, on the other hand, an inflow of skilled migrants takes place,
all the above effects are reversed. All natives will gain with migration through the
welfare-state channel. Under the tax adjustment model, higher-income individuals
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will bemore positively affected than poor ones by the decrease in tax rates. Under the
benefit adjustment model, lower-income individuals will be more positively affected
than rich ones, given that the increase in per capita benefits is mostly relevant for
this income category. Based on this model they conduct empirical analyses using
datasets from both the 1995 National identity module of the ISSP and the 2003 round
of the ESS. Their results are consistent with the tax adjustment model (an adjustment
to immigration that is carried out through changes in the tax rates). They conclude
that high income individuals oppose immigration in countries where immigration is
unskilled and considered a net burden to the welfare state. They also indicate that the
data suggest an opposite pattern when immigration is skilled relative to native.
The study in this chapter differs from Facchini and Mayda (2009) and the previous
literature in four main ways. Firstly, the analysis in this chapter focuses specifically
on European attitudes towards immigrants from poor countries outside Europe.
By this departure, the chapter is able to provide some empirical evidence that is
related to the more specific aspect of immigration policy that dominants public
debates and political differences especially in western Europe. Academically, the
focus on immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe provides, arguably, a
more precise proxy for the perceived skills composition of the potential immigrants
than in previous studies. For instance, Facchini and Mayda (2009) and Mayda (2006)
measure the perceived skill composition of potential immigrants by calculating the
ratio of skilled to unskilled labour in the native population relative to the immigrant
population. Thus the higher the calculated relative skill ratio, the more unskilled
immigrants are compared to natives. They admit that, the relative skill ratio measure
is likely to understate the actual skill level of natives to immigrants because the
immigration statistics used are for legal migration only and also because educated
immigrants often work in occupations that require lower skills than their education
level. However, apart from the issue of accuracy with the OEeD International
Migration statistics dataset used in calculating the relative skill ratio, it may also be
argued that their constructed relative skill ratio variable does not necessarily capture
the individual perceptions of the skill composition of potential immigrants. As an
alternative measure to the cross-country skill composition of resident immigrants,
Facchini and Mayda (2009) also simply employed the per capita GOP of the host
country with the empirical justification that high per capita GDP countries have a
higher supply of skilled to unskilled labour than low per capita countries. Hence high
per capita GDP countries attract predominantly unskilled labour from low per capita
GDP countries. While this argument is supported by data, it does not necessarily
follow that individuals in the high per capita GDP countries would automatically
perceive potential immigrants as unskilled. However, with the availability of a specific
survey question that focuses on attitudes towards immigrants from poorer countries
outside Europe, the analyses in this chapter takes a closer step to capturing individual
112
attitudes towards predominantly unskilled immigrants. Hainmueller and Hiscox
(2007) provides empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that immigrants from
poorer countries are more likely to be perceived as unskilled by respondents while
immigrants from richer countries are more likely to be perceived as highly skilled.
The second main departure from the previous literature is that the analysis in this
chapter also benefits from a more direct measure of subjective individual views
regarding the effect of immigrants on their welfare state. Facchini and Mayda (2009)
relied on macro level welfare state variables (labour tax rates and per capita benefits)
to construct a welfare state progressivity indicator which is then used implicitly
(as a gauge of welfare state concerns) to estimate the welfare state determinants of
individual attitudes towards immigration. The availability of a set of direct questions
in the 2008/09 edition of the ESS provides an opportunity to use the explicit views of
individuals in the analyses of attitudes towards immigration.
The third main departure from Facchini and Mayda (2009) is methodological. While
their study mostly applied a standard probit model for the empirical estimations, this
study employs a bivariate ordered probit model. This allows the joint estimation of the
determinants of both the subjective views regarding the effects of immigrants on the
welfare state and the individual attitude towards immigration. Apart from controlling
for possible endogeneity between the two, this method makes it possible to clearly
disentangle the effects of individual characteristic on their subjective welfare state and
consequently their attitudes towards immigration.
The final main difference from Facchini and Mayda (2009) is that the empirical
analyses in this chapter rely on the inter-generational welfare framework as opposed
to the intra-generational redistributive economy model adopted by Facchini and
Mayda (2009). This makes it possible to explore how differences in age structure affect
individual attitudes towards immigration when welfare state concerns are taken into
consideration. From a policy point of view, it also provides an opportunity to relate the
empirical analyses of individual attitudes towards immigration to the issue of ageing
populations in Europe and its consequences to the sustainability of public pay as you
go pension systems.
In relation to the above, the next section outlines the theoretical framework and
generates the empirical hypotheses that are tested in this chapter.
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4.4 Theoretical Framework
This section presents the analytical framework that motivates the empirical analysis
undertaken in this chapter. While part of the empirical analysis covers individual
attitudes based on subjective views regarding the effects of immigrants on the welfare
state as a whole, the theoretical models presented in this section are primarily
focused on pensions as one aspect of the welfare state. They attempt to provide a
structure to how individual attitudes towards immigration could be influenced by
pension motives. This makes it possible to look at the role of immigrants within the
context of the ageing population problem which is at the heart of the public pension
sustainability issue in most European economies. The models which lay down the
formal arguments for the empirical hypotheses are based on Scholten and Thurn
(1996), Haupt and Perters (1998) and Krieger (2004). In this regard, this section focuses
on age (age groupings) and skill levels as the leading individual characteristics that
explain individual attitudes towards immigration when social security concerns are
taken into consideration. This relies on the general reasoning that individual attitudes
towards immigration are linked to deeply held views about the economic self-interest
and social identity of the native population (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005;
Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The argument in this section shows that the economic
effects of immigrants are not confined to labour market outcomes (such as wages,
skills shortages and labour market competition) alone but extends to welfare state
outcomes (particularly taxes and pensions) as well.
4.4.1 Individual Age and Attitudes towards Immigration
How can an individual's age or age group determine their attitude towards immi-
gration in a welfare state? The answer to this question can be investigated using
Scholten and Thurn (1996) - the ST model. They consider a three period overlap-
ping generations (OlG) model in a typical immigrant receiving country where the
population consist of young workers (ZI), middle-aged workers (21-1) and old (21-2)
generations. The young and middle-aged workers pay a contribution (tax) to the wel-
fare state out of their labour income while the old generation are retired and receive
payments from the public pension system. This reflects the nature of an unfunded
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.
In this economy, Schoten and Thurn assume that the society democratically adopts
an immigration policy whereby each voter attempts to maximise their net income of
the current and future periods, neglecting the past income stream as sunk. They also
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assume that only immigrants who belong to the young generation are considered in
the immigration policy at the beginning of each period and immediately after that the
immigrants move into the country and are integrated into the labour force. However
these immigrants only become citizens with the right to vote after the end of the first
period (after about 20 years) when they are in the middle-aged generation. If the
labour supply in the country is inelastic, then the total labour force in period t is
L, = Zt-1 + Zt, where the young workers are either natives (nt) or new immigrants
(mt); Z, = n, +mi. The (gross) rate of immigration is therefore captured by the ratio
of the labour supplies after and before immigration:
At = Zt-1 +nt+mt
Zt-1 + nt
(4.1)
Thus, A( t} - 1 represents the growth rate of the labour force due to immigration. They
define the domestic population growth as rr = ntl Zt-1, suggesting that immigrants
from the previous period t - 1 become fully integrated in period t, having the same
reproductive behaviour as the native population and also remain in the country for the
rest of their lives. The total labour supply in period t, therefore, consists of generations
t - 1 and t both of which have experienced internal growth (zr) and external growth
(A) and can be re-written as: Lt = Zt-2[At-1 {1+ rrt-t} -1JAt{1 + zr), With a constant
rate of domestic population growth, n , the total labour supply becomes:
(4.2)
The ST model assumes a perfectly competitive labour market where each firm faces
a decreasing marginal product of labour and where in equilibrium the whole work
force is employed with wages that reflect the productivity of the marginal worker.
With a linear homogeneous production function of capital and labour where interest
rates are constant over time, immigration yields a reduction in the capital intensity for
a given capital stock and hence leads to a reduction in wages - at least in the short
run. This implies that wages are a function of the immigration rate: Wt = F{A,) where
immigration has a negative effect on gross wages: dwtldAt < O. From (2.2), the (old
age) dependency ratio may be written as:
0= Zt-2 = 1
L, [At-1(1 + IT} -1JAt(1 + IT} (4.3)
Since retirement benefits (pensions) are financed through a pay-as-you-go welfare
state, the dependency ratio determines the working generations' tax burden. An
increase of the immigration ratio, At, reduces the dependency ratio and the tax burden
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for workers. Immigration, therefore, has two effects. Firstly, the injection of more
workers from abroad reduces the gross wage. Secondly the increase in the labour
force reduces each worker's tax (contribution) to the pension fund. The overall effect
of immigration to an individual depends on three things: the age (age-group) of the
individual, the way pension benefits and taxes (or contribution rates) are defined in
the welfare state and the immigration elasticity of wages.
In the ST model, they assume that the elasticity of wages with respect to the
immigration rate is constant: " == ~.~ = const. They also assume that the pension
system promises a fixed percentage, q, of current wages to every member of the old
generation. Thus the retirement income of an old person amounts to q.Wt. The total
pension expenditure is Zt-2.q.Wt and is paid for by the taxes (contributions) from all
the workers, ht.Wt.Lt. Thus the budget constraint is defined as ht.Wt.Lt = Zt-2.q.Wt.
This translates to ht = q.Zt-2/ L, and confirms that the tax or contribution rate adjusts
to the dependency ratio: b, = q.D. Using (2.3), the net wage of a worker after
contribution or tax can be written as:
(4.4)
For a young worker in this economy, the decrease in wages as a result of immigration
is temporary since it only lasts through the first period of their working life. However,
the reduction in the tax rate or the pension contribution rate as a result of immigration
lasts through their entire working life. The young therefore views an additional
immigrant as relatively beneficial since the additional worker helps them to finance
social security system over a longer period. As life-time income maximizers, the
young generation will favour more immigration. Schoten and Thum (1996)argue that
as the individual grows older and closer to the retirement period, the wage depressing
effect of immigration becomes more and more important to them than the financing
effect. At retirement the individual no longer pays taxes or contributions hence they
have no interest in the financing effect. However, since pensions have a fixed relation
with gross wages any decrease in the gross wage as a result of immigration reduces
the pension benefits. Therefore zero immigration will be the preferred policy that will
maximise the retired generation's income from the public pension. This shows that
there is a negative continuous relationship between the incentives for immigration
and age such that members of the population can be ranked in terms of their desired
level of immigration.
The middle-aged worker in this model is the median voter and their optimal
immigration policy preference may be solved by setting the first derivative of the net
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wage with respect to the immigration rate equal to zero:
owr aWl 1
oAt = oAt(l-q.D}+WI·q[At_l(l+IT}-ljAt(l+7T) =0 (4.5)
Assuming that all generations behave the same way, taking the decisions of all
previous and all succeeding median voters as given then the optimal immigration
rate in period is given by
A* _ 1+ Jl - 4q(l- Yf}/Yf
t - 2(1 + IT) (4.6)
The immigration rate, Ai, maximises the net income of a middle-aged individual in
period t. The optimal immigration policy preference of the middle-aged worker, At,
is lower than the preferred immigration rate of the young generation but higher than
the retired generation's immigration policy preference'i.
Haupt and Perters (1998) point out that by modifying the ST model and allowing
the pension rates (q) to vary with the dependency ratio while taxes or contribution
rates remain fixed, the above results can reversed. In their modified model the retired
generation prefer more immigration while the young have no incentive to allow any
immigrants. However, the analysis in this chapter adopts the ST assumption of fixed
pensions and variable contribution as more realistic in the case of European countries
as shown in section 4.2 above.
This leads to the hypothesis: Old and retired individuals are more likely to oppose
immigration than young and middle-aged individuals. In other words, there is a negative
relationship between age and pro-immigration preferences.
4.4.2 Individual Skills and Attitudes towards Immigration
To understand how skills might influence individual attitudes towards immigration
under welfare state considerations, Krieger (2004)develops a simple two period OLG
model with young workers and old retired generations to show how public pension
motives in addition to labour market outcomes can influence attitudes towards
immigration when voters are differently skilled.
4Th is means that a higher relative pension rate strengthens the incentives for the median voter to have
more liberal immigration policy as the elasticity is negative. Higher birth rates reduce the necessity of
immigration.
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Building on Scholten and Thum (1996) as presented above, Krieger (2004) adopts
the defined-benefit pension system (i.e. fixed pension rates and a variable contribu-
tion/tax rate) but distinguish the working generation by their skill levels. Thus the
total labour force consists of skilled (St) and unskilled (Ut) workers plus immigrants
(Mt) who are assumed to be unskilled: Lt == St + Ut +M. This allows the specific
analysis of attitudes where immigrants come in not necessarily to fill up skill shortage
occupations.The number of retirees in period t is given by Lt-I. Similar to the ST
model above, all native workers and the retired generation vote on the immigration
policy which can be described by the ratio of total labour force and native labour force:
At = St+Ut+M
St+Ut
(4.7)
The population growth rate is given by the ratio of the labour force from the two
generations, i.e. 'TCt= (St + Ut)/(St-I + Ut-d -1and hence the dependency ratio is
given by:
(4.8)
As in the ST model, the labour market is perfectly competitive and wages depend
on immigration since the total number of unskilled workers increases with each
immigrant. Thus both skilled and unskilled wages are functions of the immigration
rate:wI(At) with awi/aAt > 0 and wr(At} where awr/aAt < O. In other words,
immigration increases the wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled and decreases
the relative wages of unskilled workers.
With the underlying assumption of a pay-as-you-go pension system, the public
pensions budget constraint is given by:
(4.9)
As in the ST model above, b, is the tax (contribution) rate while qt is the fixed
(constant) replacement (pension benefit) rate. ui, is the average wage given by
ui, = Ow: + (1 - O)wr with 0 = StI(St + Ut + Mt). This means that each retiree
receive the same pension benefit which is related to the average wage which is also a
function of the immigration rate as follows: aWt / dAt < 0 for a labour market where
lOr > wr. With a defined-benefit (constant replacement) rate, the tax rate needs to
change endogenously to changes in the underlying parameters of the model such as
the domestic population growth rate (as well as life expectancy) and the number of
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immigrants hence:
(4.10)
Similar to the result of the ST model, the retired generation has no incentive to
vote for any immigration. Thus the old and retired will still prefer a zero unskilled
immigration rate (At = 1), ceteris paribus since the relationship aWt/aAt < 0 implies
that they will unambiguously suffer an income loss from immigration. On the other
hand, skilled individuals would unambiguously gain through the reduction in the
tax rate as a result of immigration since au1/aAt > O. Thus, skilled individuals will
prefer more unskilled immigration as this maximises their life-time income. However,
for the unskilled individual, immigration has two opposing effects on their life-time
income. Firstly, the inflow of more unskilled immigrants reduces the gross wages
of the unskilled individual in the short run. Secondly, the increase in the total
working population as a result of unskilled immigration reduces the dependency ratio
and hence the tax rate. With constant elasticity of wages with respect to unskilled
immigration, the net effect of immigration on unskilled wages can be shown to be
positive (if unskilled individual are assumed to be myopic with aWt+tlaAt+l = 0).
However, the important point for the analysis in this chapter is that intuitively, skilled
individuals will prefer more immigration than unskilled individuals.
This result, leads to the hypothesis that: Skilled individuals prefer more immigration than
unskilled (low skilled) individuals when social security concerns are taken into consideration.
Thus, there is a positive relationship between individual skills (education) and pro-immigration
preferences.
4.5 Data and Method
The data used for the empirical analysis in this chapter mainly comes from the fourth
round of the European Social Survey (ESS4); edition 3.0 released on 24th March,
2010; and administered between 2008 and 2009. The ESS is a biennial multi-country
individual level survey covering over 30 nations distributed by the Norwegian Social
Science Data Services. It is an academically-driven social survey funded through the
European Commission's Framework Programmes, the European Science Foundation
and national funding bodies in each country. It is designed to chart and explain
the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs
and behaviour patterns of its diverse populations. The first round was fielded in
2002/2003, followed by the second and third in 2004/05 and 2006/07. Nearly all the
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data for the fourth round were collected between August 2008 and June 2009 and the
dataset (edition 1.0) was first released realised on 17th December 2009.
The survey covers 28 countries and consists of up to 54,988 observations (respondents)
with the average country sample being around 1900 respondents. The countries are:
Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Span, Finland,
France, UK, Hungary, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Fede-
ration, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Romania,
Turkey and Ukraine. The stratified random sample was designed to be a representa-
tive sample of the residential population of each country aged fifteen years and above
regardless of their nationality citizenship or legal status. Germany (5.00%) has the
largest proportion of the total unweighted sample size followed by Spain (4.68%) and
Russia (4.57%), while Cyprus (2.21%) has the smallest proportion of the total sample.
However, as shown in Table A4.2 (Appendix), Russia has the largest proportion of the
weighted sample.
4.5.1 Outline of Relevant Survey Questions
Respondent's answers to two questions from the ESS4 survey are used as a measure
of their subjective assessment of the effect of immigrants on the welfare state in their
country. The first question is:
IIA lot of people who come to live in [country J from other countries pay taxes and make use
of social benefits and services. On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country]
receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive? Please use this card
where 0 means they receive much more and 10means they contribute much more."
The resulting variable from respondents' answers to this question is an ordered cate-
gorical variable named Subjective Welfare Sate Effect(1)-SWSE(1) with the outcomes
shown below:
o receive more than they contribute
1
SWSE(1) = 2
10 contribute more than they receive
The second question is:
120
"Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social benefits and
services in [country] encourage people from other countries to come and live here?"
The resulting variable from the answers to this second question, named SWSE(2) is
also an ordered categorical variable which takes the following outcomes:
1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
SWSE(2) = 3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Strongly disagree
SWSE(2) is used as an alternative variable (regressor) in place of SWSE(1) in the
analysis of individual attitudes towards immigration. Thus, SWSE(2) is theoretically
considered a proxy for SWSE(1). The ESS4 also includes a question that makes it
possible to measure the overall immigration policy preferences of individuals as an
indication of attitudes towards immigration:
liTo what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries
outside Europe to come and live here?"
The resulting Immigration Policy Preference (IMPP) variable takes the following
outcomes:
IMPP=
1 Allow none
2 Allow few
3 Allowsome
4 Allow many
This particular question is chosen over other immigration policy preference questions
in the survey because it reflects the assumptions in the analytical framework better
than its counterparts since immigrants from poor countries outside Europe are more
likely to be perceived as lower-skilled (unskilled) individuals by the respondents
while immigrants from richer nations are more likely to be identified as individuals
with higher-skilled. This intuitively compelling argument has been empirically
verified to be accurate by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) using the evidence on the
skill levels of immigrants compiled in the International File of Immigration Surveys
(IFIS)database. The other immigration policy preference questions available from the
ESS4survey are:
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liTowhat extent do you think [countryl should allow people of the same race or ethnic group
as most [country'sl people to come and live here?" and
liTo what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic
group as most [country'sl people to come and live here?"
The answers to these two questions take on the same outcomes as the IMPP above. The
variables resulting form these two questions were used to analyse the role of racism
and ethnicity in the previous chapter.
The nature of the identified questions and corresponding variables presents an oppor-
tunity to estimate the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration focu-
sing on the endogenously determined subjective welfare state effects of immigrants.
4.5.2 Empirical Model and Estimation Method
Given the variables IMPP and SWSE in relation to the underlying analytical fra-
mework, it seems straightforward to adopt a standard ordered probit model for es-
timating the individual attitudes towards immigration as a function of SWSE and
the individual characteristic such as age and skill or education levels. This method
assumes that the SWSE variables are independent and exogenous determinants of
IMPP. However, it may be argued that the individual subjective views regarding
the effect of immigrants on the welfare state are also determined by the individual
characteristics and hence are not independent. It may also be argued that an indi-
vidual's subjective view regarding the effect of immigrants on the welfare state is to
some extent determined by the individual's attitude towards immigration and vice
versa, hence the SWSEs might not be exogenous determinants of IMPP.
In order to eliminate the threat of multicollinearity and endogeneity bias from the
estimates and show a more precise causal relationship, a bivariate empirical model
(relating individual Attitudes Towards Immigration (ATIM) and the Welfare State
Effects (WSE) of immigrants) is more appropriate. This allows the joint dependence
of AT/M and WSE on individual characteristic to be analysed simultaneously. Thus,
the empirical model consists of two equations relating the latent attitudes towards
immigration (ATl M) and the welfare state effects ofimmigrants (WS E) to individual
characteristics (X) of the respondents:
WSEi =Xli!31 + Eli
ATIMi ='YWSEi + X2i!32 +E2i
(4.11)
(4.12)
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The explanatory variables (individual characteristics and attributes) are given by Xt
and X2 with f31 and f32 representing the vectors of coefficients to be estimated, 'Y is an
unknown scalar that measures the relationship between equations (2.11) and (2.12).
If 'Y = 0 then WSE is not endogenously determined in equation (4.12) and hence the
equations could be estimated in a seemingly unrelated manner. The error terms, et
and E2 are assumed to be distributed joint normally N(O,l:) and correlated with each
other while the subscript i denotes an individual observation.
The observed variables relating to the latent variables, WSE and ATIM are the
subjective welfare state effect of immigrants (SWSE) and the immigration policy
preferences (IMPP) respectively. Thus the dependent variables for both equations
(2.11)and (2.12)as observed in IMPP and SWSE respectively take the form of ordered
categorical data hence the bivariate ordered probit model can be applied (Greene and
Hensher,2009). IMPP and SWSE are related to the corresponding latent variables as
flows:
1 Allow none if ATIM; s III
2 Allow few if 1Jt < ATlMj s 1J2IMPP=
3 Allow some if 1J2 < ATIMj s 1J3
4 Allow many if 1J3 < AT/Mj
0 receive more than they contribute if WSEj s b"t
1 if b"l < WSEj s b"2
SWSE(l) =
10 contribute more than they receive if b"IO < WSEj
1 Strongly agree if WSEj ~ b"l
2 Agree if b"2 < WSEj ~ 63
SWSE(2) = 3 Neither agree nor disagree if 63 < WSEj s 64 (4.13)
4 Disagree if 64 < WSEj ~ b"s
5 Strongly disagree if 6s < WSEj
The unknown parameters 1J and 6 are the cut points or threshold parameters for each
outcome such that 1Jt < 1J2 < 1J3 and 6t < b-z • ..
According to Daykin and Moffat (2002), the estimated cut points can be informative
in certain ways. This is in spite of the fact that they are typically treated as nuisance
parameters and rarely given any interpretation. They show that if the statement that
results in the variable for which the cut points are estimated is one with which most
people are either in strong agreement or strong disagreement, then the estimated
cut points would be expected to be tightly bunched together in the middle of the
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distribution. If, in contrast the statement is one on which most people are not keen
to be seen expressing strong views, then the cut points would be expected to be more
widely spread. They also show that if the wording of the statement is obscure and hard
to understand, then the middle cut points might be expected to be far apart, reflecting
that respondents who fail to understand the statement tend to report indifference.
Thus the probability that SWSE = j and IMPP = k is simply:
Pr(SWSE1 = j,IMPP1 = k) = Pr(Oj_l < WSE; ~ OJ'~k-l < ATIM; ~ ~k)
= Pr(WSEi s OJ,ATIM; s ~k)
-Pr{WSEj ~ oj_l,ATIMj s ~k) (4.14)
-Pr(WSEj s oj,ATIMj s I-'k-d
+Pr(WSEj s oj_l,ATIMj s ~k)
If eli and eu from equations (2.11) and (2.12) are distributed as bivariate standard
normal with correlation p, then the individual contribution to the likelihood function
could be expressed as:
Pr{SWSE1 = j,IMPPl = k) = ~(oi - Xlif31' (~k - 'YXlif31 - X2f32)C;;p)
-cl»2(Oj-l - Xlif31' (~k - 'YXlif31 - X2{32)C;;P)
-cl»2(Oj - Xlif31' (I-'k-l - 'YXlif31 - X2f32)C;;P)
+cl»2(Oj-l - Xlif31' (~k-l - 'YXlif31 - X2{32)C;;p)
(4.15)
This is the simultaneous bivariate ordered probit model specification where cl»2 is the
bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function, while c;; = 1
V1+2,},p+,},2
and P = C;;('Y+ p). If 'Y = 0 then the model simplifies into the seemingly unrelated
specification in such a way that c;; = 1 and P = p. The difference between rho(p) and
gamma( 'Y) is that while rho measures the correlation between the error terms (El and
E2) in equations (2.11) and (2.12), gamma estimates the effect that SWSE has on IMPP.
Any statistically significant correlation between the two error terms is indicative that
the exogeneity of SWSE in IMPP cannot be accepted. The model parameters 'Y, p, I-'
and J are estimated along with the {3 coefficients of the explanatory variable, using the
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation method as implemented by
Sajaia (2008) for Stata. The FIML estimator is based on the entire system of equations.
With normally distributed disturbances, FIML is efficient among all estimators. The
FIML estimator treats all equations and all parameters jointly. The model parameters
are obtained by maximising the log-likelihood function below for the entire sample of
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size N:
N J K
1nL = EE E I(SWSEi = j,IMPPi = k)lnPr(SWSEi = j,IMPPi = k) (4.16)
i=lj=Ok=1
For the variables SWSE(I), J = 10 and for SWSE(2), J = 5 while for IMPP, K = 4.
This method allows the two equations to be estimated with the same explanatory
variables. However, in order to improve model identification, instruments (variables
that can be excluded on each of the equations on theoretical grounds) must be included
in the Xl vector in equation (4.11).Thus, the vectors Xli and X2i may contain identical
explanatory variables, however, to improve identification properties of the model,
at least one element of Xli should not be present in Xli.ThiS is essential because, as
shown in Sajaia (2008),although both equations are globally convex and the likelihood
function for the system is highly nonlinear, the nonlinearity cannot be used as a source
of identification as it is done in other models of this kind (Filer and Honig, 2005). The
variables chosen as instruments from ESS4dataset for the estimations are discussed
in the latter part of this section.
Intuitively, the argument is that, the individual's immigration policy preference
depends on whether they think immigrants contribute more to social welfare through
taxes (and hence a reduction in their own tax burdens) or whether they think
immigrants receive more in social benefits (and hence a cost to the welfare state).
Thus, all things being equal, it is expected that if an individual accepts that on balance
immigrants receive more in social benefits and services than they contribute in taxes,
then that individual is more likely to prefer a strict immigration policy ("allow few", or
"allow none"). On the other hand, individuals who believe that immigrants contribute
more in taxes than they receive in social benefits are more likely to choose to "allow
more" immigrants, ceteris paribus.
4.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Starting with the main dependent variable, IMPP, Table 4.2 shows that majority of
the respondents either prefer to "allow few" (32.60 percent) or "allow some" (30.78
percent) immigrants(from poor countries outside Europe) to come and live in their
country. Over half of the sample (52.26percent) prefers to "allow none" or "allow few"
immigrants to come and live in their country. On the extreme ends nearly 20 percent
would "allow none", while about 12percent would "allow many" immigrants to come
and live in their respective countries on average. With a mean of 2.36 and a median
of 2, the collective individual immigration policy preferences are slightly skewed to
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Table 4.2: Policy Preferences (immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe)
Response code Observations Percent Cum.
Allow some
1 10,810 19.66
2 17,925 32.6
3 16,925 30.78
4 6,395 11.63
2,933 5.33
20.77
52.26
83.04
94.67
100
Allow none
Allow few
Allow many
Missing
Mean (St. dev)
Median
2.36 (0.94)
2
Total 54.988 100
the right (positively). As expected, this indicates that generally people prefer more
restrictive immigration policies than open immigration policies, although this varies
slightly across countries and individuals with +/ - 0.94 standard deviation.
Table 4.3 shows that residents of Sweden are more open to immigration (from poor
countries outside Europe) than any other country in the dataset with a mean response
of 3.18 +/ - 0.72, while Hungarians are the most unfriendly towards immigration in the
dataset. It is interesting, however, to note from the distribution of means, medians and
standard deviations that while preferences are generally skewed to the right, towards
restrictive policies, this is not the case for some countries.
As shown in Figure A2.1 in the Appendix, the preferences of people in Sweden,
Poland, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Croatia, the Slovak Republic,
Bulgaria, Denmark and the Netherlands are skewed to the left, towards more open
immigration policies. Thus in general people from these countries are more open to
immigration than the other countries in the dataset. Table A4.3 provides more detailed
statistics about individual immigration policy preferences to confirm this. The table
is sorted by dependency ratios and shows that countries with high dependency ratios
tend to be generally more open to immigration.
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 provide a picture of how the endogenous dependent variable,
SWSE(l), and its proxy SWSE(2) are respectively distributed. Figure 2.2 shows
that, the assessment of the majority of the people is in the region of "immigrants
neither receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive from
the welfare". It shows that despite the emotional public debates about the effects
of immigrants on public finances and services, people are generally not willing to
make extreme judgements on either side of the issue; that immigrants contribute
more than they receive or receive more than they contribute to the welfare state.
Nevertheless, the distribution is slightly skewed to the right, indicating that in general
people believe that immigrants receive more in social benefits and services than they
contribute in taxes. As a consequence, people also generally believe that social benefits
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Table 4.3: Immilf:ation Poli~ PreferencesbI Coun~
Country Total Mean Stddev Median
Sweden 1,830 3.18 0.72 3
Poland 1,619 2.92 0.81 3
Norway 1,549 2.73 0.76 3
Germany 2,751 2.64 0.88 3
Switzerland 1,819 2.63 0.75 3
Belgium 1,760 2.6 0.87 3
Croatia 1,484 2.59 1.04 3
Slovakia 1,810 2.58 0.94 3
Bulgaria 2,230 2.58 1.09 3
Netherlands 1,778 2.57 0.81 3
Romania 2,146 2.5 1.04 2
Slovenia 1,286 2.49 0.86 3
Denmark 1,610 2.47 0.82 2
France 2,073 2.45 0.82 2
Ukraine 1,845 2.38 1.08 2
Spain 2,576 2.37 0.87 2
UK 2,352 2.37 0.86 2
Finland 2,195 2.36 0.78 2
Czech Republic 2,018 2.18 0.84 2
Portugal 2,367 2.17 0.89 2
Russian Federation 2,512 2.16 0.97 2
Israel 2,490 2.12 0.98 2
Estonia 1,661 2.03 0.92 2
Turkey 2,416 1.96 1 2
Cyprus 1,215 1.84 0.61 2
Greece 2,072 1.84 0.76 2
Latvia 1,980 1.84 0.97 2
Hungary 1,544 1.77 0.81 2
Total 54,988 2.36 0.94
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Figure 4.2: Subjective Views of the Welfare State Effects of Immigrants:SWSE(l)
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Figure 4.3: Subjective Views of the Welfare State Effects of Immigrants:SWSE(2)
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Do social benefits/services encourage people from other countries to come live here?
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and services encourage immigrants to come and live in their respective countries.
Figure 2.3 shows that the majority of people seem to "agree" (though not strongly) that
social benefits and services encourage immigrants to come and live in their country.
As one would expect, given the differences in welfare systems, tax levels, population
dynamics and other economic conditions, the distributions of SWSE(l) and SWSE(2)
differ significantly across countries.
Table 4.4 provides some statistics to show the cross country differences in subjective
individual perceptions about the welfare state effects of immigrants (more detailed
statistics are presented in Tables A2.4 and A2.5 in the Appendix). The statistics
indicate that residents in countries that are less noted as large immigrant-receiving
countries and less noted as having a relatively generous welfare system tend to
disagree more that the social benefits and services in their countries encourages
immigrants to come live there. They also tend to believe that immigrants contribute
more in taxes than they receive in social benefits and services. These countries
include Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia. The
exceptions are the Czech Republic and Hungary where residents generally tend to
believe that immigrant receive more in social services than they contribute in taxes.
Although residents of Hungary and the Czech Republic also tend to disagree or
neither agree nor disagree to the statement that social benefits and services encourages
people from other countries to come and live in their country. Not surprisingly, the
residents of Germany, UK, France, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Spain
tend to agree that social benefit and services encourage immigrants to come and live
in their country.
The individual characteristics and variables that jointly determine the subjective wel-
fare state effects of immigrants and the immigration policy preferences are described
below.
The explanatory variable Age-group is defined to reflect the three generations (young,
middle-aged, and retired) prescribed by the analytical framework in section 4.4.2
using the ages of respondents. It is envisaged that the young generation is captured
by individuals within the age group of 15-40 years; the middle-aged are 41-65 years
old, while those aged above 65 are assumed to be retired. This classification takes
into consideration the fact that the minimum state retirement age is 65 years for most
countries in Europe, although on average the effective retirement age in most of these
countries is between 55 and 65 (see table A4.1 in the appendix). Comparing this to the
number of individuals who state that they are retired (in the last seven days) in the
survey, we find that while our definition of retired covers 10,820 the actual retired
people in the dataset are 14,061 individuals. This is because the individuals who
responded that they are retired cuts across all the age groups with individuals who
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Table 4.4: Subjective Perceptions of Welfare State Effects of Immi~ants
SWSE(l) SWSE(2)
Country Mean Std. Median Country Mean Std. Median
dev. dev.
Turkey 6.33 2.1 6 Bulgaria 4 1.07 4
Cyprus 5.5 2.53 5 Ukraine 3.74 1.2 4
Israel 5.05 2.14 5 Latvia 3.7 0.99 4
Romania 5.01 2.15 5 Estonia 3.53 1 4
Switzerland 4.76 1.94 5 Russia 3.51 1.1 4
Portugal 4.73 2.03 5 Hungary 3.43 1.17 4
Estonia 4.68 1.67 5 Slovakia 3.4 1.06 3
Sweden 4.57 1.76 5 Poland 3.32 0.98 4
Bulgaria 4.51 2 5 Romania 3.12 1.04 3
Poland 4.51 1.89 5 Turkey 3 1.21 3
Spain 4.4 2.2 5 Croatia 2.99 0.99 3
France 4.4 1.96 5 Portugal 2.97 0.99 3
Denmark 4.39 1.92 5 Slovenia 2.96 0.95 3
Norway 4.38 1.92 5 Czech Rep 2.77 1.2 3
Ukraine 4.32 2.33 5 Israel 2.73 1.09 2
Finland 4.27 1.8 4 Netherlands 2.64 1.06 2
Latvia 4.25 2.23 5 Greece 2.6 1.01 2
Netherlands 4.2 1.7 4 Sweden 2.51 0.91 2
Slovenia 4.09 2.18 5 Belgium 2.51 1.15 2
Greece 4.09 2.21 4 Cyprus 2.4 0.97 2
Russia 4.07 2.24 5 Finland 2.35 0.93 2
Croatia 4.06 2.07 5 Spain 2.28 0.97 2
UK 3.84 2.32 4 Denmark 2.27 0.97 2
Belgium 3.82 1.95 4 Switzerland 2.25 0.97 2
Germany 3.78 2.05 4 Norway 2.22 0.9 2
Czech Rep 3.76 2 4 France 2.16 1.08 2
Slovakia 3.64 2.04 4 UK 2.09 0.97 2
Hungary 3.45 2.13 4 Germany 2.01 0.83 2
Total 4.38 2.14 Total 2.79 1.17
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are as young as 15years reporting that they are retired. By way of robustness check
a dummy variable, Retired (equals 0 if not retired), is used in an alternative model
estimate together with age as a continuous variable. The summary statistics for the
full set of explanatory variables used are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Further
details of the age and retirement distribution across countries are shown in TableA4.6
in the appendix.
Following previous studies (Hairunueller and Hiscox, 2007;Fecchini and Mayda, 2008),
two indicators are used as proxies for individual skill levels. First, a dichotomous
variable, Skilled, is used, which takes the value 1 if the individual's highest level
of education is any post-secondary qualification. Thus, the skilled include all who
have post-secondary, non-tertiary; first stage of tertiary; and second stage of tertiary
as their highest level of educational attainment. This definition fits the benchmark
model resulting from Kreiger, 2004. The second indicator for skill levels used is the
individuals' Years of schooling variable. This is a continuous variable that simply counts
the total number of years of full-time education completed by the respondent. Note
that income is not used as a proxy for skill in this study since the income variable
in the ESS4 dataset corresponds to the household rather than the individual. The
household income is however, included (not in the baseline model) as a measure of
class differences. The household income variable is coded 1-10, where 1 represents
households with income corresponding to that held by 10percent of households with
lowest income (0-10%); and 10 represents household with income corresponding to
that held by top 10percent of households. The summary statistics show that, although
most Europeans belong to the middle class (median of 5), on average the residents
could be described as upper middle class (mean of 5.29).
Some standard socio-economic and demographic variables are also included in the
baseline model to control for the effects of those individual differences. These include
the dummy variables: female for gender (equal to 1 if female and 0 otherwise); ethnicity
(equal to 1 if the respondent belongs to an ethnic minority group and 0 otherwise);
citizen (equal to 1 if the individual has citizenship status); and citizen parents (equal to
1if both parents of the individual are citizens) which is added for sensitivity analysis.
Table 4.5 shows that 55 percent of the respondents in the sample are female, 7 percent
consider themselves from an ethnic minority, 97 percent are citizens of the respective
survey countries and 84 percent have/had parents who are/were both citizens of
the respective survey countries. Table A4.8 in the appendix provides more details
on these variables. The general distributions of these variables do not reveal any
obvious outliers that need to be taken into consideration regarding the potential bias
in estimates.
Tocontrol for the effect that labour market concerns have on the individual's immigra-
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tion policy preference, the individual's subjective estimate of the Unemployment Rate
is also included in the regressions. The argument is that, if the individual perceives
a high unemployment rate in their country they would most likely want to limit
immigration in order to reduce the labour market competition (especially if they are
unemployed). Even if they are in a stable employment they would still have an
incentive to prefer restrictive immigration policies in order to avoid or reduce the
cost (tax burden) associated with further unemployment that might come as a result
of more immigration. The statistics show that the majority of people estimate the
unemployment rate in their country to be between 10-14 percent (See Figure A2.2
in the appendix) although the mean perception of unemployment is between 20-24
percent. The high perception of the unemployment rate could be largely due to the
recession that was being experienced in most European countries in 2008/09. Table
A4.9 in the appendix indicates that Switzerland had the lowest average perceived
unemployment rate, between 5-9 percent, followed by Norway, Denmark, Czech Repu-
blic, Cyprus, Finland and Sweden where the subjective estimate of the unemployment
rate averaged between 10-14 percent. Hungary, Turkey and Ukraine had the highest
average subjective estimates of the unemployment rate (30-34 percent).
The individual's subjective estimate of the current immigrant population in their
country (Current Immigration level) is also included in the regressions. This controls
for the immigration policy that already exits in the country as well as the individual's
personal assessment of how well the immigration policy is being enforced. This
is an important variable that directly influences the individual immigration policy
preferences. For this variable, respondents are asked to provide their subjective
estimate of the proportion of people of working age born outside the country. On
average people estimate that about 10-14 percent of the people of working age in their
country are immigrants. This realistic subjective estimate indicates that people are
not prejudiced or biased in their subjective estimates of the immigrant populations in
their countries. The detailed statistics (appendix Table A4.9) shows that low subjective
estimates of immigrant populations, 5-9 percent, are reported in Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Hungary and Romania; while high estimates are
reported in Israel (25-29 percent) and the UK (20-24 percent).
To control for the effect of the political views of individuals, the variable Right-wing
Political inclination is also included in the regressions. This is envisaged to take care
of any bias in the individual's opinions and preferences that may be a result of their
political affinities. In general the majority of people are reported to be inclined neither
to the left or right, politically. To control for the effect of any differences in individual
openness as a result of foreign experience and contact, a variable that captures if
the individuals has ever worked abroad for more than six months is included in the
regressions.
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Table 4.6 provides the summary statistics for the variables that may satisfy the exclu-
sion restriction placed on the bivariate ordered probit model to improve identification.
It is envisaged that individual views about the prevalence of benefit fraud and the
efficiency of tax authorities has an impact on the SWSEs but has no direct effect on
IMP P. For example, it is expected that individuals are more likely to think immigrants
receive more benefits than they contribute in taxes if they believe that the tax and social
welfare authorities are inefficient. However, there is little direct reason to expect an
individual to be more likely to prefer strieter immigration policies if they believe that
the tax and social welfare authorities are inefficient. To capture the respondent's views
on the efficiency of the social welfare authorities, the variable Benefit fraud is used.
This measures the extent to which respondent's agree or disagree that many people
manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled. The categorical
variable, therefore, takes the values: 1= agree strongly, 2 = agree, 3 = neither agree nor
disagree, 4 = disagree and 5 = disagree strongly. Efficiency of tax authorities deals with
how efficient respondents think the tax authorities are at things like handling queries,
avoiding mistakes and preventing fraud. It is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, where
o represents extremely inefficient while 10 is extremely efficient. Table 4.6 shows that
people generally tend to hold the view that both the tax and social welfare authorities
are inefficient.
Another variable used as an instrument is Pension Sustainability, which measures the
extent to which individuals think the current pension system will be affordable in 10
years time. It is recorded on a scale of 1-3, where 1 means the respondent thinks
that the country will not be able to afford the present level of old age pension; 2
means it will be able to afford the present level but not to increase it; and 3 means
the country will be able to afford to increase the present level of old age pension.
This variable fits in well with the aims of the chapter. It measures the individual
concerns about the sustainability of their old age pension systems which could (all
things remaining constant) influence their views on immigration and how it might
affect the sustainability of the pension systems. The majority of people believe that
the country will be able to afford the present level of pensions but not any increases.
This indicates that most of the respondents are not aware of the impending public
pension crises.
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Explanatory Variable Mean
(Std dev)
Table 4.5: Summary Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
MinMedian Max Observ.
Age-group: where 1 young (15-40years), 2 middle aged
(4Hi5 years) and 3=01d and retired (above 65 years)
1.81 (0.74)
Age 47.53 (18.52)
Skilled: 1 if respondent's has post-secondary education 0.3 (0.46)
level or above; 0 otherwise
Education: Where 0= not completed primary school;1= 3 (1.42)
primary or basic; 2= lower secondary; 3=upper secondary;
4=post secondary, non-tertiary; 5=Tertiary and 6= second
stage tertiary
Years of schooling 11.87 (4.16)
Household Income 5.29 (2.79)
0.97 (0.18)
0.84 (0.37)
Ci tizen: 1 if citizen, 0 otherwise
Parents Citizen: 1 if both parents are citizens; 0 otherwise
Ethnic Minority: 1 if respondent belongs to an ethnic 0.07 (0.25)
minority group; 0 otherwise
Female: 1 if respondent is female; 0 otherwise 0.55 (0.5)
Unemployment Rate: measured on a scale of 1-11, where 5.16 (3.06)
1= up to 4%, 2=up to 10% ...11=50% or more of people of
working age unemployed and looking for work.
Current Immigration Level: proportion of people of wor- 3.79 (2.58)
king age born outside country; measured on a scale of 1-11,
where, 1= up to 4%, 2= up to 9% ...11=50% and above
Right-wing Political Inclination: 0 if respondents place 5.2 (2.3)
themselves on the left, 10 if they place themselves on the
right-wing political scale.
Worked Abroad: 1 if respondent has done paid work in 0.05 (0.23)
another country for more than 6 months in the last 10 years;
o otherwise
Retired: 1 if respondent is retired; 0 otherwise 0.26 (0.44)
Pro-immigration culture: measured on a scale from O=im- 5.35 (2.61)
migrants undermine cultural life to 10 = immigrants enrich
cultural life.
2
47 15
3 54791
123 54791
54841
6 54841
o o
48 54478
3 o
10 39,563
12 o
54943
54922
53843
54958
11 49190
5
o
o
o o
II 44486
o
4
3
5 o 10 45948
o o 4699'1
54988
10 51801
o o
Table 4.6: Surnmary Statistics for Instruments
5 o
Pension Sustainability: I if respondent thinks the cur-
rent pension system will not be sustainable in next 10
years time; 3 otherwise
1.83 (0.72)
Exclusion Restriction (Instruments) Mean (Std dev.l Median Min Max Observ.
49117
Efficiency of tax authorities: On a scale of 0 to 10
this measures how efficient respondents think the tax
authorities are at things like handling queries, avoiding
mistakes and preventing fraud. 0= extremely ineffi-
cient; 10= extremely efficient.
5.08 (2.36)
Benefit fraud (do you agree that many people manage
to obtain benefits and services to which they are not
entitled"): scaled 1-5 where 1= agree strongly; 5 =
disagree stronglv.
2.36 (0.97)
2
5 o
3
10 48448
2 5 51492
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4.6 Results
This section presents and discusses the results from a series of simultaneous bivariate
ordered probit regressions, based on the empirical model in section 4.5.2, that test
the empirical hypotheses. Country dummies are included for all the countries except
Germany (country with the largest sample size) in all the full sample regressions to
control for any country-specific effects that may influence respondents' views and
attitudes towards immigration. The coefficients of the country dummies are not
shown in the results tables due to lack of space. In addition, the appropriated weights
(design weight and population size weights) and robust standard errors are applied
to all estimates.
4.6.1 Welfare State Effects and Attitudes towards Immigration
Starting with the test statistics, the results in Table 4.7 show that both baseline models
(1 and 2) are well fitted with the Wald tests for overall significance (which tests the
hypothesis that the explanatory variables are equal to zero) - rejected at the 1 percent
significance level. Modell uses SWSE(I) as the dependent variable inequation (4.11),
while model2 uses SWSE(2) as the dependent variable in equation (4.11). The table
indicates that rho (p) - the correlation of errors in the two equations - is significantly
different from zero for model I (-0.423......) and model2 (-0.581......). This confirms that
the errors terms of the two equations, (2.11)and (2.12),are jointly correlated (for both
models 1 and 2). Hence the simultaneous bivariate ordered probit method is justified
as opposed to two univariate ordered probit estimations. In addition to the errors
being jointly correlated, the Wald test of independent equations is also rejected for
both models 1 and 2 at X2(1) = 137;p-value=0.OOOOand X2(I) = 227;p-value=0.OOOO
respectively. These tests strongly confirm the expected dependence between equations
(2.11)and (2.12),thus providing further validation of the adopted method.
The first key result in Table 4.7 is the gamma ('}.) coefficient which estimates the
correlation between the individuals' subjective view of the welfare state effects of
immigrants and their immigration policy preferences or simply the relationship
between the SWSE and 1MPP. Gamma is the coefficient in equation (4.12) that
corresponds to SWSE(I) for model 1 and SWSE(2) for model 2. The reported
gammas, 0.648and 0.679 for Models 1 and 2 respectively are identical. This indicates
a strongly significant (at 1 percent level) and positive relationship between SWSE
and IMPP. This means that, for any given individual (controlling for individual
characteristics), the propensity to prefer to "allow many" immigrants to come and
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Modell
Table 4.7: Baseline Results from Simultaneous Bivariate Ordered Probit Regressions
Model2
Observations 27629 28350
Log Pseudo Likelihood -86730.4
Wald Test of overall significance of model:
P-value
,r(39) = 2730
0.000
Rho (p)
[ Standard Error)
[0.032)
X2(1) = 137
0.000
Wald Test of independent equations:
P-value
Gamma ('}")[Standard Error) 0.648···
[0.028)
SWSE(t) IMPP
-0.042·" -0.136·"
(0.009) (0.010)
0.141· '· 0.1~··
(0.013) (0.017)
-0.364- 0.017
(0.039) (0.044)
0.105"· -0.023
(0.030) (0.033)
0.012 0.048·"
(0.013) (0.013)
Explanatory Variables
Age-group
Skilled
Citizen
Ethnic Minority
Female
Unemployment Rate-subjective estimate -0.012'· · -0.008·· '
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.013'" -0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.023- -0.038'"
(0.003) (0.004)
0.093'· · 0.001
(0.028) (0.030)
Current Immigration Level-subjective estimate
Right-wing Political Inclination
Worked Abroad
Instrumental Variables
Pension System Sustainability-subjective view 0.097*··
(0.009)
Efficiency of Tax Authorities 0.034'· '
(0.003)
Benefit Fraud 0.165"·
(0.007)
0.159·"
(0.007)
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-71625.9
,r(39) = 6906
0.000
-0.581·"
[0.0291
X2(1) = 227
0.000
0.679·"
[0.0261
SWSE(2) IMPP
-0.028- -0.119·· '
(0.009) (0.010)
0.080"· 0.156'"
(0.014) (0.016)
-0.140'" -0.091'·
(0.038) (0.041)
0.014 0.Q38
(0.031) (0.034)
0.021 0.033··
(0.013) (0.013)
0.014'· ' -0.024'"
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.019··· 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.032·" -0.024'"
(0.003) (0.004)
-0.021 0.070"
(0.029) (0.029)
0.078'"
(0.008)
0.005'
(0.003)
Table 4.7: (continued)
Estimated Cut Points SWSE(l) IMPP SWSE(2) IMPP
Cull1 and Cut 21 -1.389*** -1.586***
-0.324***
-1.423***
(0.061) (0.071) (0.058) (0.071)
cut12 and Cut 22 -1.016*** -0.496*** 0.989***
-0.472***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.058) (0.055)
cut13 and Cut 23 -0.554*** 0.663*" 1.628'-- 0.548'--
(0.061) (0.054) (0.059) (0.047)
cut14 -0.085 2.731*-'
(0.061) (0.060)
cut15 0.290***
(0.06])
cut16 1.254**-
(0.061)
cut17 1.584"-
(0.061)
cutl8 1.994"-
(0.062)
cut19 2.480"*
(0.063)
cutllO 2.806*"
(0.065)
Robust standard errors in brackets .• significance at 10%; **significance at 5%; **- significance at 1%.
All regressions include country dummies for all countries except Germany (largest sample);
coefficients for countries not reported in this table
live in their country increases significantly if they believe that immigrants contribute
more in taxes than they receive in social benefits. Similarly, for model2, the likelihood
of choosing to have a higher number of immigrants, increases for any individual
who "strongly disagree" that social benefits and services encourage people from other
countries to come and live in their country, ceteris paribus.
This evidence supports the first hypotheses of this study, indicating that welfare state
motives are significant determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. The
evidence also supports the notion that the two phenomena are jointly determined,
meaning that individual characteristics shapes both their welfare state concerns and
their attitudes. This result is not directly comparable to results from any previous
known studies as the variables used to measure the welfare state concerns are
exclusive to the ESS4 dataset.
4.6.2 Individual Age and Skill Levels
The age-group variable is negative and strongly significant (at 1 percent level) in its
relationship with SWS£(l) and SWS£(2) as well as 1MPP in both models 1 and 2.
This indicates that being above 65 years old decreases the likelihood (by 0.042) that
an individual believes that immigrants contribute much more than they receive from
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the welfare state and also decreases the likelihood ( by 0.136) of choosing to "allow
many" immigrants. Inother words, individuals aged above 65 years, are more likely
to believe that immigrants receive much more than they contribute to the welfare
state and are also more likely to prefer stricter immigration policies as compared to
individuals who are young (15-40 years) or middle-aged (41-65).
The negative age-group coefficient for SWSE(1) and SWSE(2) could be interpreted as
the age effect, as a result of welfare state concerns, on individual attitudes towards
immigration. Thus, the negative coefficient reflects the effect that age has on the
individual's attitude through its effect on welfare state concerns. As outlined in
section 4.4.1, this age effect mainly stems from the individual's social security income
maximisation concerns. This evidence therefore supports the hypothesis that old and
retired individuals have a more anti-immigration attitude than the young and middle
aged individuals due to social security considerations (holding all other variables at
their average values). An important point to note is that, the negative age-group
coefficient for IMPP is larger because it also captures other age driven restrictive
tendencies which may not be associated with the welfare state concerns. For instance,
the old generation might choose restrictive policies simply because they are more
conservative and hence not in favour of the societal changes that might be associated
with immigration.
The negative age coefficient for IMPP (see Table A4.11 and A2.12) is consistent with
findings in previous studies. However, this study provides a more structured (theory
led) interpretation of the evidence. Mode12 confirms this result with evidence that
individuals aged above 65 years are more likely to "strongly agree" that the social
benefits and services encourage people from other countries to come and live in their
country.
With regard to skill levels of individuals, the regressions report highly significant
positive coefficients for the skilled variable. This means that, holding all other
individual characteristics constant (at their sample means), the likelihood that an
individual thinks immigrants contribute much more than they receive from the
welfare state increases (by 0.141) if they are skilled. The likelihood of choosing to
"allow many" immigrants also increase if the individual is skilled (highly educated).
Similarly, the likelihood that an individual will "disagree" to the statement that
"social benefits and services encourage immigrants to come and live in their country"
increases if the individual is skilled or highly educated.
This, consistent with the model presented in section 4.4.2 (Krieger, 2004), the evidence
indicates that skilled individuals have a pro-immigration attitude partly because they
believe that immigrants have a positive effect on their welfare state outcomes (taxes
138
and social security contributions). However, as agued by Hainmueller and Hiscox
(2007), this positive relationship between skills (education) and pro-immigration
attitudes might also be explained by the fact that education means greater tolerance
and improved understanding of foreign cultures as well as a taste for cosmopolitanism
and cultural diversity. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) found that people with higher
education and occupational skills are more likely to favour immigration regardless
of the skill attributes of the potential immigrants. This finding was not consistent,
however, with their predictions based on the factor proportions labour model and
the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. Hence they concluded that individual attitudes
towards immigration in Europe have little to do with labour market competition. This
study therefore complements their findings with evidence that, while labour market
competition alone does not explain skilled individual attitudes towards immigration
in Europe, welfare state concerns playa significant role.
The results for skilled individuals in this study are, nevertheless, contrary to Facchini
and Mayda (2009), who found that high income individuals are more likely to oppose
immigration in countries where immigration is unskilled and considered a net burden
to the welfare state. The difference may be because their measure of "countries where
immigration is unskilled" may not be accurate as they themselves admit. Even though
this study does not define the individual skills attributes by income, the results do not
change when the household income variable is introduced. This is shown later in the
robustness tests.
Table 4.8: Marginal effects after Simultaneous Ordered Probit (Modell)
ABC
Predict Predict Predict Predict Predict Predict
SWSE(1)=l IMPP=4 SWSE(1)=l IMPP=4 SWSE(1)=l, IMPP=l SWSE(l)=l, IMPP=l
Overall 0.0392 0.101 0.0428 0.074 0.0104 0.0139
prediction
Age-Group 0.0035'" -0.031'" .0038'" -0.024'" 0.0031'" 0.0039'"
(0.0007) (0.002) [1] (.OOOS) (0.001) [2] (0.00021) (0.00033)
[1] [2] [I] [2J
Skilled -0.0105'" 0.054'" -0.0113'" 0.043'" -0.0048'" -0.0062'"
(O.DOlO) (0.003) [01 (0.0011) (0.003) [0] (0.00032) (0.00039)
[OJ [0] [0] [0]
Citizen 0.0223'" -0.048'" 0.0242"* - 0.038**' 0.0068*** 0.0089'"
(0.0018) (0.009) [1] (0.0019) (0008) [I] (0.00049) (0.00062)
[1] [1] [1] [1J
Standard Errors in brackets; Reference points for calculated marginal effects in square brackets; sample means
are used as reference points for all other variable; Marginal effects (dy / dx)
reported for Skilled and citizen represents a discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
To express the magnitudes of the effects that both the individual's age-group and
skills level have on their attitudes towards immigration in a more meaningful way,
the marginal effects for age-group, skilled and citizen are calculated and reported in
Table 4.8 for model 1. The calculated marginal effects (discrete change in dummy
variables) reported in the columns under A of Table 4.8 indicate that there is a 3.92
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percent overall unconditional probability that a young (15-40 years old), unskilled
citizen will conclude that immigrants receive much more than they contribute to the
welfare state, SWSE(l) = 1, all others remaining constant at the sample means. This
probability increases by 0.35percent if the individual is middle aged (41-65years old),
but falls by 1.05percent if the individual is skilled. For the individual's immigration
policy preference, there is a 10.1 percent overall probability that a young, unskilled
individual will choose to "allow many" immigrants to come and live in there country.
This probability is increased by 5.4 percent if the individual is skilled and reduced by
3.1 percent if the individual is middle aged. The columns under Bshow the predicted
marginal probabilities calculated with middle-aged, unskilled citizens as the reference
points with all other variables at their sample means. These marginal effects show
that there is a 4.28 percent overall probability that a middle-aged, unskilled citizen
will conclude that immigrants receive much more than they contribute to the welfare
state. This overall probability increases by 0.38 percent if the individual is old and
retired (above 65 years old) and reduces by 1.13percent if the individual is skilled. In
addition, the overall probability that a middle-aged, unskilled citizen will choose it
"allow many" immigrants is 7.4percent which reduces by 2.4 percent if the individual
is old and increases by 4.3 if the individual is skilled. Columns under C reports the
conditional probabilities for choosing SWSE(l) = 1 and IMPP = 1 using middle-
aged, unskilled citizen as the individual reference points and while all other variables
are set to the sample means. The results in the last column, C, indicate that there is a
1.39percent overall probability that an unskilled middle-aged citizen, having decided
that immigrants receive much more than they contribute to the welfare state, will also
choose to allow no immigrants to come and live in there country. This probability
increases by 0.39percent if the individual is old and retired but reduces by 0.62percent
if the individual is skilled or highly educated.
The above marginal effects confirm that there is a welfare state concern-driven
negative relationship between age and pro-immigration attitudes. Thus, all else
remaining constant, the results indicate that the probability of having a pessimistic
view regarding the effect of immigrants on the welfare state (SWSE(l)) increases as
the individual moves from young to old age (retirement). It increases from 3.92 to
4.28 percent as the individual moves from young to middle aged and from 4.27 to
4.66 percent as the individual moves from middle-aged to old age and retirement.
This means people above the age of 65 years are 0.39percent more likely to think that
immigrants receives much more than they contribute to the welfare state. In terms of
immigration policy preferences, the marginal effects indicate that young individuals
are 2.7 more likely than the middle-aged (from 10.1 minus 7.4 percent) to choose
to "allow many" immigrants to come and live in their countries, all else remaining
constant. Whereas, the middle-aged individuals are 2 percent more likely than old
individuals to choose to "allow many" immigrants to come and live in their country.
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Looking specifically at how welfare state concerns affect the individual's immigration
policy preferences, the marginal effects under columns C of Table 4.8 indicate that,
as a result of their welfare state concern, young individuals are 0.35 percent (1.39
minus 1.04 percent) less likely to choose a restrictive (zero) immigration policy than
middle aged individuals. The middle-aged individuals are 0.43 percent less likely
than old to choose a strict (zero) immigration policy. These findings apply more to the
situation where the potential immigrants are expected to be predominantly unskilled.
The marginal effects also confirm that skilled individuals are more pro-immigration
than unskilled individuals and the pro-immigration attitudes of skilled individuals
can partially be explained by their welfare state concerns even when the potential
immigrants are perceived as predominantly unskilled.
4.6.3 Other Individual Characteristics
Apart form the main explanatory variables, Table 4.7 also reports the results for the
control variables used in the baseline regressions. These results show that natives or
citizens are more likely (than non-citizens) to think that immigrants receive more than
they contribute to the welfare state and are also more likely to "strongly agree" that
social benefits and services encourage people from other countries to come and live
in their country. This is reflected in the negative citizen coefficient for SWSE(1) and
SWSE(2}. However, with regard to the effect of citizenship on individual immigration
policy preferences, the results differ between models 1 and 2.
The results for model 1 indicate that being a citizen does not affect the likelihood
of choosing to "allow many" immigrants to come and live in one's country since
the coefficient on citizen is statistically insignificant. This seems to suggest that, the
full effect of citizenship on one's attitude towards immigration may be based on
welfare state concerns. Hence, once the citizen effects on SWSE(l} are accounted
for, citizenship status does not significantly influence individual immigration policy
preferences. This corresponds to the notion that, the welfare state is a symbol which
is based on the political provision of welfare in exchange for the internal loyalty of
citizens. Bommes and Geddes (2000) argue that loyalty and welfare state provision
are two dimensions that structure the relations between migrants and the state, where
migrants become viewed as a potential problem due to questions about their political
loyalty or because of welfare claims (or both). However, in contrast, model 2 shows
that citizens are less likely to prefer an open immigration policy. Thus, the effect of
citizenship extends beyond welfare state concerns.
The results for the ethnic minority variable are weak and mixed in terms of signifi-
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cance. For instance, the results show that the likelihood of thinking that immigrants
contribute more than they receive from the welfare state increases if the individual
belongs to an ethnic minority. However, the individual's ethnic minority status has no
significant impact on immigration policy preferences or SWSE(2). This does not fully
support the theory of marginality outlined in Fetzer (2000).The theory of marginality
states that the experience of being, one's self, marginalised breeds sympathy with
other marginalised people in general, even if they do not belong to one's own group.
According to Fetzer, having a marginality-producing characteristic would (all else
being equal) create greater support for the welfare and rights of other marginalised
groups. Given that immigrants are in some ways a marginalised group it is expected
that people who consider themselves as being in an ethnic minority (marginalised
group) would be in favour of immigration. The results here, however, show that
being from an ethnic minority group gives one a positive opinion about the effect
of immigrants but does not necessarily increase one's support for more immigration.
This could be due to the fact that only a small proportion of individuals (7 percent)
in the entire sample consider themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority group
hence there may not be enough data to fully highlight the effect of the ethnic minority
variable.
Gender has no significant impact on the individual's subjective view of the welfare
state effects of immigrants, although being female increases the likelihood of choosing
to Uallow many" immigrants. Thus being a female or male does not impact on
one's view of how immigrants affect one's welfare state outcomes such as taxes and
social benefits. However, females may feel they are a marginalised group; hence
the support for immigration as they might have some sympathy for the welfare of
the marginalised group of immigrants. Note that even though a larger proportion
(55 percent) of the entire sample is female, they may still feel marginalised (or less
powerful), for instance, in the labour market and in socio-political circles.
Individuals who perceive that the rate of unemployment in their country is high are
less likely to think immigrants contribute more than they receive from the welfare
state and are also less likely to choose to "allow many" to come and live in their
country. However, when the question on the welfare state effect of immigrants is
changed to SWSE(2), the results show that individuals who have a high subjective
estimate of the rate of unemployment in their country are more likely to disagree that
social benefits and services encourage people from other countries to come and live in
their country. Thus, individuals who feel that the unemployment rate in their country
is very high may also feel that immigrants are the cause of the high unemployment
or that immigrants come and take the available jobs hence are less likely to agree that
immigrants come because of social benefits and services. This indicates that, labour
market considerations, where the proportion of current immigrants is perceived as
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high, may also be important in shaping attitudes towards immigration in Europe.
As expected, individuals who think the proportion of immigrants in the country is
high are less likely to think that immigrants contribute more than they receive from
the welfare state. They are also less likely to disagree that social benefits and services
encourage immigrants to come and live in their country. However the current level
of immigration does not seem to be a significant determinant of the individual's
immigration policy preference. This is a surprising result as it suggests that an
individual's immigration policy preference is not influenced by their perception of
the current level of immigration or the existing immigration policies. But it is
possible, though, that all the effect of the individual's perception of the current level
of immigration is reflected in their welfare state concerns. Thus, possibly, once the
effect of the individual's perception is accounted for in the equations for SWSE(1) and
SWSE(2), the individual's immigration policy preference may no longer be affected
by their perception of the current level of immigration or the existing immigration
policies.
As expected, having a right-wing political inclination reduces the propensity for an
individual to think that immigrants contribute more than they receive from the
welfare state and also reduces the propensity of being pro-immigration. This finding is
confirmed in model2, where the likelihood to "Strongly disagree" that social benefits
and services encourage immigrants to come and live in the country, is reduced if
the individual has a right-wing political inclination. The effect of having worked
abroad for more than six months in the last ten years is very weak. The results
for Modell in Table 4.7 show that the likelihood of an individual concluding that
immigrants contribute much more than they receive from the welfare state, increases
if the individual has worked abroad for more than six months in the last ten years but
the variable has no effect on IMPP. On the other hand, for Model2, there is a positive
effect on IMPP but no significant effect on SWSE(2). The weak and mixed results
may be due to the fact that only a small size of the sample (5 percent) of individuals
has worked abroad for more than six months in the last ten years.
4.6.4 Instruments and cut points (threshold parameters)
The next set of results to be discussed corresponds to the exclusion restriction variables
and estimated cut points. The exclusion restriction variables are the three variables
that are expected to determine SWSE{l) and SWSE(2) but not IMPP. The first
variable is Pension system sustainability, which measures the extent to which the
individual thinks the current pension level in their country will be affordable in
143
ten years time. The results indicate a positive relationship between pension system
sustainability and SWSE(l) as well as SWSE(2). This means that individuals who
believe that the country will be able to afford to increase the level of the current
pension in their country also believe that immigrants contribute much more than they
receive from the welfare state. Such individuals are also the ones who are most likely
to "disagree strongly" that social benefits and services encourage immigration in their
country. This does not seem to support the view that individuals who are conscious
about the impending pension sustainability crises are more likely see the potential
benefits of immigrants on the welfare state. Rather, it shows that individuals who are
optimistic about the sustainability of the pension system are also more likely to be
optimistic about the effect of immigrants on the welfare state in general.
The second variable is Efficiency of Tax Authorities which measures the extent to
which the individual thinks the tax authorities are efficient in dealing with things
like handling queries, avoiding mistakes and preventing fraud. The results for this
variable indicate that people who think the tax authorities are extremely efficient are
more likely to also think that immigrants contribute much more than they receive from
the welfare state. They are also more like to "disagree strongly" (though weakly) that
social benefits and services encourage people from other countries to come an live in
their country. Thus, the confidence that such individuals have in the tax authorities
does not allow to them to see immigrants as people who are simply taking advantage
of the benefits from the welfare state.
The third variable used as an instrument is Benefit Fraud, which measures the extent
to which an individual agrees or disagrees that it is easy to obtain benefits to which
one is not entitled. The results show positive relationship between Benefit Fraud
and SWSE(1) and SWSE(2). This means that those who disagree strongly with the
statement that it is easy to claim benefits to which one is not entitled are more likely
to also /Idisagree strongly" that social benefits and services encourages immigration
in their countries. Those individuals are also more likely to think that immigrants
contribute much more than they receive from the welfare state. Thus, it can be
summarised that believing that the tax and social welfare authorities are efficient (in
preventing fraud) increases the likelihood that an individual will have an optimistic
view regarding the effects of immigrants on the welfare state.
Sajaia (2008) indicates that at least one weak instrument or exclusion restriction is
sufficient for identification in the full information simulated maximum likelihood
estimates of the bivariate ordered probit model. However, given that the standard
tests (Anderson-Rubin Test, Sargan test, etc) for over-identifying restrictions are not
supported with the bioprobit command in Stata, the limited information instrumental
variable regression estimator is used to generate tests for the validity of the above
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Table 4.9: Tests For Validity of Instruments
Endogenous
Variable
Under-identification Weak identification Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
SWSE(1) AP r(3): 944.09
P-Value: 0.0000
AP F( 3.27588 ): 314.23 314.23
P-Value: 0.0000
SWSE(2) AP r(3): 592.96
P-Value: 0.0000
APF(3.28406): 197.37 197.37
P-Value: 0.0000
instruments. The ivreg2 command (Baum et aI, 2(02) provides a number of useful tests
to help judge the validity of instruments. They include the Anderson (1951) canonical
correlations test for under-identification; the Angrist-Pischke (AP) multivariate F
test of excluded instruments; and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic for weak
identification. It also provides the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values.
The benchmark model is re-run using the IV method and the test results for the
instruments are reported in Table 4.9. The table reports the Angrist-Pischke (AP) F
and chi-squared tests as well as the Cragg-Donald statistic. All three statistics confirm
that the three instruments (Pension system sustainability, Efficiency o/Tax Authorities and
Benefit Fraud) are sufficiently strong in both models. Thus, the F statistic is sufficiently
greater than 10 and the hypotheses of under-identification and weak identification are
both rejected.
The estimated cut points (threshold parameter band 11) named cut11-cut110 and cut21-
cut23 for the dependent variables shown in the bottom section of Table 4.7 provide
an insight of how strongly people feel about the welfare state effects of immigrants
and how strongly they feel about their immigration policy preferences. According to
Daykin and Moffat (2002) the estimated cut points also give a reflection of how well
respondents understood the survey questions for the relevant dependent variable.
The estimates for cutll-cutllO in model 1 represent cut points for SWSE(I), while
cut21-cut23 represent the thresholds for IMPP. The results show that cutll-cut110
are not widely dispersed from each other but are not particularly tightly bunched
to each other in the middle of the distribution. This indicates that, in general,
respondents are less keen to express strong views about whether they think on balance
immigrants receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive
from the welfare state. Instead, the slightly larger difference between cut1S and
cut16 is an indication that respondents tend to think that on balance immigrants
neither contribute more than they receive nor receive more than they contribute to the
welfare state in their country. This matches the distribution shown in Figure 2.2 in the
previous section. With regards to how respondents feel about their immigration policy
preferences. cut21-cut23 are slightly more widely spread from each other indicating
that respondents are also less keen on expressing extreme preferences about the
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number of immigrants that should be allowed to come and live in their country.
Similarly for SWSE(2) in model 2, cutll-cut14 are slightly more widely dispersed
from each other, indicating the presence of strong views but not necessarily extremist
views. Reconciling these estimates with Figure 2.3 confirms that majority of people
"agree" (though not "strongly agree") that social benefits and services encourage
people from other countries to come and live in their respective countries. Apart
from being an indication that the variables have a somewhat normal distribution
after accounting for other effects on the responses, the estimated cuts points from the
regressions also confirm that in general the results are not driven by any extremist
views in the data.
4.6.5 Household Income Effect and Cultural Considerations
The regressions in Modell and 2 are extended by adding two new variables, Household
Income and Pro-Immigration Culture. These two variables are not included in the main
regressions reported in Table 4.7 because of the potential threat of multicollinearity.
For instance, household income may be related (at least in theory) to individual skills
or education levels and in come cases to the age of the individual. Hence a case may
be made against including household income in the benchmark model. As in some
previous studies (Mayda, 2006;and Scheve and slaughter, 2(01), the estimates in this
study are reported with and without the income control, although in other studies
(Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2(07) income is included in the benchmark model.
Pro-Immigration Culture captures the individual's subjective view of how the cultural
life in their country is affected by immigrants. Respondents are asked to rate on a
scale of 0 to 10 whether they think the cultural life in their respective countries is
generally undermined or enriched by immigrants. However, their responses to this
may be determined by age, level of education and other individual characteristics
that also determine their immigration policy preferences hence it is reasonable to
show the results with and without the cultural effects control. Household Income
is expected to influence both the individual welfare state considerations and their
immigration policy preferences however Pro-Immigration Culture is only expected to
influence the individual's immigration policy preference and not their concerns about
how immigrants affect their welfare state outcomes.
Table 4.10 presents the results with additional controls taken into consideration in
Model 3 and 4, where Model3 corresponds to Modell with the additional controls
and model 4 corresponds to Model 2 with additional controls. These new sets of
results are, by and large, similar to the main results in Table 4.7,but with some notable
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Table 4.10: Results with Household Income and Cultural Effects
Model3 Model4
Observations 22PJ7 22,610
Log Pseudo likelihood -67480 -54695.81
Wald Test of overall significance of model: r(37) = 2122.51 r(37) = 5364.39
P-value 0.000 0.000
Rho(p) -0.311 -0.410
[Standard Error) (0.069) (0.037)
Wald Test of independent equations: r(l) = 50.19 r(l) = 93.69
P-value 0.000 0.000
Gamma [Standard Error) 0.456- 0.488···
(0.039) (0.036)
Variables
Skilled 0.120- 0.083- 0.083 ... • O.O~ ...
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
Citizen -0.362- 0.040 -0.128··· -0.040
(0.042) (0.050) (0.042) (0.045)
Ethnic Minority 0.134- -0.049 0.047 -0.002
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
Female 0.021 0.046· ... 0.034 .... 0.035··
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Unemployment Rate-subjective estimate -0.015·" -0.002 0.013··· -0.014"·
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Current Immigration Level-subjective estimate -0.013- -0.001 -0.017""" 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Right-wing Political Indination -O.O2?- -0.035 ....• -0.036- -0.025···
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Worked Abroad 0.091-· 0.010 -0.034 0.06~·
(0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034)
Household Income 0.012-· 0.003 -0.003 0.010···
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Pro-immigration Culture O.I~· 0.182·"
(0.005) (0.005)
Instrumental Variables
Pension System Sustainability-5ubjective view 0.094· .... 0.091···
(0.010) (0.010)
Efficiency of Tax Authorities 0.035··· -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Benefit Fraud 0.162··· 0.175···
(0.008) (0.008)
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Table 4.9: (continued)
Estimated Cut Points SWSE(1) IMPP SWSE(2) IMPP
Cutl1 and Cut 21 -1.353'" -0.615'"
-0.329'"
-0.498'"
(0.070) (0.076) (0.067) (0.070)
Cutl2 and Cut22 -0.995'" 0.632'" 0.998'" 0.685'"
(0.069) (0.070) (0.068) (0.065)
Cut13 and Cut23 -0.522'" 1.971 • • • 1.640'" ·1.963'"
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.067)
Cut14 -0.047 2.774'"
(0.069) (0.070)
CutIS 0.329**'
(0.069)
Cut16 1.308'"
(0.069)
Cut17 1.639'"
(0.070)
Cut18 2.066'"
(0.071)
Cut19 2.558'"
(0.072)
CutllO 2.851 • • •
(0.074)
Robust standard errors inbrackets .• significance at 10%;" significance at 5%; • • • significance at 1%.
All regressions include country dummies for all countries except Germany (largest sample); coefficients
for countries not reported in this table.
exceptions. Firstly, there is a very small increase in the reported standard errors for
nearly all the variables which is an indication that though multicollinearity might be
present it is not a significant threat to the results. Secondly, all the coefficients for
the main explanatory variables (SWSE(l), SWSE(2), age-group and Skilled) reduce
slightly, though the direction of the relationships remains the same. Thirdly the
insensitivities of some of the control variables are highlighted. For instance, Citizen
which was significant in Model2 for IMPP becomes insignificant in Model4, giving
more strength to the argument that the effect of citizenship on the individual's attitude
towards immigration may be fully embedded in welfare state concerns. Meaning that
once this is accounted for, citizen and non-citizens may have similar preferences for
immigration, all else remaining equaL
The female dummy, which as not significant for SWSE(2) in model 2, becomes
significant in Model4 though, it remains positive. The individual's subjective estimate
of the Unemployment Rate also loses its significance in Model 3 under IMPP. In
addition, the effect of subjective assessments of the Efficiency of Tax Authorities becomes
insignificant in model 4.
Table 4.10 shows mixed and inconclusive results for household income with significant
and positive coefficients for SWSE(l) in Model3 and [MPP in Model4. Thus being
from a high income household increases the likelihood that the individual thinks that
immigrants contribute much more than they receive from the welfare state. However,
household income does not seem to affect the indi vidual's immigration policy preference
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in the same model even though it is a significant determinant of IMPP in model 4. On
the other hand, Pro-Immigration Culture is highly Significant (at 1 percent level) and
positively related to the IMPP in both Models 3 and 4. This highlights the importance
of cultural considerations in individual attitudes towards immigration.
4.6.6 Cross-Country Differences in Attitudes towards Immigration
Having established the results for the full sample across all the countries, the next
step is to find out if the above findings hold for each of the countries involved in
the survey. To achieve this, the regressions above for models 1 and 2 are re-run for
each of the countries involved and the selected results from those regressions are
presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. The first important finding from the individual
country regressions is that the empirical method, i.e. the bivariate ordered probit
specification, adopted for the cross-country regressions does not fit the data for some
of the countries involved. In particular, for some of the countries, rho (p) is not
significantly different from zero and the Wald test of independent equations is not
rejected. This means that, for those countries, the Subjective Welfare State Effects
of immigrants (SWSE) and Immigration Policy Preferences (lMPP) are not jointly
determined. This violates a key requirement for the use of the bivariate ordered probit
model hence the method cannot be used for those countries.
In all, there are 19 countries where the bivariate ordered probit method works
appropriately (with rho not equal to zero) for either model I or model2 or both and
9 countries where the method is not appropriate for either model. The method fits
the data appropriately for model 1 in 15 countries, model 2 in 15 countries and for
both models 1 and 2 in 11 countries. Thus, if model 2 is considered as a robustness
check on model 1 then one can conclude that the bivariate ordered probit method is
robustly appropriate for the data in 11 countries. Table 4.11 brings together the results
from the 11 individual country regressions where rho was significantly different
from zero for both model 1 and model 2. Table 4.12 also presents selected results
for the countries where the method is appropriate in either one of the models but
not both. In addition, the results for the countries where the regressions produced
an insignificant rho for either or both models is provided in the appendix (Table
A4.10). For all the individual country results tables, only the coefficient estimates
for the main explanatory variables: age-group and skilled as well as SWSE(1) and
SWSE(2), represented by the gammas - are shown for the purpose of the discussions,
although the regressions included all the control variables used in the cross-country
regressions (with the exception of country dummies). As recommended by the ESS
data providers, the individual country estimates are only weighted with the survey
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design weight variable provided with the dataset.
The second noteworthy point from the individual country regressions is that the
bivariate ordered probit method works very well and the results are stable for both
models in countries that are normally referred to as western European (politically). All
the countries in Table 4.11where rho is not zero for both models 1 and 2 are western
European countries, with the exception of Estonia. This might explain why the
method fits well in those countries since western European countries are characterised
by high-incomes, well developed generous welfare states, and relatively higher levels
of both European and non-European immigration. Norway and Portugal are the
only western European countries where the method fails based on the estimated rho
coefficient.
The third interesting finding from the country results in both Tables 4.12 and 4.12
is that all the gamma coefficients are positive and highly significant, with exception
of Greece which has an insignificant coefficient and Latvia which has a negative
coefficient. This confirms, at the country level, the hypothesis that welfare state
concerns are important determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration.
The fourth noticeable finding from the individual country regressions is that the
effect of age and skill on the individual's subjective views regarding the impact of
immigrants on the welfare state is weak and not robust. Whereas the effect on age and
skill level on the individual's immigration policy preference is more consistent. For
instance, column 3 in Table 4.11 shows that the age-group variable is only Significant
(with a negative sign) for Estonia and Switzerland when model! is implemented for
each country. At the same time only Estonia and Switzerland have an insignificant
coefficient for age-group in the corresponding results (column 5) for immigration
policy preferences. The situation improves slightly when model 2 is implemented
for each country. Column 9 shows that age-group is significant for Denmark, France,
Netherlands, Sweden and The UK under SWSE(2}, in addition to being significant
for all the countries under the corresponding IMPP except Spain and Switzerland.
A similar pattern of significant and insignificant results are shown for the skilled
variable in Table 4.11, though this is significant in more countries than the case for
age-group. The degree of sensitivity in the country results suggests that the size and
significance of the effects (of age and skill levels) may be influenced by the structure
of the individual country sample sizes hence further investigations are required.
Several reasons could be responsible for the lack of significance in the estimated
correlations coefficients (rho) between the error terms of the two equations (4.11)
and (4.12) for some of the countries. Assuming rho is correctly estimated for the
countries where rho=O, then the absence of joint dependence for SWSE and IMPP
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could be due to country specific differences in demographic structures (population
growth and ageing, skill and education level, immigrations levels etc); economic
conditions (GOP and per capita income, growth rates, unemployment rates, tax levels
etc); and existing policies (welfare state policies, immigration policies etc). Detailed
country level studies beyond the scope this chapter are required to properly identify
the specific determinants that drive the differences across countries. However the
estimated rho coefficients and their significance may not be accurate due to sub-
sample structures of the individual countries and not necessarily due the individual
opinions and preferences.
The entire dataset is therefore split into six groups of countries based on the signi-
ficance of rho from the individual country regressions. The simultaneous bivariate
ordered probit regressions in modell and 2 are re-run for each of the groups and the
results are presented in Table4.13. This is done to help rule out the possibility that the
estimated rho coefficients for the individual countries are merely due to the country
sample sizes and structures.
The six groupings of the countries are described below. Group A consists of the 11
countries with stable results where rho is not zero for both models 1 and 2. This is the
group the has the countries (typically western European countries) where the model
fits best for both models 1and 2. Hence the results for this group are expected to be the
best. Group Bconsists of the 17countries where the method does not fit the individual
country data when anyone or both of the models are implemented. This is the group
where rho is zero in the individual country regressions for either model I or 2 or both.
Group C consists of the 15 countries where rho is not zero in the individual country
regressions for model 1, while Group D consist of the 13 countries where rho is zero
in the individual countries for model 1. Group E represents the countries where rho
is not zero while F represents the countries where rho is zero for model2. Thus, for
groups A and B,both model 1 and 2 regressions are repeated for the groups samples
and for groups C and D only the model I regression is repeated while model 2 is only
repeated for groups E and F. If the individual country estimates of rho are accurate
one would expect the group estimates to reflect the collective estimates of the group
members. This means that rho is expected to be significant only for groups A, C and
E while insignificant for the others.
The interesting finding from the split sample regressions reported in Table 4.13 is
that, irrespective of the individual country results, all the estimated rho coefficients
are highly Significantly different from zero. The method seems to work very well
even for groups B, D and F (the groups that consist of countries where the method
fails in the individual country regressions). All the group results are consistent with
the three hypotheses of this chapter. Thus, all the gammas are positive and highly
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significant at 1 percent level, indicating that welfare state concerns are significant
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. Age-group is negative
and highly significant for all the groups except group B (model 2") and group F.
This indicates that, by and large, individual over 65 years old are more likely to be
anti-immigration because of their welfare state concerns. Finally, skilled individuals
are more likely to be more pro-immigration because welfare state concerns since the
skilled variable is positive and significantly different from zero for all the groups.
This underscores the point that the individual country results should be taken with
caution as they may largely be influenced by the country sample sizes. A more
detailed country level study aimed at exploring the cross-country heterogeneity is
needed to understand how the findings differ by country.
4.6.7 Other Sensitivity Analyses
Four additional models are estimated with the full cross-country sample to further
check if the general findings are sensitive to changes in variable definitions as well
as other controls. Model 5 extends and modifies the model 3 such that age (as
continuous variable) and education level (a categorical variable with 0-6 categories)
are used in place of age-group and the skilled binary variable. In addition, citizen is
redefined to account for people who were born in the country as opposed to those who
have a citizenship status; worked abroad is replaced with a variable that accounts for
individuals who live in a big city; and citizen parents is included as an additional control
to account for second generation immigrants. Model 6 extends and modifies model
4 with the above changes. Models 7 and 8 then alter the definition of skill/ education
level in modelS and 6 with the years of schooling variable. The results for Models 5 and
6 are reported in Table A4.11, while the results for model 7 and 8 are reported in Table
A4.12 (both in the appendix to the chapter).
Focusing on the main explanatory variables of the four additional models, the
conclusion remains that welfare state concerns are indeed strong, significant and
robust determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. This is highlighted
by the fact that the size and significance of all the gammas from models 5-8 remain
identical (strong and highly significant) to the results from models 3 and 4.
The next finding is that the old generation are more likely to believe that immigrants
have a negative effect on their welfare state outcomes irrespective of the controls and
definition of variables. However, the likelihood that the old generation agrees that
social benefits and service encourage immigrants to come and live in their country
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is sensitive to the controls and variable definitions. The results from the last four
models indicate that the coefficients for age continues to be negative (though small)
and highly significant where SWSE(l} is concerned but loses its significances with
SWSE(2) in model 6 and 8. The negative age coefficient however remains highly
significant for all the models for 1MPP. This means that, although older people
(over 65 years) are always more likely to opposed immigration because of its negative
effect on the welfare state, it does not necessarily always mean that the older people
are more likely to agree that social benefits and services encourages immigration.
Thus, the robustness of the relationship between age and individual attitudes towards
immigration as a result of welfare state concerns is limited to SWSE(l}. This may be
an indication that old and retired people are more concerned about the negative effect
of immigration on the welfare state outcomes through the wage depression channel
rather than how immigrants affect tax rates.
The results for the individual's skills level measured by the education level and years
of schooling variables are also robust and consistent with the hypothesis that skilled
individuals are more likely to be pro-immigration due to welfare state concerns. This is
underlined by the highly significant positive coefficients for education level in model
5 and 6 as well as years of schooling in model 7 and 8.
Two additional models are also estimated as further robustness checks. In models
9 and 10, all the categorical variables with more than two outcomes in models 1
and 2 are redefined as dummy variables. Thus, for age-group the dummy variables
are Young (16-40),Middle aged (41-65);Old and retired (above 65). The subjective
estimates of the unemployment rate and the size of the current immigrant population
in the respondent's country are also re-categorised into clusters of dummy variables
as shown in Table A4.13. The political inclination variable is also changed to a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 if the respondent's political inclination is above 6
on a scale of 0-10 (where 0 represents left-wing political inclinations and 10 represents
right-wing political inclinations). The variables, pension sustainability, efficiency of the
tax authorities and benefit fraud are all also re-coded as dummy variables for models 9
and 10.
The results, shown in Table A4.13 in the appendix, confirms the findings so far. The
table shows that compared to the young (the reference group), middle-aged individuals
are more likely to be anti-immigration and also more likely to believe that immigrants
are bad for the country's welfare state. Old and retired people are even more likely to be
opposed to immigration. To a large extent, the results also confirm that the higher an
individual's subjective estimate of the unemployment rate the more likely they are to
oppose immigration and the more likely they are to think that immigrants contribute
less to the welfare state than they receive. Similarly, the higher a person's subjective
156
estimate of the size of the immigrant population the more likely they are to believe
that immigrants are bad for the Welfare state.
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•4.7 Conclusions
Individual attitudes towards immigration feature strongly in the immigration policy
making process in the modem democratic state. Irrespective of the overall effects
of immigration in the host country, attitudes towards immigration are largely based
on how immigration affects the individual's labour market (employment and wages)
and welfare state (taxes and social benefits) outcomes. Against the background that
individual attitudes towards immigration are deeply rooted in personal economic
self-interest, this chapter explored the importance of welfare state concerns and
considerations as determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration using the
2008/09 edition of the European Social Survey dataset.
The chapter examines the extent to which attitudes towards immigration are determi-
ned by individual concerns about the effect of immigrants on the welfare state, where
the potential immigrants are perceived as predominantly less skilled relative to the
native population. In addition to this, the chapter relies on established theoretical
models to analyse the effect of an individual's age/age-group and skill level on their
social security motivated attitudes towards immigrations.
There are two main conclusions from this chapter. The first is that welfare state
considerations are very important determinants of individual attitudes towards
immigration in Europe. This conclusion is based on the best available survey
evidence, the 2008/09 ESS, which revealed a strong robust positive correlation
between the subjective views of individuals regarding the effect of immigrants on
the welfare state and individual immigration policy preferences. The evidence also
confirms that causality runs from the former to the latter. The individual immigration
policy preferences relate to immigrants that are largely perceived as predominantly
unskilled, from poor developing countries outside Europe. Thus, all things being
equal, an individual who believes that immigrants have a negative effect on the
welfare state is also more likely to prefer to restrict immigration of predominantly
unskilled immigrants.
The second conclusion is that intergenerational models of public pension and immi-
gration policy do a good job of predicting the effects of age/age-groups and skill
levels on individual attitudes towards immigration. This is underlined by the two
sets of evidence relating to age and skills (education) levels. The analyses confirmed
that, by taking into consideration welfare state concerns, older retired individuals are
more likely than young and middle-aged individuals to oppose immigration. The
evidence also suggested that skilled (highly educated) individuals are more likely
than unskilled individuals to be pro-immigration based on welfare state concerns.
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The individual immigration policy preferences that were analysed to obtain both sets
of evidence relate to (perceived) predominantly unskilled immigrants.
The conclusions from the empirical studies in this chapter have significant bearing
on the direction of immigration policies in the European welfare state as well as the
public discourse on the effects of immigration. The conclusions highlight the fact
that people's concerns about their taxes and social benefits as a result of immigration
in Europe are just as important as, if not more import than, their labour market
concerns, even though public debate on the effects of immigrants tends to focus more
on employment and wages. The results also show that there is a need for policy
makers and social commentators to bring the issue of public pension financing into the
immigration policy debate arena to enrich the process of immigration policy-making.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
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4.A Appendix to Chapter 4
Table A4.1: Demo!E:aEh.ic and other statistics related to Social securit~ 2008
Country GOP Total Percentage Dependency Life Statutory
per capita population 65 or older ratio EXEectancl: Eensionable age
(USS) (millions) Male Female Male Female
Belgium 32,119 10.4 17.3 52.2 76.5 82.3 65 64
Bulgaria 9,032 7.7 17.2 44.9 69.5 76.7 63 59.5
Croatia 13,042 4.6 17.2 48.6 72.3 79.2 65 60
Cyprus 22,699 0.8 12.1 47.1 76.5 81.6 65 65
Czech Republic 20,538 10.2 14.2 40.8 73.4 79.5 61.83 56.33
Denmark 33,973 5.4 15.1 51.3 76 80.6 65 65
Estonia 15,478 1.3 16.6 46.6 65.9 76.8 63 60.5
Finland 32,153 5.2 15.9 49.9 76.1 82.4 65 65
France 30,386 61 16 53.1 77.1 84.1 60 60
Germany 29,461 82.7 18.8 49.7 76.5 82.1 65 65
Greece 23,381 11.1 18.3 48.4 77.1 81.9 65 60
Hungary 17,886 10.1 15.2 44.9 69.2 77.4 62 61
Israel
Latvia 13,646 2.3 16.6 44.9 67.3 77.7 62 6],5
Netherlands 32,684 16.3 14.2 48.4 77.5 81.9 65 65
orway 41,420 4.6 14.3 52.2 77.8 82.5 67 67
Poland 13,847 38.2 13.3 42 71.3 79.8 65 60
Portugal 20,410 10.5 16.9 48.9 75 81.2 65 65
Romania 9,060 21.6 14.8 43.9 69 76.1 63.25 58.25
Russian Federa- 10,845 144 13.8 40.6 59 72.6 60 55
tion
Slovakia 15,871 5.4 11.7 39.9 70.7 78.5 62 56.75
Slovenia 22,273 2 15.6 42.2 74.1 81.5 62.5 56
Spain 27,169 43.4 16.8 45.3 77.7 84.2 65 65
Sweden 32,525 9 9 52.9 78.7 83 65 65
Switzerland 35,633 7.4 7.4 47.3 79 84.2 65 64
Turkey
UK 33,238 60.2 16.1 51.7 77.2 81.6 65 60
Ukraine 6,848 46.9 16.1 44.5 62.1 73.3 60 55
Source: Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe Report 2008, SSPTW: Europe, 2008.
161
Table A4.2: SamEle size by countEX
Country ISO Country Unweighted Sample Percentage Weight Sample Proportion
Code Number of of total Number of of weighted
observations observations observation
DE Germany 2,751 5 7094 12.14
ES Spain 2,576 4.68 3866 6.61
RU Russian Federation 2,512 4.57 12000 20.73
JL Israel 2,490 4.53 514 0.88
TR Turkey 2,416 4.39 5194 8.89
PT Portugal 2,367 4.3 899 1.54
GB UK 2,352 4.28 5044 8.63
BG Bulgaria 2,230 4.06 662 1.13
FI Finland 2,195 3.99 441 0.75
RO Romania 2,146 3.9 1825 3.12
FR France 2,073 3.77 5054 8.65
GR Greece 2,072 3.77 961 1.64
CZ Czech Republic 2,018 3.67 890 1.52
LV Latvia 1,980 3.6 ]96 0.34
UA Ukraine 1,845 3.36 3969 6.79
SE Sweden 1,830 3.33 764 1.31
CH Switzerland 1,819 3.3] 642 1.1
SK Slovakia 1,810 3.29 455 0.78
L etherlands 1,778 3.23 1347 2.3
BE Belgium 1,760 3.2 887 1.52
EE Estonia 1,661 3.02 114 0.2
PL Poland 1,619 2.94 3221 5.51
DK Denmark 1,610 2.93 447 0.76
NO oTWay 1,549 2.82 383 0.66
HU Hungary 1,544 2.81 854 1.46
HR Croatia 1,484 2.7 375 0.64
SI Slovenia 1,286 2.34 175 0.3
CY Cyprus 1,215 2.21 65 0.11
Total 54,988 100 58000 100
Figure A4.1: Histogram of Immigration Policy Preferences by Country
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Table A4.4: Individual Subjective Assessment of the Welfare State Effects of Immigrants, SWSE(I)by country
country Mean Std. Dev. median Freq.
Turkey 6.33 2.1 6 1 22
Cyprus 5.5 2.53 5 1089
Israel 5.05 2.14 5 2]75
Romania 5.01 2.15 5 1402
Switzerland 4.76 1.94 5 1592
Portugal 4.73 2.03 5 1804
Estonia 4.68 1.67 5 1301
Sweden 4.57 1.76 5 1696
Bulgaria 4.51 2 5 1 09
Poland 4.51 1.89 5 1 29
Spain 4.4 2.2 5 2315
france 4.4 1.96 5 2021
Denmark 4.39 1.92 5 1529
orway 4.38 1.92 5 1535
Ukraine 4.32 2.33 5 1337
Finland 4.27 1.8 4 2118
Latvia 4.25 2.23 5 1642
etherlands 4.2 1.7 4 169
Slovenia 4.09 2.18 5 114
Greece 4.09 2.21 4 1997
Russian Federation 4.07 2.24 5 2086
Croatia 4.06 2.07 5 121
UK 3.84 2.32 4 2257
Belgium 3.82 1.95 4 1721
Germany 3.78 2.05 4 2555
Czech Republic 3.76 2 4 1725
Slovakia 3.64 2.04 4 1512
Hungary 3.45 2.13 4 1198
Total 4.38 2.14 47229
Figure A4.2: Individual Perceptions of the Unemployment Rate
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Table AU: Summary Age-groups by Country
country Young Middleageci OldlRetired Don't know/mlHlnl Total
Turkey 1.415 770 210 21 2,416
Israel 1,103 925 426 36 2,490
Spain 1,101 947 524 4 2,576
Russian Federation 1,018 952 S38 4 2,512
Greece 901 874 295 2 2,072
Romania 880 876 359 31 2,146
Germany 875 1,289 561 26 2,751
UK 848 967 S09 28 2,352
Finland 806 977 412 0 2,195
Czech Republic 791 921 306 0 2,018
France 787 8S6 430 0 2,073
Portugal 744 849 773 1 2,367
Sweden 724 733 373 0 1,830
Poland 718 636 265 0 1,619
Latvia 715 818 447 0 1,980
Belgium 701 744 315 0 1,760
Switzerland 681 754 384 0 1,819
Ukraine 668 767 410 0 1,845
Bulgaria 660 1,013 557 0 2,230
Norway 6SO 669 229 1 1,549
Estonia 644 65S 362 0 1,661
Netherlands 618 803 357 0 1,778
Hungary 616 599 329 0 1,544
Slovakia 582 833 383 12 1,810
Croatia 570 582 301 31 1,484
Cyprus 541 482 192 0 1,215
Denmark 530 761 319 0 1,610
Slovenia 523 S09 254 0 1,286
Total 21,410 22,561 10,820 197 ~,§§§
Table A4.7: 5umma!l: Skilled/Unskilled Distribution br Coun~
country Unskilled Skilled Don't know/milling Total
Russian Federation 1,106 1,406 0 2,512
Germany 1,539 1,207 5 2,751
Latvia 917 1,063 0 1,980
UK 1,299 1,(l38 15 2,352
Israel 1,437 1,037 16 2,490
Ukraine 892 948 5 1,845
Norway 864 679 6 1,549
Finland 1,522 672 1 2,195
France 1,429 642 2 2,073
Denmark 960 640 10 1.610
Sweden 1,191 631 8 1,830
Estonia 1,048 608 5 1,661
Belgium 1,180 571 9 1,760
Netherlands 1,206 571 1 1,778
Greece 1.536 536 0 2,072
Switzerland 1,299 516 4 1,819
Bulgaria 1,783 447 0 2,230
Spain 2,165 409 2 2,576
Cyprus 825 388 2 1,215
Romania 1,741 382 23 2,146
Poland 1,243 373 3 1,619
Croatia 1,166 315 3 1,484
Slovakia 1,502 297 11 1,810
Portugal 2,078 289 0 2,367
Slovenia 1,015 268 3 1,286
Hungary 1,300 243 1 1,544
Czech Republic 1,791 224 3 2,018
Turker
2,219 188 9 2,416
Total 38,253 16,588 147 54,988
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Table A4.8: Decrietive Statistics bl:::coun~ Citizenshie, Ethnic Minori~ Gender and worked Abroad
Country Sample Citizens (%) Ethnic Minori!l Male Female Worked abroad
Germany 2,751 96.4 4.3 52.7 47.3 3.7
Spain 2,576 93.1 3 47.4 52.6 6.7
Russian Federation 2,512 99.5 13.8 39.4 60.6 1.9
Israel 2,490 98.9 15.9 45.8 54.2 5.6
Turkey 2,416 99.9 6.5 46.7 53.4 3.3
Portugal 2,367 97.5 2.5 39.1 60.9 4.8
UK 2,352 96 6.9 45.8 54.2 5.4
Bulgaria 2,230 99.6 18.1 43.9 56.1 4.7
Finland 2,195 99.1 1.5 49.1 50.9 4.2
Romania 2,146 99.7 16.6 45 55 5.4
France 2,073 96.4 3.9 45.4 54.6 5
Greece urn 96.4 4.5 45.4 54.6 4.8
Czech Republic 2,018 99.5 2.4 48.8 51.2 6.6
Latvia 1,980 87 7.9 37.7 62.3 6
Ukraine 1,845 99.7 6 37.4 62.6 5.9
Sweden 1,830 96.2 3.1 SO.2 49.8 6.8
Switzerland 1,819 84.4 7.8 45.2 54.8 6.9
Slovakia 1,810 99.7 5.5 38 62 8.1
Netherlands 1,778 97.3 6.9 46 54 5.7
Belgium 1,760 93.6 4 49.1 SO.9 6.8
Estonia 1,661 82.6 21.1 42.4 57.6 8.4
Poland 1,619 100 1.6 47.2 52.8 6.8
Denmark 1,610 97.5 3.1 49.6 SO.4 4.5
Norway 1,549 95.4 4 52.1 47.9 3.8
Hungary 1,544 99.6 5.2 45.5 54.5 4.9
Croatia 1,484 99.8 7 43.1 56.9 6.3
Slovenia 1,286 99 2.2 46.4 53.7 3.6
Cl:::~rus 1,215 96.5 3.4 SO.5 49.6 7
Total 54,988 96.5 6.9 45.5 54.6 5.5
Table AU: Unemployment Rates and Proportion of Immigrant Poeulations bl:::Country
Subjective Estimates of Unemployment Rates Subjective Estimates of Immigrant Populations
Country Mean Country Mean
Switzerland 05-Sep Slovakia 05-Sep
Norway Oct-14 Czech Republic 05-Sep
Denmark Oct-14 Bulgaria 05-Sep
Czech Republic Oct-14 Finland 05-Sep
Cyprus Oct-14 Poland 05-Sep
Finland Oct-14 Hungary oS-Sep
Sweden Oct-14 Romania 05-Sep
Netherlands 15-19 Denmark Oct-14
Poland 15-19 Turkey Oct-14
Slovakia 15-19 Norway Oct-14
Germany 15-19 Croatia Oct-14
France 15-19 Portugal Oct-14
Estonia 20-24 Ukraine Oct-14
Slovenia 20-24 Sweden Oct-14
Israel 20-24 Estonia 15-19
UK 20-24 Greece 15-19
Belgium 20-24 Latvia 15-19
Greece 20-24 Netherlands 15-19
Spain 20-24 Slovenia 15-19
Romania 20-24 Cyprus 15-19
Russian Federation 25-29 Germany 15-19
Portugal 25-29 France 15-19
Croatia 25-29 Russian Federation 15-19
Bulgaria 25-29 Belgium 15-19
Latvia 25-29 Spain 15-19
Hungary 30-34 Switzerland 15-19
Turkey 30-34 UK 20-24
Ukraine 30-34 Israel 25-29
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Table A4.11: Results for Sensitivity Analyses: Models 5 and 6
Model 5 Model 6
Observations 24800 25300
X2(39)=2709 X2(39)=S758
0.0000 0.0000
Wald Test of overaU significance of model:
P-value
Rho(p) -0.3083'" -0.4014'"
[ Standard Error] (0.0397) (0.0354)
Wald Test of independent equations: X2 (1)=52.65 X2(1)=101.69
P-value 0.0000 0.0000
Gamma [Standard Error] 0.4516'" 0.4753++'
(0.0376) (0.0337)
Explanatory Variables (Equation 1) SWSE(1) IMPP SWSE(2) IMPP
Age -0.0018'" -0.0050'++ 0.0004 -0.0055'"
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Education level 0.0409'" 0.0387'" 0.0281'" 0.0350'"
(0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0063)
Citizen (born in country) -0.2444'" 0.0372 -0.1142'" -0.0191
(0.0306) (0.0357) (0.0316) (0.0341)
Citizen Parents -0.1255'" -0.0197 -0.0151 -0.0547"
(0.0238) (0.0267) (0.0249) (0.0257)
Ethnic Minority 0.0660" -0.0513 0.0188 -0.0233
(0.0320) (0.0358) (0.0321) (0.0363)
Female 0.0169 0.0462'" 0.0343" 0.0334"
(0.0133) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0143)
Retired 0.0097 -0.0204 -0.0608" 0.0125
(0.0227) (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0242)
Unemployment Rate -0.0121'" -0.0026 0.0172'" -0.0155'"
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0032)
Current Immigration Level -0.0158'" 0.0027
-0.0183'" 0.0061'
(0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0036)
Right-wing Political Inclination -0.0267'" -0.0347++' -0.0346'" -0.0262'"
(0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0041)
Household Income 0.0112'" -0.0012 -0.0061" 0.0070++
(0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Big City (lives in a big city) -0.0197'" 0.0024 -0.0013 -0.0027
(0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0059)
Pro-immigration Culture 0.1764'" 0.1819'"
(0.0046) (0.0048)
Instruments
Pension System Sustainability 0.0893'" 0.0907'"
(0.0098) (0.0098)
Efficiency of Tax Authorities 0.0362++' -0.0005
(0.0038) (0.0032)
Benefit Fraud 0.1567"++ 0.1772++'
(0.0073) (00080)
Robust standard errors In brackets. ~ significance at 10')'0;" significance at :;'Yo; .... significance at 1%. All regressions include country
dumrrucs for all counrncs except Germany (largest sample): coefficients for countries not reported in this table. The estimated cut points Cl
are also not reported.
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Table A4.12: Results for Sensitivity Anal~ses: Models 7 and 8
Model7 ModelS
Observations 24,700 25,300
Wald Test of overall significance: X2(39)=2715 X2(39)=5748
P·value 0.0000 0.0000
Rho(p) -0.3056'" -0.3950'"
[ Standard Error) (0.0397) (0.0353)
Wald Test of independent equations: X2(1)=51.89 X2 (] )=99.53
P-value 0.0000 0.0000
Gamma [Standard Error) 0.4495'" 0.4700'"
(0.0376) (0.0337)
Explanatory Variables (Equation 1) SWSE(1) IMPP SWSE(2) IMPP
Age -D.00]6'" -0.0047'" 0.0005 -D.0052'"
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Years of Schooling 0.0165*" 0.0156'" 0.0099'" 0.0155'"
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0022)
Citizen (born in country) -0.2394'" 0.0354 -0.1150'" -0.0187
(0.0307) (0.0357) (0.0316) (0.0341)
Citizen Parents -D.1252'" -0.D191 -0.0169 -0.0534"
(0.0238) (0.0268) (0.0249) (0.0258)
Ethnic Minority 0.0649" -0.0499 0.0165 -0.0217
(0.0320) (0.0358) (0.0321) (0.0362)
Female 0.0]75 0.0477"* 0.0347** 0.0349**
(0.0133) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0143)
Retired 0.0166 -0.0206 -0.0581*' 0.0136
(0.0228) (0.0246) (0.0237) (0.0243)
Unemployment Rate 0 -0.0118'" -0.0025 0.0174'" -0.0152*'*
subjective estimate (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0032)
Current Immigration Level 0 -0.0157*" 0.0024 -0.0181 • • - 0.0058
subjective estimate (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0036)
Right-wing Political Inclination -0.0264'" -0.0343*"
-0.0343'" -0.0261 ._-
(0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0041)
Household Income 0.0109'" -0.0013 -0.0058" 0.0064"
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Big City (lives in a big city) -0.0183'" 0.0043 -0.0005 -0.0006
(0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0059)
Pro-immigration Culture 0.1760'-- 0.1817'"
(0.0046) (0.0047)
Instruments
Pension System Sustainability 0 0.0886"- 0.0912**'
subjective view (0.0098) (0.0098)
Efficiency of Tax Authorities 0.0362'"
-0.0004
(0.0038) (0.0032)
Benefit Fraud 0.1574-'- 0.] 786'"
(0.0074) (0.0080)
Robust standard errors In brackets .» sigruficancc at lO'Yo;'" significance at 5%; u. significance at l"/tl. All regressions include country dummies
for all countnes except Cerrnany (I.lrgest sample); roefftcicnts for countries not reported in this table. The estimated cut points Cl an ..' also not
reported
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Table AU3: Results for Sensitivi!I Analyses: Models 9 and 10
Model9 ModellO
Observations 27629 28447
Wald Test: Overall 2429.37 6899.18
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Rho -0.450- -0.571·· '
Standard Error (0.053) (0.051)
Wald Test: Independent Equations 72.96 124.46
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000
Gamma 0.659"· 0.630···
Standard Error (0.038) (0.034)
Explanat Variables SWSE(t) IMPP SWSE(2) IMPP
Age-groups
Young (l6-4Oyrs): Reference Group
Middle-aged (41~yrs) -0.048- -0.101-' -0.006 -0.118"-
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Old and retired (66yr and above) -0.083·- -0.281-' -0.071- -0.252---
(0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
Skilled 0.150"· 0.154- 0.089-' 0.176···
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017)
Citizen -0.386- 0.014 -0.154'" -0.115"·
(0.038) (0.047) (0.038) (0.042)
Ethnic Minority 0.111-· -0.017 0.017 0.045
(0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)
Female 0.017 0.044"· 0.022· 0.035'"
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Unemployment Rale-Subjective
0-4 Percent: Reference Group
5-9 Percent -0.001 0.053' 0.060'· 0.008
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
10-14 Percent -0.059" 0.063" 0.011 0.015
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029)
15-19 Percent -0.056· 0.073- 0.026 0.014
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
20-24 Percent -O.IOS··· 0.094'- 0.053 -0.024
(0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
25-29 Percent -0.117- 0.036 0.108··· -0.104'"
(0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
30-34 Percent -0.091- 0.006 0.089" -0.100'"
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
35-39 Percent -0.112- 0.017 0.176'" -0.183'"
(0.043) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045)
40-44 Percent -0.088" -0.042 0.143'· ' -0.190·"
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.047)
45-49 Percent -0.075 -0.118·· 0.072 -0.202'"
(0.054) (0.058) (0.053) (0.054)
50 Percent and above -0.180'" 0.D11 0.122'" -0.173'"
(0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.040)
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Table A4.13: continued
Model9
Current Immigration Level- Subjective
0-4 Percent: Reference Group
5-9 Percent -0.026
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.021)
-0.044'
(0.024)
-0.030
(0.027)
-0.058'
(0.033)
-0.044
(0.034)
-0.123"
(0.049)
-0.200'"
(0.052)
-0.241'"
(0.068)
-0.097"
(0.048)
-0.098'"
(0.015)
0.087'"
(0.028)
10-14 Percent
15-19 Percent
20-24 Percent
25-29 Percen t
30-34 Percent
35-39 Percent
40-44 Percent
45-49 Percent
50 Percent and above
Right-wing Politicallnclination
Worked Abroad
Instruments
Pension sustainability 0.132'"
(0.013)
0.091'"
(0.014)
0.280'"
(0.015)
Efficiency of Tax Authorities
Benefit Fraud
Cut 11 and Cut 21 -1.836'"
(0.058)
-1.468'"
(0.057)
-1.013'"
(0.057)
-0.551'"
(0.056)
-0.181'"
(0.056)
0.776'"
(0.056)
1.105'"
(0.057)
1.515'"
(0.057)
2.000'"
(0.059)
2.328'"
(0.061)
Cut 12and Cut22
Cut 13 and Cut 23
CutU
Cut 15
Cut 16
Cut 17
Cut 1
Cut 19
Cut 110
0.043"
(0.022)
0.038'
(0.023)
0.033
(0.026)
-0.013
(0.029)
0.075"
(0.034)
0.017
(0.037)
0.031
(0.050)
-0.009
(0.052)
0.044
(0.067)
-0.047
(0.048)
-0.139'"
(0.017)
0.000
(0.030)
-1.461*"
(0.066)
-0.374'"
(0.055)
0.780'"
(0.055)
ModellO
-0.031 0.045"
(0.021) (0.021)
-0.082'" 0.085'"
(0.022) (0.023)
-0.157*" 0.101'"
(0.025) (0.026)
-0.111'" 0.038
(0.028) (0.029)
-0.159'" 0.138'"
(0.034) (0.035)
-0.137'" 0.074"
(0.035) (0.037)
-0.166'" 0.077
(0.048) (0.050)
-0.127*' -0.037
(0.050) (0.052)
-0.261'" 0.062
(0.067) (0.066)
-0.187'" 0.021
(0.045) (0.048)
-0.132'" -0.102'"
(0.015) (0.018)
-0.025 0.072"
(0.029) (0.029)
O.l1S·"
(0.012)
0.007
(0.012)
0.311'"
(0.016)
-0.622'" -1.354'"
(0.055) (0.063)
0.679'" -0.358'"
(0.055) (0.051)
1.318'" 0.710'"
(0.056) (0.051)
2.422'"
(0.057)
Robust standard error!' an brackets .• significance at 10%;" significance at 5%;·u significance at 1'Yo.All regressions include country dummies for ell!
countries except Germany (largest sample); coefficients for countries not reported in this table. The estimated cut points a arc also not reported
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
5.1 Summary of Main Findings
The studies in this thesis focus on immigration policies and their underpinnings from
the migrant destination country's point of view. The first study in chapter two under-
takes a panel data analysis of the determinants of migrant flows using administrative
immigration data for the UK from 1973 to 2005 to investigate what happens to migrant
flows when economic conditions in poor migrant sending countries begin to improve.
The study is motivated by the misconception that there is a linear relationship between
the level of economic development and emigration, such that, helping improve the ge-
neral economic conditions (through trade and aid) in poor countries would reduce the
rates of emigration from those countries to the developed world. This simplistic view
is apparent in the calls, by some scholars, politicians and development practitioners,
to promote economic development through trade and aid as a way of addressing the
root cause of migrant flows from poor countries.
However, the chapter argues that emigration will initially rise with economic develop-
ment (in the short to medium term) since development makes the needed resources
for migration available to potential migrants. Nevertheless, after a certain economic
development threshold any further economic development may lead to less emigra-
tion. Hence the chapter tests the hypothesis that:
There an inverse U-shaped relationship between economic development and migrant
flows from poor countries.
The chapter finds that this inverse U-shaped relationship generally exists for migrant
flows from developing countries to the UK, however, there is some heterogeneity in
the relationship across different country groupings.
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The second and third studies in the thesis focus on understanding the traditional
border immigration policies as well as the underlying immigration policy formulation
process. Recognising that individual attitudes towards immigration are key inputs
to any complete model of the immigration policymaking process, chapters three and
four of the thesis present reviews of the literature on individual attitudes towards
immigration and the results of a series of empirical analyses aimed at providing
relevant evidence on specific issues within this nexus of the literature.
Chapter three undertakes a broad analysis within the literature on individual attitudes
towards immigration by comparing the relative importance of cultural considerations
and economic concerns in shaping individual attitudes towards immigration. This
is motivated by the fact that, although cultural motivations (and other non-economic
factors in general) are recognised as important determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration, economic concerns are often regarded as overarching in the
literature. However, there is hardly any systematic evidence that establishes this idea.
The chapter therefore tests the hypothesis that:
Individual subjective assessments of the economic impacts of immigrants are more
important than their subjective assessment of the cultural impacts of immigrants in
shaping their attitudes towards immigration, irrespective of ethnic or racialpreferences.
The chapter however finds no robust evidence, based on the European Social Survey
data, to support the hypothesis and hence concludes that economic concerns are
not inherently more important than cultural concerns in shaping individual attitudes
towards immigration. The study points out that cultural considerations may just be
as important as (if not more than) economic concerns in shaping individual attitudes
towards immigration.
Chapter four focuses on the welfare state and attitudes towards immigration. Within
the context of aging populations in Europe and its consequences on the sustainability
of European social security systems, an immigration policy that allows predominantly
young workers (irrespective of their skill levels) to settle in the host country is
often seen as a simple solution, at least, while social security reforms are being
undertaken (Krieger, 2(05). However, the design and successful implementation of
such immigration policies depends on a good understanding of individual opinions
and immigration policy preferences. On the premise that individual opinions and
preferences are a result of the distributional impact of immigrants, chapter four
empirically examines the role of welfare state considerations in shaping individual
attitudes towards immigration.
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The chapter examines the extent to which individual immigration policy preferences
are determined by the concerns of residents about the effect of immigrants on the
welfare state, where the potential immigrants are perceived as predominantly less
skilled relative to the native population. Relying on established theoretical models
(Krieger, 2004; Scholten and Thurn, 1996), the chapter also tests the following two
empirical hypotheses:
i. Old and retired individuals are more likely to oppose immigration than young and
middle-aged individuals due to welfare state concerns
ii. Skilled individuals prefer more immigration than unskilled (low skilled) individuals
when social security concerns are taken into consideration.
Based on survey data, the chapter finds evidence to support the conclusion that there
is a strong, robust and positive correlation between the subjective views of individuals
regarding the effect of immigrants on the welfare state and individual immigration
policy preferences. Moreover, causality runs from the former to the latter. The
chapter also finds that, as a result of social security concerns in Europe, older (retired)
individuals are more likely than young and middle-aged individuals to prefer stricter
immigration policies, while unskilled (less educated) individuals are more likely than
skilled individuals to prefer stricter immigration policies. This finding leads to the
conclusion that inter-generational models of public pension and immigration policy
do a good job of predicting the effects of individual age/age groups and skill levels
on attitudes towards immigration.
The conclusions from chapter four highlight the fact that people's concerns about their
taxes and social benefits as a result of immigration in Europe are just as important
as, if not more important than, their labour market concerns, even though public
debates as well as economic research on the effects of immigrants tend to focus more
on employment and wage effects of migration. The findings also show that there
is a need for policy makers and social commentators to bring the issue of public
pension financing into the immigration policy debate arena to enrich the process of
immigration policy-making.
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5.2 Policy Implications
The studies in this thesis show that as poor developing countries become better
developed, the main migrant receiving countries should expect more migrant inflows
and emigration pressure (rather than less) at least in the short to medium run. This
means that border immigrations policies may need to be review periodically to take
account of changing economic situations in the main migrant sending countries.
It also means that successful legal immigrants from poor countries may typically be
of a higher income, education or social class compared to the average person in the
source countries. This therefore has implications both for the source and destination
countries. For the destination country, it indicates that there would be a flow of better-
skilled or better-equipped migrants rather than a reduction in the flow of immigrants
as a result of helping poor countries to develop. For source countries, it implies that
as they develop they loose more and more of their middle class to migration. This can
in tum slow down their development process and increase inequality further.
The thesis also provide evidence to show that cultural concerns are just as important as
economic concerns in shaping individual attitudes towards immigration. This means
that policies should not only be based on the economic impact of immigrants but the
cultural impacts as well. Policy debates and academic research should therefore focus
a bit more on cultural issues as well as issues migrant integration.
The thesis also concludes that welfare state concerns, particularly concerns about pen-
sion and tax burdens are important determinants of attitudes towards immigration.
This implies that there may be opportunities to employ strategically designed immi-
gration policies to deal with some of the problems associated with public pension
systems in Europe that emanate from high dependency ratios.
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Even though this thesis contributes more systematic evidence and new insights to
the literature, thereby improving the available knowledge on determinants of and
attitudes towards immigration, at least one limitation is worth noting. Given that the
European Social Survey data are not longitudinal, the analyses in Chapters three and
four are only able to deal with cross-country heterogeneity but are not able to properly
account for changes over time. Lack of panel data analyses may have Significant
consequences for the findings in Chapter three. This is because the relative weight
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that individuals may attach to economic and cultural concerns (with respect to their
attitudes towards immigration) may be subject to time varying economic conditions
that are not specific to their country but to the whole region or sub-regions.
For instance, Chapter three finds that, economic concerns are not substantially
more important than cultural considerations and, in fact, concludes that cultural
considerations may just be as important as economic concerns, for a survey that was
taken during the period of a general economic recession in Europe. However, it is
plausible that without the recession, cultural considerations may be more important
than economic concerns since the economic atmosphere may have caused individuals
to place more importance on economic concerns than they would normally do. Subject
to the availability of 'true' panel datasets, future studies may be able to explore the
time dimensions of the studies.
Lack of panel data analysis may also imply the the results for age in chapter four could
be attributed to a cohort effect rather that to age or age-group. Thus there is a need to
for future studies to employ panel data techniques to disentangle the effect of age and
cohort effects.
With regards to Chapter two, future studies may look at estimating the actual
threshold where development begins to have a negative impact on migrant flows from
developing countries. Future studies may also look at further exploring the observed
heterogeneity across different country groupings.
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